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 The Fourth Amendment only protects against government intrusions into spaces 
or information that receive a reasonable expectation of privacy—a subjective expectation 
of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable (Katz v. United States, 1967).  
Judges are tasked with determining when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.  But 
as evidenced by justices’ confusion at oral arguments in recent Supreme Court cases,   
judges do not always fully grasp new technology.  The current dissertation aims to guide 
courts attempting to navigate the new terrain of expectations of privacy in wired 
communications.  
 Scholars have expressed concern over the impact the ubiquity of wired 
communications may have on our expectation of privacy (Leary, 2011).  Three studies in 
the current dissertation examine the role age, experience with wired communications, and 
developmental decision making play in expectations of privacy.  Study 1 compares 
adolescents’ expectations of privacy to judicial decisions of whether a search violated the 
Fourth Amendment.  Consistent with prior research on lay adults’ expectations (Slobogin 
& Schumacher, 1993), adolescent participants agree with judges on extreme violations of 
privacy, but there are significant disagreement about several types of searches.  
     
 Study 2 asks participants to evaluate the privacy implications of various searches 
and examines whether these perceptions vary as a function of age, experience with social 
networking sites, impulsivity, or sensation seeking.  All three categories of variables—
age, experience, and developmental decision making—had different effects on privacy 
concerns.  
 Finally, Study 3 measures adolescent and young adult participants’ perception of 
the risk of sharing information online as participants create a profile on a “new” social 
networking site.  Participants do not appear to view the decision to share information as a 
risk and the amount of information shared publicly was not related to age, experience 
with social networking sites, or developmental decision making.  
 The results of the current study can be valuable in understanding how 
expectations of privacy change over time.  As we move our lives increasingly online, the 
Fourth Amendment must also evolve to continue to protect privacy interests.  
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How Can Teens Be Reasonable?  
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age 
 After Portland, Oregon, public officials openly claimed individuals give up all 
expectation of privacy in garbage placed at the curb for trash pick-up, two journalists set 
out “to turn the tables on three of [the] esteemed public officials” and “embarked on an 
unauthorized sightseeing tour of their garbage” (Lydgate & Budnick, 2017).  The 
journalists visited the homes of the local district attorney, police chief, and mayor, and 
collected items from their garbage, including: a receipt with a complete credit card 
number, an investment summary, a print-out of a private work-related email, and a 
newsletter from the Christian conservative organization Focus on the Family.  The mayor 
issued a press release calling the journalists’ actions “potentially illegal” and requested a 
meeting with the journalists and their attorney.  Despite the public officials’ prior stance 
on the lack of a privacy interest in garbage, they all reacted negatively to being the 
subject of such a search.  
Concerns about privacy are not new.  In 1949, George Orwell published a book 
set in the (then) future year of 1984, depicting a government that constantly monitors its 
citizens through the use of two-way television screens in homes, screening of written 
correspondence, and undercover agents acting as normal citizens (Orwell, 1949).  We are 
now more than three decades past the time period in which the book was set, and while 
not all of the book’s government practices actually are used now, numerous changes in 
daily life have impacted how much of our lives are on display.  From an innocent 
Christmas toy keeping watch over young children to report their behavior to Santa Clause 
(Pinto & Nemorin, 2014), to the revelation of a widespread government surveillance 
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program of citizens’ metadata from cellular phones and internet usage, recent 
developments have led scholars to express concern over the future of our privacy rights.  
A counselor to the United States president in 2017 expressed dismay over the ability to 
surveil individuals through the phones, television sets, and microwaves that all have 
camera capabilities (Memloi, 2017).  Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of one of the 
most popular social media sites—Facebook—declared there’s a new “social norm” of 
sharing information with others, and the chief executive of Sun Microsystems—a former 
computer and software company—famously quipped, “You have zero privacy anyway.  
Get over it” (Popkin, 2010).  Concern over the safety of our information may be well-
founded—recently, a journalist and data scientist pretended to be marketing a new 
product and purchased large datasets of German citizens’ internet browsing habits, and 
the researchers were able to identify individual browsers to the point they uncovered a 
local judge’s preference of pornography and the medication used by a German politician 
(Hern, 2017).   
Individuals sometimes exhibit behavior that seems completely contrary to any 
interest in privacy.  In October 2014, thirty-one adolescent students at a middle and high 
school in Oakland County, Michigan, were investigated on suspicion of manufacturing 
and distributing child pornography (Russell, 2014).  The adolescents under investigation 
looked very different from the stereotypical image of a child pornographer: middle-aged, 
White males who amass large collections of photography and videos that can involve 
hundreds of young children (Sentencing Commission Congressional Report, 2012).  In 
this case, several adolescent girls sent their peers naked photographs of themselves via 
text message; their peers then forwarded the pictures on to others (Russell, 2014).  Such 
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acts often fall under state and federal child pornography statutes, which criminalize 
producing or distributing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a 
minor (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251).  Many statutes apply even when the producer or 
distributor of the photographs is the minor depicted.  
 Oakland County is not the only community facing a so-called “sexting” scandal, 
where one indecent photo sent between under-aged paramours gets circulated among an 
entire school.  Twenty percent of adolescents age 13-19 report sending or posting on-line 
nude or semi-nude photographs of themselves (Lounsbury, Mitchell & Finkelhor, 2011).  
School districts, including Oakland County, have established educational campaigns that 
try to send the message that “once you hit ‘send,’ you lose control over that image 
forever” (Russell, 2014).  However, there is no evidence adolescents are refraining from 
sending these explicit text messages after hearing this message.  One possible reason is 
that adolescents have different expectations of privacy and this impacts their behaviors.  
This difference may be attributable to the development of risk-taking and decision-
making capabilities or to a “generation gap” such that teens today view privacy very 
differently and will continue to do so even when they are adults.  
 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures (U.S. Const., Amend IV).  While this Fourth 
Amendment protection does extend to minors, the nature of that protection can be 
different than it is for adults (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985).  Though case law and legal 
scholars have explored how the Fourth Amendment applies minors in the digital age, 
social science research can provide valuable insight to how adolescents evaluate their 
expectations of privacy.  Legal scholars have suggested adolescents exhibit lessened 
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expectations of privacy than do adults (Leary, 2010), but there is little empirical research 
to support this assumption.  Adolescents may differ from adults due to developmental 
differences in decision making and risk taking or due to generational differences in 
experiences with and views of privacy invasions.  If adolescents are different from adults 
due to generational differences, expectations of privacy may evolve over time, and 
evaluations of expectations at one point in time may not be accurate for future 
generations.  Therefore, it is important to examine how expectations of privacy differ 
with age and what factors have caused any differences.  
Chapter 1 of this dissertation examines how evolving expectations of privacy may 
impact Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  In Chapter 2, the dissertation outlines 
psychological theories that could be useful to the courts and legal theorists in developing 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including Steinberg’s Dual Systems Processing Model 
of Adolescent Risk Taking (2010) and Kahnemann’s (2003) dual processing model of 
decision making, as models for how adolescents may develop expectations of privacy.  
This dissertation also discusses legal decision making research that could be useful to 
provide a framework for how these theories should be applied to expectations of privacy.  
Chapter 3 describes the findings from three studies that aim to measure the application of 
psychological theories to adolescents’ expectations of privacy.  Finally, Chapter 4 
explains what the results of these studies tells us about the future of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that the right to 
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause” (U.S. Const., Amend. IV). While the text of the 
amendment contemplates a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, courts have 
crafted numerous other instances in which a search will be reasonable, such as searches 
incident to a lawful arrest (Trupiano v. United States, 1948), searches of things that are in 
plain view (Hester v. United States, 1924), and searches following a hot pursuit (United 
States v. Johnson, 2001).   
 The United States Constitution does not limit its applicability to adults, but 
neither does it specifically say that it provides rights and protections to minors (Garza, 
2010).  However, it is not true that “the Bill of Rights is for adults alone” (In re Gault, 
1967, pp. 13).  Like other constitutionally protected rights, the Fourth Amendment 
extends to minors.  The Fourth Amendment applies both in situations that are common to 
minors and adults (like in a criminal investigation, People v. Dilworth, 1996) and also in 
situations that are unique to minors (such as schools, T.L.O. v. New Jersey, 1985). 
Therefore, it is important to explore adolescents’ rights and how these rights are protected 
under the law. 
The Fourth Amendment Right to Be Free from Searches and Seizures 
 The Fourth Amendment of the United States protects “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures” (U.S. const., amend. IV). State actors, such as police officers, government 
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officials, and public school teachers, are prohibited from intruding on individuals 
reasonable expectations of privacy.  The first inquiry in any Fourth Amendment 
challenge of a search is to determine whether a search actually occurred (in other words, 
whether the person claiming a Fourth Amendment violation has “standing”), and only 
searches that violate a reasonable expectation of privacy fall within the Fourth 
Amendment.  The United States Supreme Court has formulated a two-prong test to 
evaluate whether an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated (Katz v. 
United States, 1967; Smith v. Maryland, 1979): (1) the individual claiming a violation of 
his or her Fourth Amendment right must have had a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the thing or place that was searched, and (2) that expectation of privacy must be one that 
society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  Thus, only searches in which an 
individual’s actual subjective expectation of privacy was violated, and there is also an 
objective expectation of privacy, receive Fourth Amendment protection.   
 In practice, however, courts may ignore claimed subjective expectations (Kerr, 
2015).  A review of 540 published cases evaluating expectations of privacy decided in 
2012 found only 43% of the opinions even mentioned the subjective prong, and even 
fewer—only 12%—applied the subjective prong to evaluate whether the individual had a 
subjective expectation of privacy.  In contrast, 93% of the opinions mentioned the 
objective prong and 80% conducted an analysis only of whether a claimed expectation of 
privacy was objectively reasonable.  Thus, it appears courts are not concerned with 
whether an individual claiming a Fourth Amendment violation had an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy, and focus more on whether any expectation of privacy, whether 
or not it exists, is one society is willing to recognize as reasonable.   
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 The Supreme Court itself appears to have anticipated the irrelevance of the 
subjective prong, at least in some circumstances.  In an early description of the 
reasonable expectations of privacy test, the Supreme Court opined that analyzing 
subjective expectations would be inadequate to protect privacy rights “where an 
individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-
recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,” such as where “the Government were 
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be 
subject to warrantless entry”  (Smith v. Maryland, 1979, pg. 740 FN5).  At least where 
the government takes action to undermine subjective expectations, the Supreme Court has 
foreseen, and in fact encouraged, ignoring subjective expectations.      
 Perhaps partially due to this clear unimportance of the subjective prong, courts 
have struggled with applying the reasonable expectations of privacy test.  Courts have 
difficulty with this test, in part, because the test is vague and requires consideration of 
many factors (Kerr, 2008).  Professor Kerr describes four models courts use in 
determining reasonable expectations of privacy: the probabilistic model, the private facts 
model, the positive law model, and the policy model.  Courts may select one, or multiple 
models, depending on the nature of the case.  The probabilistic model is a descriptive 
model that examines the likelihood information would become known to others or the 
government; the lower the likelihood of disclosure, the higher the reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  The private facts model looks at the nature of the information disclosed; if 
the information that was revealed was particularly private or personal, then there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.  This model is frequently utilized 
by courts examining claimed violations of privacy in new technology.  The positive law 
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model looks to non-Fourth Amendment sources of law, such as property rights, to find a 
legal source for an expectation of privacy.  Under this model, conduct that is prohibited 
in other areas of the law—violating trespass rights under property law, for example—will 
violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The fourth model, the policy model, asks the 
question of whether the police conduct at issue should be regulated by the Fourth 
Amendment.  This is a normative question that balances whether the search violates civil 
liberties with whether regulation would unnecessarily restrict police investigations.   
 According to Professor Kerr (2008), the reasonable expectations of privacy test is 
not, and should not be, just one test.  Instead, courts have various models from which to 
choose as the case requires.  The probabilistic, private facts, and positive law models are 
all “proxy” models, in which some benchmark—probability of disclosure, nature of the 
facts, and non-Fourth Amendment law—is used as a proxy for a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  However, in some situations, all three proxies do not adequately measure 
expectations, and that is when the policy model is particularly helpful in evaluating 
Fourth Amendment protections.   
 One difficulty in applying the reasonable expectations of privacy to a challenged 
search is the court must identify what state action constitutes the “search” itself for 
Fourth Amendment practices.  In recognition of this, courts have recently turned to the 
so-called mosaic approach (Kerr, 2012).  In this approach, courts analyze a series of 
police actions over time to create a “mosaic” of surveillance.  Though each individual 
action might not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, together the collective 
surveillance does.  For example, GPS surveillance of a car over a series of weeks does 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search even though a shorter segment, say GPS 
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surveillance of a few hours or a day, might not (United States v. Jones, 2012; United 
States v. Maynard, 2012).  
 Searches that violate a reasonable expectation of privacy are allowed under the 
Fourth Amendment if the official searching has obtained a warrant issued pursuant to 
probable cause (U.S. Const., amend IV).  The Supreme Court has defined probable cause 
as “where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they 
have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief 
by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed” (Brinegar v. United 
States, 1949).  Additionally, courts have balanced the degree of intrusion into a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with the needs of the government in searching to craft 
various other situations in which a search will be reasonable, including exigent 
circumstances such as hot pursuit (United States v. McConney, 1984; United States v. 
Johnson, 2001), searches subsequent to a lawful arrest (Trupiano v. United States, 1948), 
and searches of an automobile where the searcher has probable cause (Pennsylvania v. 
Labron, 1996).   
 The Fourth Amendment provides the greatest protections to areas and things that 
are viewed by society as requiring the most privacy.  Thus, individuals in their home 
receive the greatest protection under the Fourth Amendment, while areas that are 
traditionally open to the public or for regular intrusions are not as protected.  One 
doctrine courts use to evaluate expectations of privacy, the third party doctrine, examines 
whether an individual voluntarily provides otherwise-secret information to non-
government actors (United States v. Miller, 1976).  If so, the individual loses any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that property.  So, because people willingly share the 
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phone numbers they are dialing with the phone operator (Smith v. Maryland, 1979), the 
address they write on the outside of a package with the postal service (Ex Parte Jackson, 
1877), and the bank records they provide to their banker in order to conduct their 
business (United States v. Miller, 1976), people lack any expectation of privacy in this 
information and the government can obtain that information without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.    
Empirical Examinations of Expectations of Privacy 
A potential difficulty of the reasonable expectation of privacy test is that 
reasonable expectations of privacy are evaluated by judges and not by the individuals 
being searched.  This may result in a discrepancy between a searchee’s perceptions of the 
search and the judge’s perception, either because of personal differences between the 
judge and the searchee or because the searchee experienced the search in the first person 
while the judge is evaluating it in the third person.  
Slobogin and Schumacher (1993) compared undergraduate students’, law 
students’, and community members’ expectations of privacy to determinations made by 
the Supreme Court.  Participants evaluated, on a scale of 0 (not at all intrusive) to 100 
(extremely intrusive) a brief description of a search from a Fourth Amendment case 
already evaluated by the Court.  In addition, the researchers varied the perspective of the 
search: participants read one description of each search presented in the first person 
perspective (e.g., a search of your car), and an additional description of each search 
presented in the third person (e.g., a search of a car).  The researchers also varied whether 
the context (the underlying reason for the search) was included in the description of the 
search.  
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For most of the 50 search scenarios presented, the participants’ ratings of 
intrusiveness matched the Fourth Amendment protections the Court provided (Slobogin 
& Schumacher, 1993).  For example, participants rated searches such as a forced surgery 
of a suspect’s shoulder to retrieve a bullet and a search of a suspect’s bedroom as highly 
intrusive; these are both searches the Supreme Court held unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Participants perceived searches like looking in foliage in a public park and 
shining a flashlight down a dark alley next to someone’s home as not intrusive, and these 
are both searches the Supreme Court held did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
However, there were some key differences between Supreme Court rulings and 
participants’ ratings of intrusiveness.  Participants viewed use of undercover agents and a 
dog sniff of a vehicle as fairly intrusive, while the Supreme Court has held that these 
searches do not violate reasonable expectations of privacy.  In addition, participants rated 
searches presented in the first person perspective as more intrusive than those presented 
in the third person perspective, which the researchers took to demonstrate a “distancing 
effect” in evaluating expectations of privacy.  The researchers theorized that individuals 
rated first person searches as more intrusive because they felt more personal, and thus felt 
more intruded upon.  This research indicates that individuals may evaluate certain search 
scenarios differently than do the courts.   
Slobogin and Schumacher (1993) identified three aspects of searches that their lay 
participants used to evaluate intrusiveness: (1) guilt of person searched, (2) 
dangerousness of suspected activity, and (3) implied consent to the search.  Blumenthal, 
Adya, and Mogle (2009) sought to extend and replicate these findings using a “bottom-up 
approach” (multidimensional scaling) to determine the underlying constructs lay people 
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use to evaluate the intrusiveness of the search.  Participants in this study were presented 
with pairs of the same fifty searches Slobogin and Schumacher (1993) used, in addition 
to a Supreme Court case decided in the interim between the two studies.  Participants 
rated on a scale of 1 (not at all similar) to 7 (extremely similar) they believed the two 
searches to be (Blumenthal et. al., 2009).   
Using this approach, Blumenthal and colleagues (2009) determined lay 
individual’s use of several factors to evaluate searches.  The first factor is whether the 
search is of a person or of property.  The second factor is the perceived level of 
intrusiveness of the search.  Participants also focus on the act that constitutes the search, 
such as whether the search was merely looking or involved physically manipulating an 
object.  Lastly, to evaluate the search, individuals examine both whether permission was 
granted and the dangerousness of the suspected criminal activity.  These findings 
supported Slobogin and Schumacher’s (1993) hypothesis that people use guilt, 
dangerousness, and consent to evaluate the intrusiveness of a search.  The fact that 
laypeople use consent to evaluate the intrusiveness of a search mimics courts’ use of the 
third-party doctrine to evaluate whether a search occurred: both individuals and courts 
reason that if someone has voluntarily handed information over to a third party, that 
person no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.  Similarly, 
courts often look to the action of the search itself to help evaluate whether a search 
occurred.  For example, courts are likely to determine a search occurred if a state actor 
physically manipulated an object, such as by moving a radio to see what was hidden 
behind it (Arizona v. Hicks, 1987).  However, courts, unlike laypeople, do not—or at least 
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should not—consider whether evidence was found in evaluating whether a search 
occurred (Rachlinski, Guthrie, & Wistrich, 2011). 
Fradella, Morrow, Fischer, and Ireland (2010) identified different “zones” of 
privacy in Fourth Amendment cases and examined how expectations of privacy differ 
among the zones.  The zones included personal space (further divided into bodily privacy 
and territorial privacy), informational privacy, and communications privacy.  Fradella 
and colleagues presented participants with twenty-one fact patterns describing searches 
from Fourth Amendment cases and whether the court had held that the search violated 
expectations of privacy or not.  The fact patterns included searches from each of the 
different “zones” of privacy the researchers identified.  Participants indicated their 
support with the holding on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
The participants indicated the highest levels of agreement regarding expectations 
of privacy for issues involving bodily privacy, such as strip searches, and showed greater 
expectations of privacy in territorial privacy than what the Supreme Court has previously 
protected (Fradella et al., 2010).  Participants also indicated greater expectations of 
privacy in informational and communications privacy than what Court rulings protect.  
For example, 85.5% of participants indicated they disagreed with the Court holding in 
United States v. Knotts (1983) that the Fourth Amendment did not prevent state officials 
from using a tracking beeper to track the movements of a vehicle.  Fradella and 
colleagues included searches of students in a school setting.  Participants (the average age 
was 23) agreed with cases that upheld invasions of students’ territorial privacy.  
Participants largely disagreed with a prior Supreme Court ruling holding a school’s drug 
testing policy did not violate students’ expectations of privacy, indicating participants 
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believed such policies did violate privacy rights.  While lay individuals report similar 
level of expectations of privacy that the Supreme Court protects in some court decisions, 
there are certain domains or types of privacy that individuals report higher expectations 
of privacy than the Court finds. 
McCallister (2012) focused on the probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment in asking participants whether they believed police should get a warrant 
before attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle.  Instead of varying the type of 
information searched, McCallister asked participants whether their view of the warrant 
requirement was different based on the identity of the person being tracked: an individual 
suspected of being a drug dealer, an individual suspected of being a serial killer, an 
individual suspected of being a terrorist, a convicted felon currently suspected of an 
unspecified crime, a person who had never been convicted of a crime but was currently 
suspected of an unspecified crime, a convicted felon who was not currently suspected of 
any crime, and a person who had never been convicted of a crime and was not currently 
suspected of committing any crime (a “true” innocent).  Participants supported the 
warrant requirement for a GPS tracking device, regardless of the suspected guilt of the 
individual being tracked.  
Scott-Hayward and colleagues (2015) surveyed American adults for their opinion 
on the burden of proof law enforcement should have to have before conducting certain 
types of searches of online information: no proof, gut instinct, reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, or never.  The majority of participants reported they thought probable 
cause should be required for law enforcement to access location tracking data, social 
media profiles, cell phones, and email address.  Older adults reported more expectations 
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of privacy in social media posts shared with friends, online purchase history, and online 
television shows watched than did younger adults, while younger adults reported more 
privacy expectations in GPS location data than did older adults.   
Smith, Madden, and Barton (2016) extended this research and found, consistent 
with Fradella and colleagues, participants overwhelmingly disapproved of governmental 
intrusions into territorial spaces without a warrant, even ones the Supreme Court has 
allowed such as aerial surveillance.  Consistent with court holdings in United States v. 
Jones and Riley v. California, participants disapproved of police tracking suspects with a 
GPS tracking device or searching a cell phone.  And, perhaps helpful to the Court’s 
upcoming decision in Carpenter v. United States (see below), participants were also 
disapproving of law enforcement tracking suspects via cell phone tower information.  
Overall, the available research indicates discrepancies between judges’ and lay 
adults’ expectations of privacy, and between lay individuals of different demographics 
(e.g., law students and non-students).  These discrepancies may be especially large when 
judges evaluate new technology that has become ingrained in daily life.  
Reasonable expectations of privacy and electronic communication devices. 
Advances in technology can create problems for the Supreme Court analyzing reasonable 
expectations of privacy; the Ninth Circuit recently called electronic communications such 
as e-mails and text messages a “new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence” (Quon 
v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 2010, pg. 904).  The Supreme Court has cautioned 
against determining reasonable expectations of privacy before technological device’s role 
in society becomes clear (City of Ontario v. Quon, 2010).  As new devices are developed 
and become popular, courts have to determine what types of searches the Fourth 
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Amendment protects.  In addition, cases often take years to work their way to the 
Supreme Court, so by the time the Supreme Court evaluates expectations of privacy on a 
certain device, that type of device may be outdated.  For example, the Supreme Court 
decided a case regarding expectations of privacy in text messaging beepers in 2010, long 
after beepers first became popular (City of Ontario v. Quon, 2010), and did not decide a 
case involving cell phones until 2014, forty years after the first mobile phone call was 
made (Riley v. California, 2014).   
 Courts often reason by analogy, and try to determine Fourth Amendment 
protections of electronic communications by comparing them to more traditional types of 
information.  In 1979, the Supreme Court held individuals do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in phone numbers they dial because they voluntarily share the 
information with the telephone company (Smith v. Maryland, 1979).  The Court 
compared the issue to one they had decided a few years before in United States v. Miller 
(1976).  In that case, the Court held bank customers do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their banking transactions because they voluntarily convey that information 
to the bank.  To the Court, telephone numbers shared with a telephone company were the 
same as banking information conveyed with the bank.  Legal scholars (e.g., Clancy, 
2005) attempt to similarly compare electronic communications to different types of 
information to reason what level of protection the Fourth Amendment provides.  For 
example, Clancy (2005) argues that computers are “closed containers” and, thus, any 
information stored on the physical hard drive should be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  However, computer users may not have reasonable expectations of privacy 
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in information voluntarily transmitted to third parties, such as the URL of visited 
websites.   
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of reasonable expectations of 
privacy in cellular phones (Riley v. California, 2014; United States v. Wurie, 2014).  Both 
cases involved a search of a suspect’s cell phone shortly after the suspect’s arrest.  In 
general, police can search a suspect incident to their arrest to search for dangerous 
weapons or evidence of the crime that led to the arrest.  Several lower courts had held 
police can search suspects’ cell phones incident to their arrest, comparing cell phones to 
other objects that may be hiding a weapon or evidence.  The Supreme Court held that 
officers generally cannot search a suspect’s cell phone incident to arrest without a 
warrant.  Chief Justice Roberts indicated “cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person” (Riley v. 
California, 2014, pp. 17).  The Court noted the data stored on a cell phone cannot itself 
be used as a weapon to physically endanger an arresting officer; in addition, officers can 
store a cell phone while they wait for a warrant to prevent suspects from deleting 
information stored on it.  Though the Court did not explicitly address the issue of 
reasonable expectations of privacy in cellular devices, the opinion indicates the Court 
recognizes that individuals subjectively feel differently about information stored on their 
cell phones than they do about other types of information.   
One relatively new area for the courts to evaluate is location tracking data.  The 
Supreme Court held attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle and tracking the 
vehicle’s travel on public streets for 28 days was a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment (United States v. Jones, 2012), but law enforcement has many ways of 
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tracking the location of individuals.  Cell site location information (CSLI) uses signals a 
cell phone “pings” to nearby towers to establish an approximate location, and cell phone 
companies often store both historical and prospective CSLI (NACDL, 2016).  Police 
officers may subpoena service providers for this information to determine where a 
suspect was at the time of a crime.  Under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.  
Sections 2701-2712, service providers must disclose these types of records when 
“specific and articulable facts” provide reasonable ground to believe the records are 
relevant and material to a criminal investigation.  The Sixth Circuit distinguished the use 
of such records from the GPS tracking device analyzed in Jones, because individuals 
have a lessened expectation of privacy in a third party’s business records and CSLI is not 
as accurate as GPS tracking so it does not provide as much detail into the individual’s 
daily life (United States v. Carpenter, 2016).  The Fourth (United States v. Graham, 
2016) and Eleventh Circuits (United States v. Davis, 2015) reached the same conclusion 
as the Sixth, determining law enforcement’s use of historical CSLI was not a Fourth 
Amendment search.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Carpenter and will 
weigh in on this issue in the 2017-2018 term.    
At oral arguments in Carpenter, the Justices exhibited varying views on 
expectations of privacy in the digital age.  Justice Elena Kagan noted technology, like the 
GPS tracking the Court evaluated in United States v. Jones, now allows law enforcement 
to conduct 24/7 surveillance of individuals with minimal effort (Carpenter v. United 
States, oral argument at 48).  Justice Sonya Sotomayor mused about the ubiquity of cell 
phones and analogized to the Court’s prior determination that a tracking beeper inside 
someone’s home was subject to Fourth Amendment protections:  “I know people who 
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take phones into public restrooms.  They take them with them everywhere.  It’s an 
appendage now for some people.  If it’s not okay to put a beeper into someone’s 
bedroom, why is it okay to use the signals that phone is using from that person’s 
bedroom, made accessible to law enforcement without probable cause?” (Carpenter, oral 
argument at 44). 
The Court’s newest justice, Justice Gorsuch, appeared to focus on the positive law 
model of the Fourth Amendment, inquiring about how state law would handle a non-
government actor accessing CSLI (Carpenter, oral argument at 39).  Chief Justice 
Roberts questioned the applicability of the third party doctrine, in light of his opinion in 
Riley that cell phones hold such a vast multitude of information that, necessarily, must be 
shared with a third party.  To the Chief Justice, Riley “emphasized that you really don’t 
have a choice these days if you want to have a cell phone” (Carpenter, oral argument at 
80-81).  
As recent court cases demonstrate, the use of social media has been on the rise in 
recent years and presents new challenges for courts evaluating expectations of privacy.  
The Montana State Supreme Court addressed the issue of reasonable expectations of 
privacy in a Social Networking Site profile (Montana v. Windham, 2015).  In this case, an 
undercover police officer gained access to the defendant’s Facebook profile by 
pretending to be a 16-year-old girl.  Police then sought to use evidence obtained from the 
defendant’s profile page against him at his trial for charges of child pornography.  The 
Montana Supreme Court found the defendant had both a subjective and objective 
expectation of privacy in the information he posted on Facebook.  The defendant had 
utilized all of Facebook’s privacy settings to keep others from accessing his information 
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without permission.  The court compared the defendant’s Facebook profile to a living 
room: the defendant’s Facebook profile was like a living room where he was hosting a 
party with friends a family, and private messages were like the defendant pulling a friend 
into his bedroom and closing the door to have a private conversation.  The defendant 
maintained an expectation of privacy of the events that occurred in his living room even 
though he invited others inside (like “friending” someone on Facebook), and the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy is even greater in the private conversation (like the 
instant message on Facebook) because he took further steps to keep that information 
private.  In addition, the court cited the widespread popularity of Facebook in reasoning 
that society recognizes the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable.  The court 
pointed out that millions of people use Facebook to keep in touch with family and 
communicate, therefore people expect the information to remain private.  The court found 
the search was unreasonable.   
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota has also found an 
expectation of privacy in private messages sent over Social Networking Sites (R.S. v. 
Minnewaska Area School District, 2012).  Here, a school required a student to turn over 
her Facebook and email passwords after the school learned the student was having 
sexually explicit conversations with another student while off-campus.  The court held 
that Facebook messages, like emails, are inherently private and thus users have both a 
subjective and objective expectation of privacy.  Thus, without a warrant or other 
exception to the warrant requirement, the school could not search R.S.’s private messages 
or emails.     
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The Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether misplaced 
trust in a “friend” on a social networking site is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
(Everett v. State of Delaware, 2018).  A Delaware detective created a fake Facebook 
profile with a fake name, picture, and other information, and used that page to monitor 
the defendant, Everett.  At some point the detective sent Everett a friend request, which 
the defendant accepted.  As a result of that acceptance, the detective had access to all the 
information Everett posted on his Facebook page, even that information he restricted to 
his inner circle.  One piece of information—a photograph of a handgun on Everett’s 
nightstand—led to a warrant and Everett’s eventual arrest.  
The Delaware court likened Everett’s mistaken trust in accepting the fake 
profile’s friend request to a defendant providing information to an undercover officer, a 
situation the Supreme Court determined was not a violation of Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights in Hoffa v. United States (Everett v. State of Delaware, 2018).  According 
to the Delaware court, individuals assume the risk that one of their social network friends 
may be an undercover officer or may share information with law enforcement.  Thus, at 
least in Delaware, users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
willingly posted to social media and accessed by law enforcement.  
A potential concern is that courts are not able to adequately gauge expectations of 
privacy—either subjective or objective—in electronic communication devices due to a 
lack of experience with new technology (Leary, 2015).  As discussed below, “digital 
natives” are those who were born into a world constantly connected to the internet and 
began using electronic communication devices from a young age.  The Federal Judicial 
Center estimated the average age of federal judges as 68 years (Federal Judicial Center, 
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2015), and the average age of the current Supreme Court justices according to their 
birthdates on the Supreme Court website is also 68 years.  According to recent census 
data, the median age of the United States population is less than 38 years old (Cook, 
2015)—and a difference of thirty years can mean drastic differences in knowledge of and 
experience with electronic devices.   
The justices’ questions and comments have highlighted this potential gap between 
Supreme Court justices’ and the average person’s understanding of technology.  For 
example, during oral arguments for a case examining Fourth Amendment interests in an 
employer-provided text messaging pager, Chief Justice Roberts questioned: “Maybe 
everybody else knows this, but what is the difference between the pager and the email?” 
(City of Ontario v. Quon, 2010, oral arguments at 29).  The Chief Justice—who is 
undeniably well-educated—also was unaware text messages are first sent to a service 
provider before being sent to the recipient, opining that he thought, “You push a button, it 
goes right to the other thing” (Quon, oral arguments at 36).  Justice Kennedy also 
wondered what happens if a text message is sent at the same time one is received, asking, 
“Does it say, ‘Your call is important to us, and we will get back to you?’” (Quon, oral 
arguments at 44).  Chief Justice Roberts also appeared not to believe an attorney’s 
assertion that there are many innocent reasons people would have multiple cell phones at 
the same time (Riley v. California, 2014, oral arguments at 50).  Justice Kagan has 
publicly admitted the justices are “basically clueless when it comes to technology” 
(Oremus, 2013).  The late Justice Scalia expressed his distaste for social media, calling it 
evidence of a “narcissistic society” that people want to put minute details of their life out 
there for everyone to see (Senior, 2013).   
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This lack of experience is particularly concerning because lay people view the 
information stored on electronic communication devices as very private (Kugler, 2014).  
Adults in the United States rate searches of content on electronic communication devices, 
such as the content of emails or text messages, as nearly as intrusive as strip searches and 
body cavity searches, the type of searches the Supreme Court has found to have full 
Fourth Amendment protection.  In addition, searches of electronic content is rated as 
more intrusive, more revealing of private information, and more embarrassing than 
searches of content stored in physical property, such as papers held in a briefcase.  This 
empirical study suggests lay people have privacy expectations in electronic content 
comparable to their privacy expectations in their personal body, but it remains to be seen 
whether courts recognize a similar expectation.    
Are We Losing Any Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? 
 Many scholars have expressed dissatisfaction with the reasonable expectations of 
privacy test, even pointing out that under the test “privacy is a legal fiction” (Pearlman & 
Lee, 2015, pg. 7560).  A major criticism of the reasonable expectations of privacy test is 
that it is inherently circular: legal pronunciations of what reasonable expectations of 
privacy people hold can impact actual expectations of privacy held by individuals, which 
in turn impact legal pronunciations of what reasonable expectations of privacy people 
hold (Kugler, 2017).  Legal scholars and Supreme Court justices have expressed concern 
with this test because, as it is inherently circular, it is a subjective test and does not 
provide guidance to how to apply it to lower courts.  Circularity resulting from 
application of this test can be either doctrinal—to determine whether someone has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, look to whether the legal cases says there is a 
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reasonable expectation of privacy—or attitudinal, asking whether societal understandings 
of privacy expectations are affected by legal pronunciations of privacy expectations.   
 But circularity might not be as big of a problem as some scholars suggest in light 
of the fact legal decisions determining Fourth Amendment rights are not well-known and, 
even if they are, do little to change public perceptions (Kugler, 2017).  Kugler surveyed 
American citizens just prior to, immediately after, one year after, and two years after the 
Supreme Court handed down a decision evaluating reasonable expectations of privacy in 
cell phones.  Perceptions of intrusiveness in searches of cell phones increased directly 
after the Riley v. California decision, but were comparable to pre-Riley ratings one year 
and two years later.  There was no difference in perceptions of intrusiveness pre- and 
post-Riley for different types of searches, such as a search of property.  Those participants 
who had heard of the Riley decision had stronger expectations of privacy in their cell 
phones than did participants who had not heard of the Riley decision, which provides 
support for the claim Fourth Amendment decisions impact expectations of privacy, but 
this difference had disappeared one year after the decision.  Thus, any impact on 
expectations of privacy is short lived and likely does not do much to change the course of 
societal privacy expectations.   
 Other scholars point to technology eroding expectations of privacy and any 
meaning to the Fourth Amendment (Leary, 2011).  With the rise in popularity of cell 
phones, email, and the internet, individuals are sharing more and more information with 
countless others at the touch of a button.  Social media sites such as Facebook and 
Instagram let users post every facet of their lives for others to see, from what they ate for 
breakfast to the TV shows they are watching after work.  Technology has also enabled 
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government surveillance of individuals: GPS and cell phone towers provide location data, 
while browsing history and communications can reveal criminal activity.  Baxter (2011) 
theorizes digital natives, those who grew up with technology, never really had privacy so 
they are not aware of the implications of any further encroachment on their rights.   
 As Justice Blackmun wrote in 1976, the government can easily eliminate any 
expectations of privacy by announcing a widespread “Big Brother” type of surveillance 
program (Smith v. Maryland, 1976).  As far-fetched as constant surveillance of private 
activities may seem, something not too far off was revealed in June 2013.  A National 
Security Agency sub-contractor copied thousands of classified documents regarding a 
national global surveillance scheme (Greenwald, MacAskill & Poira, 2013).  One such 
program, PRISM, allowed the government to access citizens’ Google and Yahoo 
accounts (Lee, 2013), while other programs included mass data collection of cell phone 
records such as location tracking data and phone numbers dialed.  These leaks were 
widely reported in both America and abroad and have been cited as an example of a 
major event that could erode expectations of privacy (Tokson, 2016).   
 Data on online behavior does show a slight effect of the NSA surveillance 
programs.  Marthews and Tucker (2017) analyzed search terms using Google trends both 
before and after the revelation of the mass surveillance programs.  The researchers 
compiled a list of sensitive search terms from a variety of sources, including the 
Department of Homeland Security’s list of suspicious terms (e.g., chemical agent, 
emergency response, hostage), pilot testing on embarrassing terms (e.g., alcoholics 
anonymous, debt consolidation, honey boo boo), and Google’s top search terms (e.g., 
Aaron Hernandez, royal baby, World War Z), and examined data on the frequency of 
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searches for those terms both before June 2013 and after.  Those search terms that were 
rated as highly likely to get people in trouble with the United States government were 
searched less frequently after the mass surveillance programs were released, while those 
terms rated as unlikely to get people in trouble were searched more frequently.  This 
effect was observed in eleven countries outside of the United States.  According to 
Marthews and Tucker, individuals may be deliberately refraining from searching for 
information due to fear of surveillance and punishment from the government.   
 A similar chilling effect was observed pre- and post-June 2013 in Wikipedia 
article visits.  Penney (2016) examined the number of monthly visits to Wikipedia articles 
on topics present on the Department of Homeland Security’s list of suspicious terms the 
DHS uses to monitor internet activity.  Immediately after the NSA surveillance programs 
were revealed, the sensitive terms exhibited a 30% drop in number of visits.  An 
interrupted time series design tracking monthly visits both prior to and after the reveal 
demonstrated this drop was due to the leaks: prior to the leaks, the number of monthly 
views for the sensitive information was trending upwards, while after the leaks the 
number of monthly views sharply dropped and continued decreasing over time.  The 
same trend was not observed for articles relating to domestic security issues, 
infrastructure issues, or Wikipedia’s most popular searches.   
 Preibusch (2015) measured privacy-protecting behaviors both before and after the 
2013 leak of government-sponsored NSA surveillance.  Preibusch found a slight increase 
in searches related to NSA, surveillance, and government immediately after the 
surveillance program was revealed—most likely due to individuals searching for stories 
related to the leaks—and this increase returned to baseline levels after a short time.  The 
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use of Tor, software that inhibits tracking of information online, increased three weeks 
after the leaks, but the increase was not sustained over time.  Use of privacy options on 
an internet browser also slightly increased, but again the behavior change did not last 
long.   
 Though the empirical data is inconclusive, it does appear government programs 
may change the actions individuals take to protect their privacy, at least in the short term.  
The same programs may also affect the expectations of privacy society is willing to 
recognize as reasonable: if most people voluntarily share information online, and most 
people know the government keeps track of the information they do share, can any 
expectation of privacy in online information be reasonable?  Due to this concern over 
technology and government intrusions changing expectations, several scholars have 
proposed amending or abandoning the reasonable expectation of privacy test.   
Some scholars call for a complete abandonment of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test in exchange for a normative or regulatory approach.  Gardner (2014) would 
restate the standing requirement for Fourth Amendment searches as whether society 
should allow law enforcement officers to conduct such a search.  This would involve a 
balancing between the impact of the search conduct on society’s sense of security with 
the utility of the conduct as a law enforcement technique.   
If the aim is to adopt a “technological neutral” approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, in which the function of the Fourth Amendment stays the same as 
technology advances, Kerr (2009) proposes a distinction between coding and content 
information.  Kerr argues the reasonable expectation of privacy test is actually a legal 
fiction because the case law does not, and likely cannot, mirror actual societal 
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expectations.  Instead, Kerr would take a normative approach and decide what types of 
information we should protect.  A coding-content distinction would protect all 
information that is the “content” of a communication, but the addressing or coding 
information such as the email address or phone number to which the message is sent is 
not protected.  Kerr sees similarities between this approach and the more traditional 
approach used for physical property: there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
anything located “inside” physical property (such as property inside of a home), but not 
in anything that is “outside.”    
 Of particular concern is the extension of the third party doctrine to information 
shared online.  As discussed above, in the Fourth Amendment context, the third party 
doctrine holds no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared 
with others (United States v. Miller, 1976).  Thus, much information shared via 
communications—telephone numbers dialed, addresses written on packages—are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are necessarily shared with others to 
facilitate the communication.  The same would hold for information communicated 
online.  All information shared online, from websites visited to emails sent, are shared 
with third-party Internet Service Providers (ISPs).  Similarly, all communications via 
cellular phones, including text messages, phone numbers dialed, and locations visited, are 
shared with the cell phone provider.   
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones (2012), 
opined “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” 
because the third party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a 
29 
 
     
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks” (pg. 957).  Johnson (2017) argues the third party doctrine is not 
applicable to internet communications because most people lack a complete 
understanding of how the service providers are using the information.  Bedi (2013) calls 
for an exception to the third party doctrine for online communications that are part of a 
“bona fide relationship.”  As Bedi points out, courts have protected interpersonal 
relationships in other legal arenas, such as substantive due process.  Though online 
communications do require disclosure to ISPs, according to Bedi this disclosure should 
not prevent Fourth Amendment protection because the ISP is not part of the personal 
relationship and communications are vital to such relationships.    
 Some scholars attempt to analogize to other Fourth Amendment case law to 
provide a framework for analyzing electronic communication privacy expectations.  
Ferguson (2016) would incorporate into the reasonable expectation of privacy test a 
concept of digital curtilage.  Courts have long-recognized a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the curtilage of a home, the property immediately adjacent to a home and 
associated with the “sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” (United States v. 
Boyd, 1886, pg. 630).  Ferguson would have courts also recognize a limited protection 
for personal data stored on electronic communication devices.  This new doctrine would 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in all stored data and communications that 
are closely associated with the device, marked as secure from other users, and implicate a 
personal or family-use interest.   
Findlay (2008) compares social networking sites to a home, the type of property 
that has traditionally received the fullest Fourth Amendment protections.  According to 
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Findlay, social networking profiles are comparable to homes because they generally 
require specific permission to enter while close friends have open access to everything 
inside, there are mechanisms in place to protect unwanted intrusions, and people bare the 
most private, sensitive facts inside.  Thus, in Findlay’s view, social networking sites, at 
least dependent on one’s privacy settings, should receive just as much Fourth 
Amendment protection as does the interior of a home.  In contrast, Pearlman and Lee 
(2015) argue the internet is nothing like one’s home, but more like valet parking, where 
you place your prized information into someone else’s hands and you hope you can trust 
them not to give it away.   
 Leonetti (2016) suggests courts have a wide latitude in applying the reasonable 
expectations of privacy test and this latitude has “eviscerated many Fourth Amendment 
protections” (pg. 6).  Instead, Leonetti would have courts look to other sources of law, 
particularly property principles such as trespass, nuisance, and theft, to determine what 
types of property should be protected by the Fourth Amendment.  This test would 
primarily revolve around whether an individual has the right to exclude others from the 
property or from seeing the information, and would empower Congress to create (or 
destroy) “zones” of protected privacy by enacting statutes that create (or destroy) 
property interests.   
 Baxter (2011) argues for a reformulation of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test that would abandon the subjective prong and inquire only into the objective 
reasonableness of the expectation.  This objective test, according to Baxter, would ask 
two questions: (1) whether the individual took steps to limit others’ access to the property 
or information, and (2) is society prepared to protect the property or information from 
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government intrusion?  This test is very fact-specific, particularly for new electronic 
communications such as for social media sites, and would require courts to examine 
details such as the number of “friends” the user has provided access and the use of 
privacy settings on the profile.   
 Still other scholars claim changing the doctrine will not do enough to protect 
privacy.  Former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Kozinski and Nguyen (2011) point out the 
increasing use of sharing information online does not necessarily mean individuals are 
willingly giving up privacy, because many people are unaware of how their information 
is stored and shared.  They argue an educational campaign, along with government 
regulation of information disclosures and courts adapting the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, can help protect privacy interests.  Leary (2015) calls on Fourth Amendment 
litigants to provide courts with better evidence of technological capabilities and privacy 
expectations, and on legislatures to pass laws to protect privacy interests.  Kerr (2016) 
similarly describes legislation and case law as independent and parallel systems that can 
help protect privacy interests.  Scott (2017) expresses concern the Fourth Amendment 
cannot adequately protect privacy interests and society needs better community oversight 
to fill the gap.   
The concern over the adequacy of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in 
light of the changing ways we share information is highlighted by an additional struggle 
of applying the Fourth Amendment to a subset of the population that may have different 
privacy expectations and may use technology in a very different way than do adults: 
juveniles.  
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Juveniles’ Place in the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of electronic devices and 
juveniles.  This may be a particularly important issue to address because Millennials 
(those born in 1980 or after) are the first generation to “grow up” with digital 
communications.  This generation has never experienced a world where digital 
communications, including cell phones, e-mails, and instant messaging, did not exist.  
Thus, their expectations of privacy regarding electronic devices may be different than 
expectations of people who remember a time before such devices.  Research discussed 
above demonstrates adults’ assessment of reasonable expectations of privacy corresponds 
with courts’ assessment on some types of searches, but not others, and may be affected 
by awareness of government privacy intrusions.  In addition, adults may use certain 
domains or dimensions, such as intrusiveness or the type of privacy interest involved, to 
evaluate the search.  No known research has examined whether adolescents use the same 
domains when establishing expectations of privacy.      
Juveniles’ right to be free from searches and seizures differ from adults’ in 
various ways.  Courts may view juveniles’ expectations of privacy differently than they 
do adults’ because courts may expect juveniles to be different; courts may also see the 
need for governmental intrusion as more important or more justified for juveniles than for 
adults.  In general, juveniles have been afforded the same constitutional rights as adults, 
except in a few circumstances.  The Supreme Court of the United States held the 
protections in the Constitution for criminal suspects and defendants extend to minors, 
including the right against self-incrimination and the right to an attorney (In re Gault, 
1967).  Certain rights are not extended to juveniles, such as the right to be tried by a jury 
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of their peers, but the rights afford to criminal defendants at the procedural stage of an 
investigation (the so-called Miranda rights and the Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from searches and seizures) are afforded to minors.    
For Fourth Amendment challenges, the Supreme Court uses the same standard to 
evaluate searches of juveniles as searches of adults: whether the search violated an 
expectation of privacy that the juvenile actually had (a subjective expectation) and that 
expectation is one society is willing to recognize as reasonable (objective expectation) 
(Lanes v. State of Texas, 1989).  Courts have not been as clear, however, in defining what 
“society” is relevant in evaluating the objective expectation of privacy.   
Perspectives on Appropriate Policies: Protectionism and Personhood  
 Legal scholars (e.g., Gardner & Proffitt Dupre, 2012) recognize that defining 
juveniles’ rights is particularly difficult because it involves three sets of interests: the 
juvenile’s, the parent or guardian’s, and the government’s.  Two different, and often 
conflicting, theories may be used in defining adolescent rights: protectionism and 
personhood (Gardner & Proffitt Dupre, 2012).  Courts and policymakers are often 
inconsistent in using these two theories.  
The protectionist theory (Hafen, 1976) emphasizes juveniles’ vulnerability and 
dependence by highlighting their rights to receive care, affection, and guidance.  
According to some theorists, the protectionist view recognizes the “political reality” that 
children must be subject to the discretion of adults (i.e., protected by adults) until they 
reach an age where they have the capacity to make their own decisions (presumably, the 
age of majority) (Coons, 1985).  Coons argues the protectionist theory actually does 
protect juveniles’ choice because parents and guardians will allow their children to make 
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decisions to varying degrees as the children get older.  Policies that allow children to 
make choices independent of their parents would conflict with the autonomy of the 
supervising adults and impinge on the parent’s right to custody and control of their 
children (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923).  For example, compulsory education laws often 
require children to attend school until the age of 16; parents can consent to children un-
enrolling from school at a younger age in some circumstances, but younger children 
cannot make this decision without their parental consent (Alabama State Code §16-28-1, 
2014).   
Protectionist policies expect that allowing parental control will promote children’s 
liberty (Hafen, 1976).  First, most parents have a selfish interest in their children 
becoming independent so the parent no longer has to care for the child.  In addition, more 
than any other person or entity, parents care for their children and this caring will 
promote decisions that advance the child’s autonomy.  Parents also know more about 
their children than any other person or entity, and thus will have better knowledge of 
what will nourish the child’s autonomy.  Protectionist theorists advocate for policies that 
place control in the hands of the child’s parents and of the state acting in loco parentis.  
Hafen claims that the adolescents lack the capacity to function as mature, independent 
members of society and thus should enjoy legally protected rights to special treatment.  
Under this view, parental authority and responsibility are valuable sources of support as 
minors develop; children require a satisfactory and permanent relationship with their 
rights.  Policies that undermine parental rights to control and raise children may 
undermine parental responsibility and harm the parent-child relationships.  According to 
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Hafen, then, state policies should enhance parental authority as a way to foster parent-
child relationships.  
State and federal governments also are charged with the task of safeguarding the 
welfare of children under protectionist theories (Hafen, 1976).  Under the theory of 
parens patriae, the government can interfere to help care for individuals who are unable 
to care for themselves, including children.  Governments often enact policies to protect 
the welfare of children overall, which may interfere with the parents’ right to choose how 
to care for their own children.  Policies such as minimum age limits for purchasing and 
using cigarettes and alcohol apply to all minors, and parents can be charged with 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor for providing prohibited substances to their 
children (e.g., Florida Statute § 827.04, 2014).  However, it should be noted that some 
states (e.g., N.R.S. § 53-168.06, 2014) allow parents to provide alcohol to their children 
in private homes.   
Thus, policies that are consistent with the protectionist theory place the 
responsibility for making major decisions in someone other than the child, primarily with 
the parent but also with the government.  The United States Supreme Court has promoted 
the protectionist theory in cases such as Meyers v. Nebraska (1923) that prioritize 
parental control instead of state decision making.  Protectionist policies sometimes only 
interfere with parental decisions in extreme circumstances.  For example, child abuse and 
neglect statutes (e.g., N.R.S. § 43-247(3) (a), 2010) intervene in the parent-child 
relationship only where there is a great danger to the child.  Other protectionist policies 
that limit minor’s rights to make decisions while providing parents the ability to provide 
consent in certain circumstances, such as age of consent laws for marriage, are designed 
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to help parents protect children from harm while still providing parents freedom to make 
decisions regarding their children (Henning, 2011).  Still other protectionist policies take 
away parental discretion and apply to all minors regardless of whether their parents 
would like to consent, such as minor in possession statutes.  Protectionism itself, then, 
covers a wide range of policies that are not always consistent with one another.  
In contrast to the protectionist theory, the personhood theory argues rights to 
autonomy should be afforded to juveniles, at least those that have reached adolescence 
(Richards, 1980).  Personhood theorists identify certain decisions, such as medical 
decision making or decisions involving constitutional rights, as so important that they 
should not be taken away from juveniles when those juveniles can reason through and 
understand the decision.  Richards identifies a “moral imperative” to protect capacity for 
autonomy that exist in all people.  While young children may possess only a “future 
interest” in personhood until they develop a capacity for rationality (Morris, 1975), 
personhood rights should be recognized in older adolescents that have developed these 
capacities.  Batey (1982) argues the law should give the same weight to adolescents’ 
considered choices that it does to the choices of adults.  Under this theory, courts should 
serve as a mechanism to enable competent adolescents to overturn parental decisions that 
the adolescent disagrees with.  Adolescence is a transition from childhood to adulthood, 
and personhood theorists believe that policies should reflect this transition and respect 
adolescents’ decisions that are competent and well-informed.   
Personhood theorists highlight developmental research (e.g., Steinberg, 
Cauffman, Woolard, Graham, & Banich, 2009) that demonstrates that adolescents do 
have some cognitive capacities that compare to adults (discussed below in Part II).  At 
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common criminal law, offenders fourteen and older were presumed fully responsible for 
their actions, while offenders age seven and younger were conclusively deemed not 
responsible.  However, the age of majority was often set at age twenty-one, which meant 
that adolescents could be held fully criminally responsible but could not sign a contract, 
for example.  Personhood theorists (e.g., Melton, 1983) focus on research that 
demonstrates adolescents fifteen and older are not distinguishable from adults for 
problem-solving activities and vulnerability to social influence.  Decisions of older 
adolescents, according to personhood theorists, should be given the same weight as those 
of competent adults.   
A protectionist theory may view the need for governmental intrusion as 
overriding any juvenile expectation of privacy; other protectionist theorists may argue 
that protecting juveniles’ expectations of privacy may be an important interest in itself.  
Personhood theorists would argue that juveniles, particularly older and more cognitively 
developed juveniles, should be treated similarly as adults in terms of the Fourth 
Amendment and their expectations of privacy should be respected.  Differences between 
adolescents and adults have implications for whether a searchee can establish a Fourth 
Amendment search actually occurred.   The next section details how courts apply the 
Fourth Amendment to juveniles and how many courts struggle with the tension between 
protecting juveniles while respecting their rights.      
 As mentioned above, the courts are not clear whether objective expectations of 
adolescent peers or objective expectations of adults are relevant to the Fourth 
Amendment reasonable expectations of privacy inquiry.  Under a protectionist theory, the 
relevant society for juveniles would be that of adults: the parents, caregivers, educators, 
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and lawmakers who are responsible for protecting adolescents and ensuring their safety.  
On the other hand, a personhood theory would support including adolescents’ objective 
evaluations of reasonable expectations in the analysis.  This would recognize that 
adolescents, like adults, have the capacity to reason through decisions and this capacity 
should be respected.  However, courts have not adequately addressed this issue, and the 
question remains whether the “reasonableness” of the search should be evaluated from 
the perspective of a reasonable adult or a reasonable juvenile.   
Supreme court cases and the struggle with personhood vs. protectionism.  
Policies that follow the personhood theory give adolescents certain rights as long as those 
adolescents have the cognitive capacity required to make decisions regarding those rights.  
One example is the mature minor doctrine in abortion law (Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 1976).  The United States Supreme Court struck down in Danforth a blanket 
requirement that all minors seeking an abortion obtain parental consent.  The Court noted 
that some minors can reason through the decision independently from their parents, and 
state interests promoting family unity do not override this ability.  The Court stressed the 
importance of letting the minor make the decision with her physician.  The Court has, 
however, upheld parental consent requirements that allow for a judicial bypass (Bellotti v. 
Baird, 1979).  Judicial bypass is a procedure where the minor can go before a court to 
prove that she either has the capacity to make the decision on her own or that for reasons 
of abuse or otherwise she cannot go to her parents and the court must determine whether 
the abortion is in her best interests.  The Court reasoned that minor’s constitutional rights 
cannot be equated with adults for three reasons: “the peculiar vulnerability of children; 
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the 
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importance of the parental role in child rearing” (pg. 634).  However, due to the unique 
nature of abortion and its consequences, the Court found it inappropriate to give parents 
an absolute veto of the minor’s decision.  The Court reasoned that as the minor’s capacity 
for reasoning develops, the minor will not need as much adult guidance.  This reasoning 
highlights the Supreme Court’s inconsistency with utilizing the personhood vs. 
protectionist stance in dealing with minor’s constitutional rights.   
Another example of the Supreme Court’s difficulty in evaluating minors’ legal 
rights is the discrepancy between two decisions that the Supreme Court handed down on 
the same day: Fare v. Michael C. (1979) and Parham v. J.R. (1979).  Fare v. Michael C. 
involved the ability of a sixteen-year-old suspect to waive his rights to an attorney and to 
remain silent in a police interrogation.  The opinion, authored by Justice Blackmun, 
highlighted that Michael C. was an older adolescent with significant prior involvement 
with the police, and thus was able to comprehend the Miranda warnings.  The Court 
applied the “totality-of-the-circumstances” test used when evaluating whether adults 
understood and competently waived their rights in custodial interrogation: considering 
the individual’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, did the 
individual knowingly and competently waive his rights?  The same factors, according to 
the Court, are relevant when evaluating a juvenile’s waiver of Miranda rights.  Instead of 
establishing a bright line rule creating a minimum age at which individuals are capable of 
waiving their rights, the Court recognized that some juveniles do have the capacity to 
understand the nature and consequences of waiving their rights.  This opinion has been 
highlighted by legal scholars as exemplifying the personhood theory of adolescent rights 
(Gardner & Proffitt Dupre, 2012).  
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Justice Burger authored an opinion that was handed down the same day in 
Parham v. J.R. (1979).  In this case, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia policy that 
allowed parents to voluntarily place their children under the age of 18 in state mental 
hospitals did not violate the children’s right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Here, the Supreme Court noted that the child’s liberty interest was 
inextricably linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the child’s welfare.  In 
addition, children’s liberty is not the same as adults: children are often already restricted 
by parental authority.  The Court also pointed out that “most children, even in 
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, 
including their need for medical care and treatment” (pg. 603).  Thus, allowing parents to 
voluntarily institutionalize their children without a formal hearing did not violate their 
children’s due process rights because the parental and state interest in protecting children 
outweighed the child’s interest in not being institutionalized.   
As Parham and Fare demonstrate, courts and policymakers may rely more on one 
theory or the other depending on the decision and political interests at stake.  
Development of jurisprudence surrounding criminal procedural rights also varies 
depending on whether the court takes a protectionist or personhood view of adolescents.  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is one area where courts and policies particularly 
struggle with balancing respect for adolescents’ decisions with protecting the health and 
welfare of adolescents.  In addition, courts decisions may affect how expectations of 
privacy develop.  As discussed below, parenting plays a role in how adolescents conceive 
their privacy rights; it may be possible widespread government policies, partially shaped 
by court decisions, may do the same.  The next section details Fourth Amendment 
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policies and case law involving adolescents and how this exemplifies the struggle 
governing bodies face with dealing with adolescents’ rights.   
Juveniles’ Expectations of Privacy in the Eyes of the Law  
In New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects juveniles from unreasonable searches and seizures by public school 
officials.  Other cases (e.g., California v. Hodari D., 1991) have found the Fourth 
Amendment protects juveniles in other settings, such as from unreasonable law 
enforcement searches.  Legal scholar Kristin Henning (2011) argues that the Supreme 
Court has yet to develop a consistent framework for evaluating Fourth Amendment 
claims made by juveniles.  Instead, according to Henning, juvenile’s rights under the 
Fourth Amendment are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with courts discussing three 
main principles: (1) context, (2) capacity, and (3) parental authority.  Context refers to the 
situation or area to be searched.  Courts have long recognized the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection is greater where individuals have greater reasonable expectation 
of privacy (Rakas v. Illinois, 1973); thus, context is an important factors for courts to 
evaluate when determining what qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
Capacity requires an examination of the development and individual abilities of minors.  
Parental authority recognizes that parents have the legal right to control and raise their 
children, and this must be considered when evaluating Fourth Amendment protections for 
minors.  Parental authority is particularly important when evaluating who has the right to 
consent to a search.  Courts evaluate these three factors (context, capacity, and parental 
authority), sometimes focusing more on one than the others, when determining what 
rights juveniles have under the Fourth Amendment.   
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 One context is unique to juveniles: the school setting.  Courts have recognized 
schools stand in loco parentis when juveniles attend school, which means schools have 
the limited power to educate, discipline and protect the children (Blackstone, 1769).  
Unlike parents, however, public schools can qualify as state actors and are thus 
constrained by the requirements in the United States Constitution (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
1985).  But the Fourth Amendment protects juveniles in schools differently than it does 
adults in public because of different expectations of privacy and because the state’s 
interest in promoting safety is greater in a school setting.   
 Recognizing that the determination of what is a reasonable search requires 
balancing the need to search with the invasion of privacy, the Supreme Court in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) determined the substantial need of teachers and administrators to 
maintain order in the schools does not require probable cause (the standard of proof 
required to obtain a warrant to search an adult) before a search of a student.  In New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., two high school freshman were caught smoking in the bathroom.  A 
teacher took the girls to the principal’s office where the assistant vice principal searched 
T.L.O.’s purse and found evidence that T.L.O. sold marijuana.  The Supreme Court held 
that schools could search students’ property based on a reasonable suspicion that the 
search will reveal evidence that the student broke either a school rule or a criminal law.  
The Supreme Court took a middle stance between protectionism and personhood theorists 
in this opinion by recognizing that schools had a legitimate interest in protecting students 
and promoting order in schools, but also identifying that students have some degree of 
reasonable expectations of privacy.   
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Like all searches by state actors, the school’s search must be justified at its 
inception and reasonable in its scope.  However, in the school setting, a search of a 
student will ordinarily be justified at its inception when there are “reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
violating either the law or the rules of the school” (New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985).  This 
differs from the standard for adults in two ways.  First, reasonable suspicion requires less 
evidence of wrongdoing than probable cause (Terry v. Ohio, 1968).  In addition, students 
may be searched based on reasonable suspicion that they are violating the rules of the 
school, while adults can only be searched if there is probable cause that they violated 
laws.   
The Fourth Amendment has been applied to school searches involving drug 
testing (Board of Education v. Earls, 2002), dog sniffs (B.C. vs. Plumas Unified School 
Districts, 1999), and locker searches (State v. Jones, 2003).  While courts have generally 
found that a school’s need to promote order and discipline in their school outweighs 
students’ right to privacy, there are situations where student privacy will prevail.  The 
Supreme Court evaluated whether the Fourth Amendment protected a strip search of a 
student in Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009).  In Redding, the school 
administration suspected a female middle school was providing other students 
prescription-strength drugs that were forbidden from campus.  School officials searched 
Redding’s belongings and did not find any evidence of drugs; following this, the school 
officials (both female) required Redding to strip down to her underwear and shake out the 
bands of her undergarments to reveal any drugs.  The school officials did not find any 
illegal drugs in Redding’s possession.  The Court found this search violated Redding’s 
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Fourth Amendment rights because the level of intrusion exceeded the content of the 
suspicion.  A serious intrusion such as a strip search requires schools to have a reasonable 
suspicion that the student is a danger to others or that the student is hiding contraband in 
his or her clothing.  Absent this, such as in Redding, the search violates the student’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.   
Outside of the school setting, though, courts have extended to juveniles the same 
Fourth Amendment protections that are enjoyed by adults (Lanes v. State of Texas, 1989).  
Lanes involved a seizure of a juvenile from school to obtain his fingerprints.  The Texas 
Supreme Court reasoned that juveniles have the same right to be secure in their person as 
do adults, and thus any seizure must be supported by probable cause.  This means that 
law enforcement will have to obtain a warrant to legally search a juvenile, or will have to 
rely on one of the other court-created ways to make a search reasonable.  If a search is 
not justified by reasonable suspicion for schools or probable cause for law enforcement, 
the officials may resort to obtaining consent from the juvenile to search.   
 Capacity and juveniles’ Fourth Amendment rights. Though courts generally 
do not discuss the issue of capacity when evaluating reasonable expectations of privacy, 
capacity is an element courts consider when evaluating consent to search.  Evaluating 
juveniles’ capacity to consent to search is one area where courts struggle with 
recognizing the capabilities of adolescents (personhood theories) and protecting 
adolescents from unreasonable intrusions (protectionist theories).  Like adults, juveniles 
have the rights to remain silent and to have an attorney in an interrogation; a corollary of 
these rights is the right to waive them (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).  This means that 
competent juveniles can waive their rights to an attorney and to remain silent as long as 
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the waiver is voluntary.  The juvenile’s age, experience and education are all factors to 
consider in the totality of the circumstances, but the juvenile’s age itself does not require 
a different standard.  The United States Supreme Court has allowed minors, particularly 
adolescents, to make decisions in other circumstances.  States must allow for minors 
seeking an abortion to judicially bypass parental consent requirements by convincing a 
judge that either the abortion is in the minor’s best interests or that the minor has the 
capacity to make the decision for herself (Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 1976).  Some 
states similarly allow mature minors to make other important medical decisions, such as 
the decision to withdraw from treatment (In re E.G., 1989).  In a similar way, courts have 
ruled juveniles have the ability to waive a right to be free from searches and seizures by 
providing consent to a search.  
 Though the United States Supreme Court has never decided a case on the issue, 
state courts have ruled that children as young as 8 are competent to consent to a search 
(Lenz v. Winburn, 1995), but other courts have found that ten-year-olds are too young to 
consent (Bilbrey v. Brown, 1984).  Similar to evaluating consent to search by adults, 
courts take into account the “totality of the circumstances,” and age and individual 
abilities of the youth are just two of the factors in the analysis.  In Bilbrey v. Brown 
(1984), a school bus driver observed two ten-year-olds exchanging items on the 
playground and suspected that the children were exchanging drugs.  The children were 
later removed from class and brought to a locker room, where they were strip searched.  
The school officials claimed that they sought permission from the boys to search them 
and both boys consented to the search; however, the trial court held as a matter of law 
that the children were too young to consent to such a search.  The trial court reasoned that 
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the circumstances were so coercive that the children could not have voluntarily waived 
their rights.   
 Courts frequently consider coerciveness of the environment when evaluating 
consent.  The Eastern District of Texas court examined the coercive nature of the school 
setting and found the juvenile’s consent was not voluntarily given (Jones v. Latexo 
Independent School District, 1980).  After finding a dog sniff of the plaintiffs was 
unconstitutional, the court in Jones turned to the question of whether the juveniles’ 
subsequent consent to a search was voluntary.  The court identified the targets of the 
search were “children with limited experience in a threatening situation.”  The 
adolescents (three high school students) were “accustomed to receiving orders and 
obeying instructions from school officials” and “incapable of exercising unconstrained 
free will when asked to empty their pockets.”  Thus, because juveniles are taught to obey 
and are frequently threatened with punishment in a school setting, their consent must be 
evaluated in light of this setting.  Despite this lower court decision, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has never spoken on how to evaluate the totality of the circumstances of 
consent to search in a school setting.  
 However, the Supreme Court has reasoned the adolescent’s age and the coercive 
environment are factors to consider in the Miranda warning context (J.B.D. v. North 
Carolina, 2011).  Police interrogators must read suspects their Miranda rights (i.e., right 
to remain silent and right to an attorney) whenever suspects are exposed to a custodial 
interrogation; courts determine whether a suspect is in custody by evaluating the totality 
of the circumstances (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  The Supreme Court held that the 
totality of the circumstances test is the same for juvenile suspects interrogated in a school 
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setting, but that the suspect’s youth and the potentially coercive environment of the 
school are two important factors in evaluating whether the juvenile is in custody (J.B.D. 
v. North Carolina, 2011).  Thus, it is likely courts will consider both age and coercive 
school environments when evaluating the voluntariness of adolescents’ consent to search 
in a school setting.  
Taken together, age and coerciveness of the school environment are important 
factors in evaluating consent to search, and may also have important implications for 
determining adolescents’ reasonable expectations of privacy.  As discussed below, 
decision-making capacities develop throughout adolescence, and these may play a large 
role in how adolescents evaluate their privacy rights.  In addition, adolescents may view 
their privacy rights differently in certain environments, such as within the home or at 
school, where they are accustomed to privacy intrusions by adults.  We expect that courts 
should take these factors into consideration when evaluating both subjective and 
objective expectations of privacy of adolescents.    
 Parental authority and juvenile’s Fourth Amendment rights.  A third factor 
that is important in evaluating minors’ Fourth Amendment rights is parental authority 
(Henning, 2011).  The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents have a 
fundamental right in raising their children (Meyers v. Nebraska, 1923; Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 1925).  Parents have the authority to make many decisions about children of all 
ages including education (Meyers v. Nebraska, 1923) and medical and psychological 
treatment (Parham v. J.R., 1979).  According the Supreme Court, “the law’s concept of 
the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, 
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions” 
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(Parham v. J.R., 1979, pg. 602).  As discussed above, protectionist theories of 
government regulation of children view government policies as one way to protect 
vulnerable individuals from harm.  In some situations (such as parental consent to 
marriage), the government assumes parents know the needs of their children best, and  
parents can “work around” government rules, while other regulations (such as child abuse 
and neglect statutes) are designed to protect children from harm from their parents.   
 The issue of parental authority is complicated when examining what role parents 
should play in providing consent to a search of their minor child or their minor child’s 
property.  The Supreme Court has indicated it does not look toward traditional property 
principles when determining privacy interests; instead, courts look to whether the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property according to “widely 
shared societal expectations” (Illinois v. Rodriguez, 1990, pg. 111).  Like the Fourth 
Amendment protection of reasonable expectations of privacy in general, ability to 
consent to a search also is related to what individuals reasonably expect.  Thus, 
expectations are important both in determining what searches are unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment and in evaluating who can provide consent.   
 The Supreme Court has recognized the family relationship has privacy 
implications.  In Georgia v. Randolph (2006), the Supreme Court held that if an adult 
defendant who is physically present at the scene of the search and objects to the search, a 
third party with common authority over the property may not consent to the search.  
However, if the adult defendant is not physically present, the third party’s consent will be 
valid even if the defendant had earlier objected to the search (Fernandez v. California, 
2014).  In examining the social expectations of who should have authority to consent to a 
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search, the Court noted in Georgia v. Randolph (2006) that “[u]nless the people living 
together fall within some recognized hierarchy, like a household of parent and child . . . 
there is no societal understanding of inferior and superior” (pg. 114).  This dicta indicates 
the Court assumes that parents do have the authority over their children to consent to at 
least a search of the home, over a child’s objection, but the Court has not yet explicitly 
held so.   
 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relies heavily on reasonable and societal 
expectations of privacy.  While some research indicates lay opinions generally match 
those of the Court’s, with some notable exceptions (Slobogin & Schumacher, 1993), it is 
not yet clear how adolescents and their parents view adolescents’ Fourth Amendment 
rights.  Courts often make assumptions regarding minors and consent to search, such as 
what society expects of adolescents’ privacy rights.  Social science research can help 
inform the three main factors courts consider when evaluating minors’ Fourth 
Amendment rights: the effect of contexts such as a school setting, adolescents’ capacity 
to make important decisions, and the role of parental authority (Henning, 2011).  
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CHAPTER 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH TO INFORM COURTS AND 
POLICY-MAKERS 
 Though courts have looked to social science research in other areas of the law 
(Roper v. Simmons, 2005), courts have not yet relied upon psychological findings in 
determining reasonable expectations of privacy.  Social science theories on decision 
making and privacy can help policymakers and courts better understand how individuals, 
including adolescents, evaluate their privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.  These 
bodies of research include the development of privacy expectations, dual systems 
processing models of decision making and risk taking, and adolescent legal decision 
making.    
Adolescents’ Expectations of Privacy  
Adolescents have a whole world open to them that was not available as recently 
as twenty years ago—the Internet.  “Digital natives” are individuals who have grown up 
using digital communications and networked technologies (Palfrey & Gasser, 2013); 
these individuals are more familiar with using computers, sending information online, 
and living in a virtual “world.”  In 2017, the website Commonsense Media detailed 
seventeen social media websites frequented by teens, including texting apps (GroupMe, 
Kik, WhatsApp), photo and video-sharing sites (Instagram, Musical.ly), “microblogging” 
sites (Tumblr, Twitter), livestreaming apps (Houseparty, Live.ly, Live.me, YouNow), 
“self-destructing” apps (SnapChat, Whisper), and sites with the aim to meet new people 
(MeetMe, Omegle, Yubo) (Elgersma, 2017).  One issue with the influx of social 
networking sites is how these impact adolescents’ expectations of privacy and 
willingness to share information with others.  Social science research can aid 
51 
 
     
examinations of how adolescents view their privacy and information management in this 
new “world.” 
Boyd (2014) calls adolescents experts at digital privacy.  Because adolescents 
perceive regulation in their physical lives, they may seek out an alternative “public” 
space in which to express themselves, and the internet has provided this for them.  
Adolescents using social media may experience “context collapse,” where their use of 
social media brings together very different groups of people, such as their family, their 
school friends, and their work friends, who normally otherwise would not meet.  While 
some content may be appropriate for certain social groups to view, other groups may not 
approve of the same content.  Without a proper knowledge of who has access to their 
information, adolescents may risk unintentionally exposing information to the wrong 
people.   
Berriman and Thomson (2015) designed a model of adolescent’s conception of 
digital privacy.  This model has two axes: participation and visibility.  Participation is the 
degree to which adolescents feel comfortable having control over and putting information 
into the digital world, and visibility is the degree to which adolescents make their digital 
content identifiable.   
According to Berriman and Thomson (2015), there are four distinct types of 
adolescents when it comes to privacy.  The incompetent or victim is high in visibility but 
low in participation.  This is the most worrisome type, in Berriman and Thomson’s view, 
because these adolescents create intimate data but have no control over it; for example, 
an incompetent or victim adolescent may create risqué photographs and share them with 
one other person, but lacks control over how those photographs may be circulated.  The 
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second type is a fan or lurker, low in both participation and visibility.  The fan takes a 
more cautious approach to digital content, which can be an active choice an adolescent 
makes after witnessing the negative effects of sharing information online.  The fan may 
exhibit “stalking” behaviors towards celebrities or well-known peers by following them 
on multiple social media accounts and frequently checking on posts, but does not make 
much digital content him or herself.  The third type is the geek, who is high in 
participation but low in visibility.  The geek creates original digital content, such as fan 
fiction or animation, but keeps the content unidentifiable through the use of screen names 
or anonymous accounts.  The geek may be a cultural entrepreneur who wishes his or her 
content to “go viral” so he or she can make money off of it, but recognizes the dangers of 
being too identifiable online.  The final privacy type is the e-celeb, who is high in both 
participation and visibility.  The e-celeb seeks notoriety through the cultivation of “self as 
content”—the e-celeb creates original content that is identifiable and able to be linked to 
his or her real-life persona.  The ideal e-celeb is the famous YouTuber, an individual who 
creates original videos of themselves to be posted on YouTube and gains hundreds, or 
sometimes millions, of followers.  The e-celeb often makes a conscious trade off, 
willingly giving up anonymity in exchange for an opportunity to be seen.   
Adolescents’ online behaviors are often compared to adults; while adults are 
assumed to be more logical, adolescents are perceived to use social media more often 
(Whitty, Doodson, Creese & Hodges, 2015).  While some research has demonstrated 
older adults are less knowledgeable about online security than younger users (Grimes, 
Hough, Mazu, & Signorella, 2010), other research shows adolescents are more willing to 
take risks with their information, such as by sharing their passwords with others (Whitty 
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et. al., 2015), and feel more responsible and are more confident in their ability to manage 
their data online (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014).   
Current research on adolescents’ perceptions of online privacy has focused on 
describing adolescents’ willingness to make information public on the Internet.  
Christofodies, Muise and Desmarais (2012a) surveyed 256 adolescent Facebook users 
regarding their information control on Facebook.  Adolescents who had more knowledge 
of Facebook’s privacy protections were more likely to make use of them and control the 
information that is shared on Facebook.  For example, adolescents who were aware of 
Facebook’s available privacy settings were more likely to have their profile set to private, 
so that only approved friends could view it.  Adolescents express concern over automatic 
monitoring of content on social media sites such as Facebook (Van Royen, Poels, & 
Vandebosch, 2016).  While adolescents do report they are in favor of automatic 
monitoring in situations they cannot solve themselves, like when a peer is in danger of 
hurting him or herself, adolescents also express worry automatic monitoring will limit 
their freedom online.  Also of concern is commercial monitoring of online content; 
adolescents, especially those with high privacy concern, report skepticism over targeted 
ads on social media sites (Zarouali, Ponnet, Walrave & Poels, 2017).   
In addition, as Social Networking Sites increase in popularity, adolescents may 
become more cognizant of what types of information are appropriate to be posted online.  
A study of the once-popular Social Networking Site MySpace found that 85% of youth in 
2009 chose to at least partially restrict access to their profile (this number was up from 
39.1% in 2006) (Patchin & Hinduja, 2010).  Adolescents’ MySpace profiles in 2009 were 
less likely to include pictures of the profile holder or friends in swimsuits or underwear 
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and less likely to provide references to tobacco or alcohol use.  This indicates that, as 
society becomes more accustomed to digital communications and networked 
technologies, adolescents are becoming savvier to the type of information they place 
online.  Some evidence also indicates adolescents are less willing than adults to share 
information online; this may be because adolescents are more accustomed to Social 
Networking Sites and more aware of the negative ramifications of posting information 
online (Moscardelli & Divine, 2007).  Psychological research has only just begun to 
examine why adolescents choose to place potentially sensitive information online and 
how this may differ from adults’ reasoning about privacy expectations. 
Social media developers have attempted to attract users with the promise of 
privacy and secrecy.  Snapchat, for example, was a social media platform initially 
marketed as a way to protect your privacy: users could share photo messages with other 
users, but the photo messages would disappear after a short period of time (Neeves, 
2017).  But the claims of privacy may have been a false sense of security, as users 
developed ways to save snaps received from other users, and Snapchat itself admitted it 
only deletes the messages “most of the time.”  Snapchat, like other platforms, is not 
immune to hacking or other privacy leaks.  This platform, and others that aim to enhance 
the feeling that your information is “safe,” may encourage users to continue sharing 
information without thinking about the possible ramifications.  Future research can 
explore how privacy protections on social media platforms may change privacy 
expectations.  
Another potential factor in adolescents’ willingness to share information may be 
perceptions of risk of sharing such information.  Evidence demonstrates adolescents do 
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evaluate the risks and benefits of sharing information online and that this relates to 
disclosing information online.  Adolescents who perceive risks associated with publicly 
posting identifying information on a Social Networking Site profile are less likely to 
provide such info (Youn, 2005).  Similarly, adolescents who perceive benefits associated 
with sharing information, such as peer acceptance, are more likely to publicly provide 
information.  Adolescents who report a greater need for popularity and less awareness of 
the consequences of disclosure are more likely to disclose personally identifying 
information (Christofides, Muise, & Desmarais, 2012b). Adolescents who were less 
willing to provide information publicly engaged in coping behaviors such as providing 
inaccurate or incomplete information (Youn, 2005).  There may also be gender 
differences with willingness to post information online: girls perceive privacy risks to be 
more severe, while boys are more likely to read unsolicited email and place information 
online by registering for websites (Youn & Hall, 2008). 
Individual differences may play a role in adolescents’ privacy-protecting 
behaviors.  Adolescents use a combination of three strategies to protect the information 
on-line: limiting the data posted, using privacy settings, and managing their audience 
(Heriman et. al, 2016).  According to Heriman and colleagues, adolescents first decide 
what content they want to post, then choose their audience and privacy settings.  In a 
study of adolescents 12 to 18 years of age, adolescents who disclose more data online 
also had more friends than those who disclose less data online.  While the researchers 
hypothesized the opposite finding—theorizing adolescents who post a lot of content 
would limit their audience due to privacy concerns—they reasoned the link between data 
disclosed and number of friends could be because users who post more data online are 
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more attractive to have as friends, so more people seek to add them to their social circle.  
Additionally, only 5% of the study used customized privacy settings, and users who had 
been using social media longer used fewer privacy-protecting privacy settings.  Again, 
this was a surprising finding for the researchers, who had assumed users with more 
experience with social media would be more aware of the dangers of posting public 
content, and more aware of how to set their privacy settings.   
Though research is just beginning to examine adolescents’ privacy concerns 
online, decades of research has examined how adolescents’ view privacy in their family.  
As technology and expectations evolve, privacy expectations in the home may be 
relevant in examining privacy expectations on-line.  
Parenting and Adolescents’ Expectations of Privacy  
Social Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983) proposes individuals make social judgments 
by evaluating the domain in which the action occurs.  Adolescents view parental 
authority differently when the authority is exercised in different domains: moral, 
conventional, psychological, personal, and prudential (Smetana, 1988).  Domains may 
also be multifaceted, meaning they involve issues in more than one domain. The moral 
domain involves issues of fairness, justice, rights, and general welfare.  The conventional 
domain is concerned with arbitrary and agreed-upon behavioral conventions that structure 
social interactions.  In contrast, the psychological domain involves more personal issues 
and individual discretion.   Personal issues are those that only have consequences to the 
person who is involved (Nucci, 1981), while prudential issues pertain to safety and health 
(Nucci & Lee, 1993).  While some research has identified a shift in adolescence from 
unilateral parental authority to a more reciprocal relationship (Youniss & Smollar, 1985), 
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research from a domain perspective focuses on how this shift occurs in some domains but 
not others.  
 Smetana and Asquith (1994) examined how adolescents and their parents view 
parental authority in moral, conventional, personal, prudential, multifaceted (containing 
multiple domains), and friendship domains.  Sixty-eight sixth, eight, and tenth graders, 
and their parents, evaluated hypothetical parent-child interactions in each of the domains.  
For each situation, participants indicated whether they thought it was appropriate for the 
parent to make a rule about such a situation and whether there was an obligation for the 
parent to make a rule about such a situation.  Adolescent participants indicated whether 
they would feel obligated to obey a parent’s rule in such a situation.  Participants also 
indicated if the wrongness of the child’s act was contingent upon whether or not the 
parents had previously made a rule forbidding that act and provided justifications for the 
act’s wrongness or permissibility.  
 Both adolescent participants and their parents viewed all issues except personal 
issues (for example, what the child wears to school or with whom the child hangs out) as 
legitimately subject to parental authority, and most participants stated they thought 
parents had an obligation to make rules about moral issues, but not personal issues 
(Smetana & Asquith, 1994).  Parent participants viewed all issues as more legitimately 
subject to parental jurisdiction than adolescent participants.  In addition, results indicated 
there was a shift in views of legitimate parental authority with age.  Adolescents in sixth 
and eighth grades, and their parents, viewed personal issues as more legitimately subject 
to parental authority than did adolescents in tenth grade and their parents.  Sixth graders 
also saw obedience to personal rules as more obligatory than older participants.  It is clear 
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from research findings that opinions on legitimacy of parental authority vary for different 
domains, and these views change with the age of the adolescent.   
 Smetana (1995) examined the relationship between parenting style and views of 
the legitimacy of parental authority in the various domains in 110 sixth, eighth, and tenth 
graders and their parents.  Participants evaluated the legitimacy of parental authority in 
each of the domains, reported the parents’ parenting style using the Parental Authority 
Questionnaire (Buri, 1989), and assessed family conflict and decision making.  
Adolescents rated their parents as both more permissive and more authoritarian than their 
parents did, while parents viewed themselves as more authoritative than did adolescents 
(Smetana, 1995).  Parents who were rated as more authoritarian and authoritative judged 
all domains as more legitimately subject to parental authority and stated parents have 
more of an obligation to make rules.  Parents with different parenting styles also viewed 
the domains differently.  Permissive parents viewed issues that fell within the 
conventional domain as more like personal issues outside of legitimate parental authority.  
Authoritative parents maintained clear boundaries between moral, conventional, and 
personal issues, and gave their adolescent children autonomy over a limited range of 
personal issues but not over multifaceted, friendship, or prudential issues.   
 Parental authority differs in the various domains for much younger children as 
well.  Mothers of five- and seven-year-olds also recognize that parental authority should 
be exercised in some domains but not others (Nucci & Smetana, 1996).  Mothers of 
young children rate moral, conventional and prudential items as issues that the mothers 
should control, but leave personal items up to the child.  Mothers report setting limits on 
items that cause safety issues, issues of family conventions, and daily routines.  In 
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contrast, mothers let their children make decisions about food, recreational activities, 
clothes, and playmates.  This is one way parents help their children to develop autonomy 
and competence, even at very young ages.   
 Conceptions of legitimacy of authority depending on domain have been extended 
outside the family as well (Smetana & Bitz, 1996).  Adolescents view moral, 
conventional and prudential issues as legitimately subject to teachers’ authority, while 
personal issues are outside of teachers’ authority.  Younger children (fifth graders) judge 
all types of acts as more legitimately subject to teachers’ authority, while older 
adolescents are more likely to view personal issues such as with whom to associate as 
outside the bounds of school authority.  Perceptions of legitimacy of school authority 
may develop parallel to perceptions of parental authority.   
 A consistent body of research has demonstrated parents and adolescents view the 
legitimacy of parental authority differently depending on the domain in which the 
authority is exercised.  This may extend to adolescents’ expectations of privacy in on-line 
communications.  Adolescents may use similar domains when creating their expectations 
of privacy from government actors.  For instance, adolescents may view intrusions into 
certain domains, such as conventional or prudential, as not violating their privacy because 
these are domains where government actors legitimately have authority.  But intrusions 
into other domains, including personal, may be viewed as more intruding into privacy 
because adolescents do not view government actors as having authority.  In addition to 
this, adolescents manage the information that they share with their parents in different 
domains to control what parents know about their behaviors.    
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Adolescent information management in different domains. Parental 
monitoring, which involves parents knowing where their children are, who they are with, 
and what they are doing, is associated with fewer problems in adolescence, especially 
when the child voluntarily discloses information (Dishion & McMahon, 1998) and 
becomes even more important as youth spend more time with their peers instead of their 
parents (Larson, Richards, Moneta, Holmbeck, & Duckett, 1996).  Waizenhofer, 
Buchanan and Jackson-Newsom (2004) differentiated between active and passive 
parental monitoring.  Active monitoring includes actively seeking out information and 
participating in a child’s activities, while passive monitoring involves letting others come 
to the parent with information.  Active monitoring is associated with better adolescent 
adjustment and better parent-child relationships.   
 In general, adolescents are only willing to disclose a moderate amount of 
information to their parents (Smetana, Villalobos, Tasopoulos-Chan, Gettman, & 
Campione-Barr, 2009).  Adolescents’ willingness to disclose information is related to 
their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of parental authority (Smetana, Metzger, Gettman, 
& Campione-Barr, 2006).  Adolescents feel more obligated to tell parents information 
about prudential behaviors and less obligated to tell parents information about personal 
behaviors.  In addition, as adolescents grow older, they rate parents’ authority as less 
legitimate and were less likely to disclose information in all domains.   
 Adolescents’ reasons for not disclosing to their parents also differ by domain 
(Smetana et al., 2009).  Adolescents state they do not disclose prudential information 
when they fear parental disapproval or punishment, but do not disclose peer or 
multifaceted issues when they view the issues as not causing harm or as personal matters.  
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One common strategy for minimizing the amount of information parents know is to tell 
parents some details, but not all of the important information.  Adolescents do not report 
frequently lying to their parents.   
 Parents’ reactions to their children’s disclosures affect the children’s later 
disclosures (Tilton-Weaver et al., 2010).  A longitudinal study of adolescents ages 13 to 
15 found parents’ negative reactions to disclosures were related to adolescents feeling 
over-controlled and decreased disclosure over time.  Youths who reported feeling over-
controlled were less likely to disclose as they got older.  In addition, adolescents’ clear 
communication to their mothers and mothers’ receptiveness to that communication in a 
structured laboratory task were associated with a higher rate reported disclosure than 
adolescents’ who do not clearly communicate with their mothers or with mothers who do 
not clearly exhibit receptiveness to that communication (Rote, Smetana, Campione-Barr, 
Vollalobos & Tasopoulos-Chan, 2012).  Parental reactions, then, greatly affect how much 
information children choose to disclose to their parents.   
 The summarized research explores how adolescents control what information 
their parents receive and how this information management differs among domains.  
Adolescents may similarly manage information online in different ways depending on the 
domain.  Another important consideration is how adolescents react when they perceive 
invasions of their privacy.  Adolescents may feel parents are invading their privacy when 
the parents know information that the adolescents did not disclose, and this may impact 
the parent-child relationship.     
One challenge facing families is how to manage privacy (Petronio, 2010).  Parents 
must navigate between seeking necessary information from their adolescent children and 
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allowing them a sense of privacy that is important to their development (Blasi & Milton, 
1991).  Significant parent-child conflict may occur when adolescents perceive that their 
parents have violated their privacy.  Hawk, Keijsers, Hale and Meeus (2009) interviewed 
adolescents and their parents over three time periods.  Family conflict was related to 
parental privacy invasions as reported by adolescents.  In addition, the research 
uncovered a reciprocal relationship between perceived privacy invasions and conflict: 
perceived privacy invasions led to increase reported conflict at later time periods; at the 
same time, conflict led to later perceived privacy invasions.  Similarly, solicitations from 
parents about information lead to greater perceived privacy invasions (Hawk, Hale, 
Raaijmakers, & Meeus, 2008).  Parental solicitation and parental control may not lead to 
its desired effect: greater perceived privacy invasion leads to less parental knowledge 
about the adolescents’ behaviors than prior to the perceived invasion (Hawk et al., 2013).   
 It is clear from previous research that adolescents’ and parents’ views of 
legitimacy of authority and adolescents’ disclosures vary by domain.  In addition, 
adolescents view solicitations from their parents as violating their privacy.  However, this 
research on the legitimacy of parental authority and disclosures has not yet been extended 
to a relatively new and constantly evolving arena: digital communications. 
Parents’ socialization of adolescents’ privacy expectations. Parents may play 
an important role in teaching adolescents about privacy risks online.  Parents report a 
higher level of concern with their adolescent child’s privacy online than do adolescents 
(Fent & Xie, 2014).  But parents with a higher reported level of concern tend to have a 
child who also reports a higher level of concern with privacy than children with parents 
who report a low level of concern.  Because parents’ privacy concerns are correlated with 
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their children’s privacy concerns, it seems clear that parents play an important role in 
shaping their children’s online behaviors.  Ward (1974) identifies a consumer 
socialization process by which individuals learn the skills, knowledge, and attitudes that 
shape their behaviors as a consumer.   
 Similar to the above discussion about methods for obtaining information about 
children, parents can mediate with their children’s Internet behaviors either actively (by 
taking active steps to find out information and to make rules) or passively (by letting 
others come to them with information).  Active mediation directly decreases adolescents’ 
disclosure of personally identifying information online (Liu, Ang & Lwin, 2013).  Active 
mediation also increases adolescents’ privacy concern, which in turn decreases 
adolescents’ disclosure of information.   
An important aspect of consumer socialization is communications from parents, 
which can be classified as either socio-oriented communications (those that emphasize 
deference and obedience to authority) or concept-oriented communications (those that 
encourage children to develop and express their own views and include reciprocal 
discussions) (Moscardelli & Devine, 2007).  This dichotomy mirrors that of protectionist 
and personhood legal theories: protectionist theorists might encourage socio-oriented 
communications to protect children from online dangers, while personhood theorists 
would support concept-oriented communications that help develop and nurture 
adolescents’ decision-making capacities and respect the decisions adolescents make.  
Concept-oriented communications lead to increased privacy concerns among 
adolescents, but socio-emotional communications do not impact privacy concerns 
(Moscardelli & Devine, 2007).  In addition, parents can influence their children’s online 
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behaviors by taking steps to mediate their child’s communications online, such as by 
making rules about the Internet, co-surfing (surfing the Internet with their child) or 
discussing privacy issues with their children.  Parents who engage in discussions with 
their child about the Internet and co-surf the Internet with their child have adolescent 
children who have higher levels of concern about their privacy online than those without 
parents who similarly monitor their child’s online behavior; however, making rules 
regarding privacy on the Internet was not related to increased privacy concerns among 
adolescents (Youn, 2008). 
Like the two methods for obtaining information about children, parents can 
mediate with their children’s Internet behaviors either actively (by taking active steps to 
find out information and to make rules) or passively (by letting others come to them with 
information).  Active mediation directly decreases adolescents’ disclosure of personally 
identifying information online (Liu, Ang & Lwin, 2013).  Active mediation also increases 
adolescents’ privacy concern, which in turn decreases adolescents’ disclosure of 
information. 
In general, it appears parent-child relationships can help shape expectations of 
privacy and information management within the family.  No known research has 
examined how these factors may play a role in shaping expectations of privacy and 
information management outside the family, particularly on the Internet.  Research also 
identifies important factors such as age and perceptions of risk that play a role in privacy 
protecting behaviors on the Internet.  The next section discusses how adolescents’ risk 
perception and decision-making abilities change with age, and how this may play a role 
in developing expectations of privacy.   
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Decision-making Theories and the Fourth Amendment   
 Fourth Amendment cases and legal discussion often make assumptions about 
adolescents’ decision-making capabilities.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned 
that even very young children have a sense of privacy expectations, even if they do not 
have the same agency over property as adults (Lenz v. Winburn, 1995).  However, the 
Eleventh Circuit did not cite any research or amicus briefs in support of this contention, 
and relied primarily on the intuition and personal experiences of the judges.  An 
examination of the applicable theories is helpful to determine how adolescents may be 
evaluating searches and seizures.    
Adolescent legal decision making.  As discussed in Part I, adolescents have the 
legal ability to make decisions regarding their legal rights.  Psychological research has 
examined adolescents’ legal decisions, primarily in the area of health care decision, 
confessions, and attorney-client relationships.  Such research provides courts with 
valuable information on what types of decisions, and under what circumstances, 
adolescents can adequately reason through decisions.   
Adolescent health care decision making.  One area where courts and 
policymakers especially struggle with balancing protectionism and personhood theories is 
that of adolescent decision making regarding health care decisions.  As discussed in Part 
I, adolescents’ decisions regarding health care are respected in certain situations, 
including abortion (Bellotti v. Baird, 1979) or (rarely) end-of-life care (In re E.G., 1989).  
Medical scholars also struggle with balancing policies that protect adolescents from harm 
by allowing for decisions to be made by parents or other adults with expanding 
participation in decisions for at least mature adolescents (Piker, 2011).  Psychological 
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research has examined how adolescents reason through these types of decisions and how 
these decisions differ from those of adults.  
 One area of interest for both legal and psychological scholars is the competence 
of adolescents seeking an abortion.  Ambuel and Rappaport (1992) interviewed 75 female 
adolescents seeking a pregnancy test at a medical clinical and evaluated them on 
measures of cognitive and social decision making.  The adolescents ages 16-17 all 
performed similarly to young adults ages 18-21 from the same population on measures of 
volition (the degree to which their decision appeared to be voluntary), consideration of 
consequences, richness (the amount of distinct factors taken into consideration), and 
overall global quality of reasoning.  Adolescents ages 15 and younger, however, 
expressed a different pattern.  Those adolescents 15 and younger who reported 
considering an abortion performed similarly as older adolescents and young adults, while 
those adolescents 15 and younger who reported not considering an abortion scored lower 
than older adolescents and young adults on measures of volition, consideration of 
consequences, and overall global quality of reasoning.  The authors interpreted these 
results to indicate that adolescents’ do have the cognitive capacity to make decisions 
regarding abortion, but that certain adolescents may still benefit from consulting with 
peers and adults.   
 Individuals must provide informed consent to medical treatment, and research has 
indicated that adolescents as young as 14 reason through medical decisions similarly as 
adults (Weithorn & Campbell, 1982).  Comparing adolescents to their parents, 
adolescents may focus more on the immediate effects of treatment and their quality of 
life, while their parents focus more on long-term impacts (Lipstein, Dodds, Lovell, 
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Denson & Britto, 2016).  Fourteen-year-old participants presented with vignettes 
involving health care decisions for diseases such as diabetes showed evidence of 
understanding, rational reasoning, ability to choose, and a reasonable outcome that 
mirrored that of 18-year-olds and 21-year-olds.  Other research (e.g. Koocher & DeMaso, 
1990) has also found that around age 14, adolescents are competent to make decisions 
regarding their medical care; some commentators have argued that this research indicates 
adolescents ages 14 and older should be more involved in the informed consent process 
prior to treatment (Schachter, Kleiman, & Harvey, 2005).  
 A more complicated issue surrounds allowing adolescents to make decisions 
regarding end-of-life care.  At least one state, Illinois, has recognized a “mature minor” 
exception that allows older adolescents who demonstrate the capacity to reason to make 
decisions regarding their end-of-life care, including to refuse treatment (In re E.G., 
1989).  Adolescent cancer survivors generally support allowing adolescents to make 
decisions regarding pain alleviation and the decision to withdraw from treatment, 
particularly where adolescents are diagnosed with a terminal disease (Poussett et. al., 
2009).  Research on actual end-of-life decisions from adolescents is difficult to conduct, 
but some commentators argue for allowing more adolescent participation in medical 
decisions in terminal situations, potentially with the aid of an advance care planning 
document (Wiener et. al., 2008).   
 Medical decision making is one area where psychological researchers have 
examined adolescents’ capacity to make decisions.  Some policymakers have used this 
research to create a framework where adolescents are more involved in the decision 
making process regarding their health care.  Similarly, psychological research has 
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examined how adolescents reason through a different type of important decision: 
decisions that impact their rights under criminal procedure laws.  
Adolescent decision making and Miranda Rights. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the holding in Miranda (suspects in custodial interrogation must be informed 
of their rights) applies to adolescents (Fare v. Michael C., 1979).  However, 
psychological research has examined whether adolescents can properly understand those 
rights and reason through decisions regarding them.  Grisso (1981) demonstrated 
adolescents fourteen and younger have particularly poor understanding of the core 
Miranda rights (e.g., the right to remain silent, anything you say will be held against you, 
the right to an attorney, the right to have an attorney appointed, and the right to stop 
questioning at any time).  Older adolescents, however, comprehended Miranda rights at a 
level similar to that of adults.   
Using a Canadian sample, Abromovitch, Peterson-Badali, and Rohan (1995) 
found most adolescents did comprehend the right to an attorney and the right to remain 
silent.  Adolescent participants were more likely to say they would invoke the right to 
counsel than would invoke the right to silence.  Adolescents reported they would assert 
the right to counsel at about the same rate adults did.  Adolescents were more likely to 
request counsel when presented with a vignette in which the character was innocent, 
while adults were more likely to request counsel when the character was guilty in the 
vignette.  Abromovitch and colleagues hypothesized that these findings are evidence that 
adults have a better understanding of the role of defense counsel.  Older adolescents 
reported they would request counsel at a similar rate (56%) as adults (60%), but only 
44% of young adolescents would assert their right to counsel.  While younger adolescents 
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demonstrate particularly poor understanding and decision making in an interrogation 
setting, older adolescents’ decisions are more similar to those of adults.     
Adolescents may not feel that assertion of their rights is voluntary.  Ferguson and 
Douglas (1970) interviewed 90 fourteen-year-old boys who had recently been adjudicated 
delinquent.  Most participants were aware of their right to remain silent, but 29% reported 
that they felt like they had to talk to police when arrested.  Sixty percent of the 
participants stated it would harm their case if they remained silent and 74% felt that it 
would help them if they spoke to the police.  Fifty-five percent of the sample reported 
that the arresting officer told them that talking would help their case.  Even if adolescents 
do comprehend their legal rights, they may not feel that they are free to exercise them.    
Researchers have also used vignettes to determine under what circumstances 
adolescents would confess in an interrogation.  Vignette studies present adolescents with 
a fictional scenario and ask them how they would react in that scenario.  More 
adolescents age 11-13 report they would confess in an interrogation (50%) and accept a 
plea deal (70%) than adults (20% would confess and 50% would accept the plea) (Grisso 
et. al., 2003).  Younger adolescents in particular report they would react differently in an 
interrogation scenario while older adolescents would make similar decisions as adults.   
Other researchers have interviewed juvenile offenders for reports of how they 
react in interrogations.  Viljoen, Klaver and Roesch (2005) interviewed 152 juvenile 
offenders in pre-trial detention regarding their recent interrogations.  Three-quarters of 
the juveniles reported that they had been questioned regarding the offense; of these, 
slightly over half were reported being worried.  Only 13% of juvenile offenders reported 
that they invoked their right to remain silent in their interrogation, and only 7.7% of 
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juvenile offenders fourteen and younger did so.  Fifty-five percent of the juveniles 
reported confessing to the offense; nine participants (5.9%) reported falsely confessing to 
the police.  Less than 10% of juvenile offenders requested an attorney, and only one in 
the sample (.9%) reported having counsel present.  Fifty-two percent reported they were 
pleading guilty to the offenses, and sixty-six percent of the total sample reported they 
would accept a plea bargain if offered.   
Research has explored adolescent’s competencies in regards to legal decision 
making in general.  In an examination of 152 juvenile offenders age 11-17, Viljoen and 
Roesch (2005) found that legal capacities increased with age.  Viljoen and Roesch 
assessed legal capacity using the Fitness Interview Test, Revised Edition (Roesch et. al., 
1998) (a semi-structured clinical interview originally designed to measure competency to 
stand trial in adults) and the Grisso’s Miranda Scales (Grisso, 1998), a series of scales 
that measure participant’s understanding and comprehension of basic legal rights.  Older 
offenders had higher scores on these legal capacity measures (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005).  
Cognitive abilities significantly predict legal capabilities, particularly understanding of 
Miranda rights, appreciation of adjudicative processes, and communication with counsel.   
Legal capacities are also related to other individual differences.  Intelligence, 
particularly verbal ability, is related to adjudicative competence and comprehension of 
Miranda rights (Viljoen & Roesch, 2005).  Prior contact with the police is generally not 
related to better comprehension of legal rights (Grisso, 1997), but prior arrests may be 
related to appreciation of the right to counsel and adjudicative competency (Viljoen & 
Roesch, 2005).  Contact with an attorney may help to improve various legal capacities 
regarding interrogation and adjudication.  Individuals from low socioeconomic status 
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backgrounds have lower scores on legal competencies, especially understanding and 
comprehension of legal rights.  
Adolescents are more likely than adults to confess to a crime they did not commit 
(Redlich & Goodman, 2003).  Gross and Shaffer (2012) examined the National Registry 
of Exonerations and found 11% of adult exonerations involved a false confession, but 
more than three times that, 38%, of juvenile exonerations involved a false confession.  In 
a laboratory experiment, participants were asked to take the blame for a confederate who 
had been caught cheating (Pimental, Arndorfer, & Malloy, 2015).  While a significant 
proportion of adult participants signed a false confession (39%) an even greater 
proportion, 59%, of adolescent participants did so.   
 Grisso (1981) observed 390 police interrogations of juvenile suspects where the 
juvenile’s parents were statutorily required to be present.  Parents did not communicate at 
all with their children in 66% of these interrogation.  In addition, less than 10% of the 
juveniles turned to their parents for advice.  Viljoen, Klaver and Roesch (2005) 
interviewed juvenile offenders regarding their recent police interrogations.  One-quarter 
of the offenders reported having one or more parent present for the interrogation; all of 
them stated that they did not specifically ask for their parent to be present.  Forty percent 
of these juveniles reported they were not aware of what their parents wanted them to do; 
of those that were aware, most thought their parents wanted them to confess (55.6%) or 
to tell the truth (33.3%).  Only two juveniles (11.1%) thought their parents wanted them 
to deny the offense.  This type of research indicates that parents may not always 
adequately help their children in the police interrogation setting, whether because they 
are unable, unwilling, or their children do not want their help.  Even when parents are 
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physically present for interrogations, they do not always participate or make their advice 
clear to their children.   
 Adults are often not fully aware of their own or their children’s legal rights.  
Woolard and colleagues (2008) compared parent’s understanding of legal rights in an 
interrogation with that of their adolescent child’s.  While parents had better knowledge of 
their Miranda rights and the behavioral implications of those rights, parents were not any 
more knowledgeable of police practices.  For example, 90% of adults and 95% of 
adolescents wrongly believed that police must identify whether the juvenile is a suspect 
or a witness, 2/3 of parents and half of the adolescents wrongly believed that the police 
must always wait for the parent to be present before interrogating the adolescent, and 
50% of both parents and adolescents wrongly believed that police could not lie in an 
interrogation.  Thus, even when parents are physically present, they may not know 
enough to adequately protect their child’s rights.  
 Development of risk taking and decision making in adolescence could help 
explain why adolescents exhibit less knowledge of their legal rights.  If adolescents do 
exhibit different expectations of privacy than adults, it could be due to how they evaluate 
risks and rewards.  One difficulty in extrapolating research findings to real-world 
decisions is that much research examines knowledge and decision making in a low-risk, 
low-emotion setting in which the individual has ample time to consider his or her options. 
Instead, the decision to confess and to waive one’s rights are actually made in a very 
high-risk, high-emotion, time sensitive situation. The next section discusses a 
developmental model of adolescent risk-taking and decision making models that could be 
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why adolescents’ decisions regarding their legal rights and evaluations of privacy differ 
from those of adults.    
Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-taking  
Steinberg’s (2010) Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking differentiates 
between two systems in the brain: the incentive processing system and the cognitive 
control system.  The incentive processing system involves the valuation and prediction of 
rewards and punishments.  This theory is based on developmental neuroscience research 
that identified two separate systems at work in adolescent risk-taking (Casey, Getz, & 
Galvan, 2008; Steinberg, 2008).  The “socioemotional” system (or incentive processing 
system) is located in the limbic and paralimbic brain areas and involves the amygdala, 
ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, and superior temporal 
sulcus.  The “cognitive control” system consists of the prefrontal and parietal cortices and 
related parts of anterior cingulate cortex.   
Steinberg (2010) connected adolescent risk-taking behaviors to an increase in 
dopamine activity in the socioemotional system beginning around puberty.  This leads to 
an increased attentiveness to rewards, increased sensation seeking, and heightened 
emotional arousal.  When this system is at its peak, adolescents may focus more on short 
term rewards and ignore long term consequences.   
 In contrast, the cognitive control system involves impulse control, foresight, and 
future planning (Steinberg, 2010).  This system matures gradually throughout 
adolescence, unlike the abrupt increase and then drop off seen with the incentive 
processing system.  Around age sixteen, the incentive processing system is at its most 
active point, while the cognitive control system is not yet fully matured.  Steinberg 
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(2010) identifies a temporal gap between the incentive processing system, which 
develops early in adolescence, and the cognitive control system, which fully matures 
much later, that makes adolescence a particularly vulnerable time for risk-taking 
behaviors.  This period of vulnerability coincides with an increase of risk-taking 
behaviors such as delinquency and reckless driving (Steinberg, 2008); these behaviors 
then decrease in early adulthood.  Subsequent research has demonstrated a link between 
reward seeking, cognitive control, and sexual behaviors in adolescence (Wasserman, 
Crockett & Hoffman, 2017), and an association with the gap between sensation seeking 
and impulsivity and juvenile deviant behaviors (Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017).   
 Steinberg (2010) empirically tested the development of the reward-processing and 
impulse control systems.  Steinberg collected data on 935 individuals ages 10 to 30.  
Participants completed self-report measures of reward-seeking (Sensation Seeking Scale; 
Zuckerman, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978) and impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, 
Patton & Stanford, 1995), a behavioral measure of impulsivity (the Tower of London 
task), and a behavioral measure of reward-seeking (an adapted version of the Iowa 
Gambling Task, described in detail below).  Consistent with the hypothesis of the Dual 
Systems Model, Steinberg observed an increase in reward-seeking in the early part of 
adolescence, which then declined starting around age sixteen.  Impulsivity, in contrast, 
declined throughout adolescence.  This pattern was displayed in both the self-report 
measures and the behavioral measures of these constructs.  
 Longitudinal studies of adolescents also demonstrate the period of vulnerability 
(Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011).  Harden and Tucker-Drob measured self-reported 
reward-seeking and impulsivity in a sample from the National Longitudinal Study of 
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Youth, Children and Young Adults.  Consistent with Steinberg’s (2010) cross-sectional 
research, mean levels of self-reported impulsivity declined from ages 12-24, but mean 
levels of self-reported reward-seeking increased from ages 12-16 before gradually 
declining through age 24 (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011).  This longitudinal data also 
showed significant individual differences in the changes in self-reported impulsivity and 
reward-seeking.  While most adolescents did follow the general trend, the magnitude of 
the developmental changes differed between individuals.  In addition, the correlation 
between individual differences in changes in self-reported impulsivity and individual 
differences in changes in self-reported reward-seeking was not statistically significant, 
indicating that the two systems develop independently from one another.  Longitudinal 
research has also identified sex differences in the development of the dual systems; 
female participants are higher in impulse control and lower in sensation-seeking than 
same-age male participants throughout adolescence and early adulthood (Shulman, 
Harden & Steinberg, 2014).  Sex differences in impulsivity and sensation-seeking 
increased with age, and females tended to reach the peak sensation-seeking behaviors 
around age 16-17, while males tended to reach the peak sensation-seeking around age 18-
19.   
“Hot” vs. “cold” decision making: Empirically studying the Dual Systems 
Model.   One way researchers measure decision making in the lab is the Iowa Gambling 
Task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994; Cauffman et. al., 2010).  The Iowa 
Gambling Task is a computerized task where participants are presented with four decks 
of cards and aim to get as much “money” as possible.  Participants must choose a card 
from one of the decks; the card will either add or take away simulated money. Two of the 
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decks are “good” decks in that they lead to gains over the course of many trials, while the 
other two decks are “bad” decks and lead to overall losses.  Adults demonstrate a 
preference for the advantageous decks over the course of many trials (Bowman & 
Turnball, 2003).  Young children (ages 6-12) keep a preference for the bad decks, while 
adolescents (ages 13-17) do learn to choose from the good decks (Crone & van der 
Molen, 2007).  However, adolescents still do not exhibit as strong of a preference for the 
good decks as adults.    
The Iowa Gambling Task is designed to approximate “hot” or emotional decision 
making, decisions that are made under time pressure and that involve considerations of 
risks and rewards.  Performance on the IGT has been linked to risk-taking behaviors, 
such as smoking (Xiao, Koritzky, Johnson, & Bechara, 2013) and risky driving behaviors 
(Lambert, Simons-Morton, Cain, Weisz, & Cox, 2014) and has been tied to intelligence 
(Webb, DelDonno, & Killgore, 2014).   Poor performance on the IGT in adolescence may 
be linked to increased impulsivity; Smith, Ziao and Bechara (2012) found that individuals 
who fail to exhibit a preference for the advantageous decks on the IGT had significantly 
faster response times when choosing a “bad” deck than individuals who perform 
advantageously.  Response times on the IGT get faster throughout middle adolescence, 
which supports the theory that reward-seeking peaks during adolescence and impulsivity 
generally declines .  In addition, adolescents’ poor performance may be due to their 
increased sensation seeking and sensitivity to rewards (Singh, 2013).   
Different decision-making tasks can measure capabilities under more controlled, 
less emotional circumstances.  The Gambling Machine Task (van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, 
Visser, & Huizenga, 2010) presents participants with two different gambling machines 
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that differ in their frequency of loss, the amount of loss, and the amount of constant gain.  
Participants need to indicate which machine is more advantageous (or if they are equally 
advantageous).  Unlike the Iowa Gambling Task, no feedback is provided to participants 
and gains and losses are not tracked over trials.  Adolescents perform similarly to adults 
on such a task.  While adolescents generally use one-dimensional decision rules on the 
Iowa Gambling Task (e.g., choosing decks that are characterized by infrequent loss), 
adolescents frequently employ more complicated two- or three-dimensional decision 
rules on the less affective Gambling Machine Task.  Adolescents also differed on the 
complexity of decision-rules they used on the GMT, demonstrating that individual 
differences may be important to examine in adolescent capabilities.  Similarly, providing 
more information about the probabilities of gains and losses on the Iowa Gambling Task 
can help bring adolescents’ performance close to that of adults (van Duijvenvoorde, 
Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012).  Thus, it may be possible to help improve 
adolescents’ decision making in hot circumstances by providing adolescents more 
information about the decision.  This would not, of course, completely do away with the 
risk and emotion associated with the decision, but would at least provide the adolescent 
more time to “cool down” this hot decision.  This research indicates that adolescents’ 
cognitive control system can utilize complicated decision-making rules but only under 
certain circumstances.  
The Columbia Card Task (CCT) (Figner et. al., 2009) includes two types of trials: 
hot and cold.  The hot version of the CCT allows participants to make step-wise decisions 
and receive feedback at every level.  For example, the participant clicks on a card and 
immediately learns whether it is a gain or a loss; if it is a gain, the participant 
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immediately sees the new value of the payoff and then determines whether to continue or 
to end the trial.  Neuroimaging studies (Aron et. al., 2004) show that this type of task 
activates the affective system in the brain.  In contrast, the cold CCT version does not 
provide feedback to avoid triggering the affective system.  Participants merely indicate 
the number of cards they wished to turn over, not which cards they would turn over.  The 
combination of no immediate feedback and a single, final decision avoids activation of 
the affective system.   
Adolescents demonstrate greater risk-taking (operationalized by turning over 
more cards) than adults in the hot version of the CCT, but not the cold (Figner et. al., 
2009).  It is possible that adolescents’ decision making was more influenced by the 
feedback than that of adults due to adolescents’ increased sensitivity to rewards.  In 
addition, greater risk-taking was associated with less use of relevant information (such as 
the number of loss cards) for adolescent participants in the hot version, but not the cold.  
Adolescents may be less likely to use provided information in affective situations than in 
deliberative situations.     
One potential reason adolescents demonstrate impaired capacity for “hot” 
decisions compared to adults could be their ability to anticipate negative outcomes 
(Crone & van der Molen, 2007).  Crone and van der Molen examined heart rate and skin 
conductance in children and adolescents as they completed the Iowa Gambling Task.  
Improved performance on the IGT was associated with changes in heartrate and skin 
conductance immediately prior to choosing from a “bad” deck, and this increased with 
age.  However, all participants, regardless of IGT performance or age, had similar heart 
rate and skin conductance responses immediately following a draw from a “bad” deck.  
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This indicates that while children and adolescents understand a negative outcome and are 
similarly impacted by it, children and younger adolescents do not anticipate the negative 
outcome the same as older adolescents or adults.   
Dual systems and legal decision making. Steinberg and colleagues (2009) 
recognize that this discrepancy between the two processing systems has legal implication.  
The American Psychological Association wrote amicus briefs in two Supreme Court 
cases that commentators observed were conflicting: in the brief for Roper v. Simmons 
(2005), the APA argued that adolescents are developmentally immature and should not 
be held as culpable as adults for criminal acts, but in the brief for Hodgson v. Minnesota 
(1990), the APA claimed that adolescents are as capable as adults at making medical 
decisions.   
According to Steinberg and colleagues (2009), these seemingly contradictory 
positions just reflect the fact that research has shown that adolescents are worse than 
adults when making “hot,” or emotional, decisions, but are as capable as adults at making 
“cold,” or cognitive, decisions.  Arguably, adolescents’ cognitive control system is 
adequately developed to reason through decisions when given enough information and 
time to do so, while being incapable to evaluate more emotionally-involved decisions 
made under time pressure.  The developmental gap between the incentive processing 
system and the cognitive control system may be responsible for the dichotomy between 
hot and cold decisions.  
The dual systems model for adolescent risk-taking may help predict adolescent 
delinquent behavior (Peach & Gaultney, 2013).  Data from the National Longitudinal 
Study of Adolescent Health on self-reported impulsivity, sensation-seeking, and 
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delinquent behavior was collected at three time points.  The average age at the first time 
point was 16.0 years, 21.8 years at the second time point, and 28.4 years at the third time 
point.  Similar to age-related differences in impulsivity and sensation-seeking, self-
reported impulsivity and sensation-seeking predicted delinquent behaviors at all three 
waves even after controlling for age, gender, and depression.  Thus, the dual systems 
model provides a framework for understanding one type of “hot” decision: delinquency 
through adolescence and adulthood.  As the cognitive control system develops and 
sensation seeking system activity declines, delinquent behaviors also decline.   
Reward appraisal may be especially important in delinquent behaviors.  Shulman 
and Cauffman (2013) hypothesized the development gap between the two systems results 
in an inability to properly evaluate rewards and risks. The incentive processing system 
sensitizes individuals to potential rewards and the excitement of novel experiences; the 
sensation-seeking aspect of this system is the most active in early and middle 
adolescence, while the cognitive control system develops slowly and is unable to 
“override” the more immature incentive processing system.  This may alter adolescents’ 
perceptions of rewards and costs of crime.  
Shulman and Cauffman (2013) measured reward bias (the tendency to perceive 
more rewards, fewer costs, and less danger when evaluating risk-taking behaviors) and 
law-breaking behaviors in adolescents and young adults.  Reward bias increases through 
early adolescence and is highest for ages 16-17, before declining through young 
adulthood.  Self-reported delinquent behaviors is strongly associated with reward bias for 
adolescents, but the association is weaker for adults.  The same pattern is shown when 
comparing court-involved youth with non-court-involved youth (the researchers used 
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whether an individual youth was involved in a case before the juvenile court as a proxy 
for delinquent behaviors).  While court-involved youth showed more reward bias than 
non-court involved, this association was strongest for the youngest age group included 
(12-13 year olds) and the weakest for the oldest age group (22-24 year olds).  This 
indicates reward bias is more related to law-breaking behaviors for early- and mid-
adolescents than it is for young adults.   
The above research indicates development of sensation-seeking and cognitive 
control system is relevant for both “hot” and “cold” decisions.  Decisions relevant to the 
Fourth Amendment could be either hot or cold.  Some empirical research on perceptions 
of privacy (e.g., Slobogin & Schumacher, 1993) ask participants to evaluate search 
scenarios in a cold, deliberative scenario; this is similar to the circumstances under which 
judges evaluate expectations of privacy.  Other research (e.g., Groscup, Brank, & 
Hoetger, in progress) use methodology that sets up a time-pressured, stressed decision 
and thus is more comparable to an actual search.  It is possible lay individuals evaluate 
expectations of privacy in a way that is similar to the decision to engage in law-breaking 
behaviors because it involves the immediate valuation of rewards and costs, and thus 
early- and mid-adolescents would not have the decision-making capacity to reason 
through the implications of violations of privacy (Shulman & Cauffman, 2013).  This is 
in contrast to the cold, “cognitive” decisions judges and policymakers make that involve 
evaluating objective expectations of privacy.  Further research is needed to explore how 
adolescents make decisions regarding their Fourth Amendment rights.       
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Kahneman’s Dual Systems Processing Model  
Other decision-making theorists have discussed and studied different systems in 
decision making.  Kahneman (2011) divides decision making into two systems: System 1 
and System 2.  Kahneman observes that social scientists often assume that humans are 
rational thinkers, while also recognizing that human logic is flawed and people frequently 
make errors in judgment.  He reconciled these observations with two separate systems.   
System 1 involves fast, automatic thinking.  Much of System 1 thinking is 
developed through experience, but some skills (such as being able to recognize faces 
from multiple angles), may be native to human thinking (Kahneman & Frederick, 2006). 
Thinking under this system is often so quick people are not aware of the processes behind 
the thought (Kahneman, 2011).  System 1 decision making often involves encoding 
choices in a way that disregards superficial or irrelevant features while still capturing the 
important and essential aspect of the choice.  If the context around the decision is overly-
complex or involves ambiguous circumstances, people often rely on heuristics to simplify 
the decision.  Heuristics are decision rules that may not be optimal but are “good enough” 
in a given situation.  Examples of heuristics that are at work in System 1 processing are 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (people rely on an initial piece of information, 
even when they know that information is not related to the answer), the availability 
heuristic (people judge the probability of an event occurring based on the ease with which 
examples of the event come to mind), or the representativeness heuristic (people evaluate 
the probability of an event or characteristic occurring based on how similar the person or 
situation is to a prototype of that event or characteristic).  These heuristics are not 
“wrong” necessarily but can lead to errors in judgment.   
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System 2, in contrast, involves more systematic, controlled, and effortful 
processing (Kahneman, 2011).  System 2 requires more time and mental resources to 
think through a problem; because of this, effortful processes can disrupt one another and 
cause errors in thinking.  Kahneman suggests that “System 2 monitors the activities of 
System 1” (Kahneman, 2003), meaning that System 1 processes (and all the heuristics 
that go along with them) kick in when System 2 processes are disrupted.  One example of 
the difference between System 1 and System 2 thinking is the “bat and ball problem” 
(Frederick, 2003).  Participants are told that, together, a bat and a ball cost $1.10 and that 
the bat cost $1.00 more than the ball.  When asked how much the ball costs, the majority 
of participants (50% of Princeton undergraduates and 56% of University of Michigan 
undergraduates) immediately give the incorrect answer of 10 cents (the correct answer is 
the ball cost five cents).  This is an example of an immediate judgment that would 
involve System 1 processing.  Kahneman (2003) hypothesizes that errors in the bat and 
ball problem would be even higher if participants’ System 2 thinking was disrupted, such 
as being involved in a different task.   
The dual system processing model can be applied to legal decisions.  Danzinger, 
Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso (2011) studied the parole decisions of Israeli judges and when 
the judges made those decisions in relation to their two daily meal breaks (a late morning 
snack and their lunch break).  The likelihood of a favorable ruling for the prisoner 
requesting parole was greater at the beginning of the day or immediately following one of 
the meal breaks.  The probability of a favorable ruling was around .65 at the beginning of 
the day or following a break, and declined steadily to nearly zero as the work period 
progressed.  The probability jumped back up to .65 after the break.  The authors 
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suggested that the results indicate that, when judges make repeated decisions, they tend to 
default to the “status quo” as they get fatigued.  The breaks restored the judges (either 
because of eating, resting, or an improvement of mood, but the authors could not 
determine which) to be able to fully use their deliberative System 2 processing.  The 
authors hypothesize that the same effects could be seen in other expert decision making, 
such as medical and legislative decisions.  The dual systems processing model may be 
important in a wide range of legally relevant decisions.  Specifically, subjective 
expectations of privacy may involve System 1 processing, while judges and policymakers 
likely use the more deliberative System 2 processing to evaluating objective and 
reasonable expectations of privacy.   
Kahneman’s (2011) dual systems processing model of decision making has some 
overlap with Steinberg’s (2010) dual processing model of adolescent risk-taking.  Both 
theories identify a deliberative process that requires utilizing mental resources and 
involves reasoned, effortful processing.  However, Kahneman’s (2011) System 1 does not 
exactly overlap with Steinberg’s (2010) incentive processing system.  Kahneman’s 
System 1 involves fast, automatic evaluations, while Steinberg’s incentive processing 
system involves the valuation of risks and rewards.  While this valuation may be 
automatic and fast, Kahneman’s System 1 applies to situations that do not necessarily 
involve valuation of risks and rewards.  For example, the ball and bat problem previously 
discussed does not involve risks or rewards but often demonstrates System 1 errors. 
However, it is possible that the valuation of risks and rewards involved in the incentive 
processing system occurs using System 1 thinking.  Thus, many of the biases and 
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heuristics that Kahneman discusses may also occur when individuals evaluate the risks to 
a certain decision.    
Like Steinberg’s (2010) Dual Systems Processing Model of Adolescent Risk-
Taking, Kahneman’s (2011) dual systems processing model of decision making is 
applicable to adolescents’ Fourth Amendment decisions.  Fourth Amendment decisions 
in the real world are often made in high-pressure situations without time to reason 
through them.  Thus, subjective expectations of privacy involve System 1 thinking and 
individuals may resort to the “status quo”, much like the judges in Danzinger, Levav, and 
Avnaim-Pesso (2011).  The status quo for adolescents (and, potentially, all people) may 
be both obedience to authority and expecting violations of privacy.  This may be 
especially true if the adolescents are especially accustomed to sharing information with 
others, as evident in the research on adolescents’ privacy expectations and information 
management within the family.  Thus, if subjective expectations of privacy are made 
using System 1 processing, individuals may be more likely to think that privacy invasions 
are reasonable.   
Applying Legal and Decision-Making Research to the Fourth Amendment  
 Legal scholars and judges often struggle with balancing policies that aim to 
protect adolescents from harm and policies that recognize adolescents have the capacities 
to make certain decisions and these decisions should be respected.  Psychological 
research has demonstrated adolescents have the cognitive ability to make certain 
decisions adequately, particularly those that are made in a cognitively cool setting that is 
not highly emotional.  One way to reconcile the difference between protectionism and 
personhood theories is to identify the types of decisions where adolescents are more 
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vulnerable to harm and creating policies that protect them, while allowing adolescents to 
make decisions in more cognitively cold situations.  
 One area where psychological research can particularly help inform this tension is 
in Fourth Amendment decision making.  The current standard of evaluating what privacy 
interests the Fourth Amendment protects involves an evaluation of both subjective and 
objective expectations of privacy.  Judges may have a particularly difficult time 
understanding adolescents’ expectations of privacy, and psychological research can help 
inform that.  Adolescents’ expectations of privacy may differ from those of adults for two 
potential reasons.  One, adolescents’ decision-making capacities are still developing.  
Adolescents differ from adults in incentive processing and sensation-seeking, and this 
may impact how they evaluate expectations of privacy, especially where their cognitive 
control system is not yet fully developed.   
In addition, current adolescents’ expectations of privacy have developed in the 
“Digital Age,” where digital communications and sharing of information are very 
common.  Adolescents are growing up aware of governmental privacy intrusions; for 
example, in 2013, the controversial National Security Agency policy of collecting mass 
amounts of on-line and cellular data was revealed (Greenwald, MacAskill, & Poira, 
2013).  Private policies and practices may also impact development of expectations of 
privacy.  For instance, commentators have suggested that the recently popular Elf on a 
Shelf fairy tale may lessen expectations of privacy (Pinto & Nemorin, 2014).  Elf on a 
Shelf is a holiday practice where parents place a small toy elf in their home and tell their 
children the elf is there to observe their actions and report back each night to Santa 
Clause in the North Pole.  Pinto and Nemorin argue that this accustoms children to 
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surveillance from third parties, which will translate to accepting surveillance and privacy 
intrusions from the government.  Today’s youth are constantly surrounded by technology, 
such as Amazon’s Alexa or iPhone’s Siri, that is constantly watching, listening, and 
attempting to make their lives easier.  Thus, adolescents differ from adults both in 
development and in experiences, and both of these factors may lead to differences in 
expectations of privacy.   
Such differences may have important impacts on the development of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  The reasonable expectation of privacy standard allows for 
Fourth Amendment protections to change over time as those expectations that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable evolve.  If adolescents’ expectations of privacy differ 
from those of adults’ due to generational differences, eventually the types of searches that 
are currently protected under the Fourth Amendment will change.  However, if 
adolescents’ expectations differ more so because of developmental differences in 
decision making, as adolescents’ develop their expectations will look more like those of 
adults’, and the current Fourth Amendment protections will arguably not need to evolve.  
 The current dissertation has detailed several lines of social science research that 
have studied issues relevant to understanding adolescents’ Fourth Amendment rights, 
including adolescents’ privacy expectations within the family and adolescents’ risk taking 
and decision making.  Next, the dissertation describes three studies that examine 
adolescents’ expectations of privacy and how those expectations differ from those of 
adults due to developmental or generational differences.  Study 1 extends studies from 
Slobogin and Schumacher (1993), Blumenthal, Adya and Mogle (2009), and Fradella and 
colleagues (2010) to examine adolescents’ expectations of privacy and compare those 
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expectations to Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions.  Study 2 measures the 
relationship between the sensation seeking and cognitive control systems in Steinberg’s 
(2010) Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-taking and expectations of privacy.  
Lastly, Study 3 tests one hypothesis for differences between adults and adolescents on 
privacy protecting behaviors: perception of risk in sharing information online, as 
measured by physiological responses.   
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ADOLESCENTS’ 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
Pilot Study 1: Adolescent Experiences with Searches 
 The first pilot study asked adolescents’ about their experiences with searches by 
police officers and school officials.  Adolescent participants also answered questions on 
how they think their parents would respond if requested to consent to a search of their 
(the adolescent children’s) belongings.   
Method. 
Participants. Participants were recruited from Holmes Middle School in Livonia, 
MI.  A teacher at the middle school forwarded an email to 68 parents of her seventh grade 
students that explained the opportunity for participation and provided a link to parental 
consent.  Students of parents who consented were provided with a password to allow 
them access to the online study.  Forty-five participants completed the survey; two 
participants were excluded for failing one or more of the attention checks for a total 
sample of 43 students (mean age = 12.2, 68.9% female).    
Procedures. Participants were told that the survey examined teenagers and 
searches.  Participants first completed the informed assent online before proceeding to the 
survey.  The survey first collected demographic information.  The next section of the 
survey asked participants about searches by a police officer, which excluded security 
officers such as at an airport.  If the participant had been searched by a police officer, the 
participant answered questions about if they gave consent, how the search made them 
feel, and what exactly was searched.  The participant also answered questions regarding 
whether they thought their parents would give police officers consent to search the 
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participant’s room, the participant and his or her clothing, and the participant’s cell phone 
(including text messages, email, and all social media accessible on the cell phone).  The 
participant then answered the same questions regarding school officials, which includes 
teachers and principals but excluded police officers who came to the school.   
Results.  No participants reported being searched by a police officer; three 
participants (7.0%) reported being subject to a dog sniff by a police officer.  Two 
participants reported being searched by a school official.  Of these, both students reported 
that the school official asked them for their consent to search and both students reported 
consenting to the search.  One student reported her consent was voluntary, while the other 
student reported her consent was not voluntary.  No students reported being subject to a 
dog sniff by a school official.   
 Participants also reported whether they thought their parents would consent to a 
search of their belongings in three situations by either a teacher or a school official.  
Table 1 depicts participants’ responses to these questions.  Participants were significantly 
more likely to predict that their parents would consent to a police search of their room 
(65.1%) or their cell phone (60.5%; χ²(1) = 18.06, p = .001) than a police pat down 
(48.8%; χ²(1) = 10.38, p = .035).  Participants were significantly more likely to predict 
that their parents would consent to a teacher search of their bag (71.1%) than a teacher 
pat down (51.2%; χ²(1) = 13.56, p < .01) or a school official search of their cell phone 
(55.8%; χ²(1) = 14.75, p < .01).  There was no significant differences in participants’ 
predictions of whether their parent would consent to a search conducted by a police 
officer compared to their predictions of whether their parent would consent to a search 
conducted by a teacher.  
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Table 1 
Adolescents’ Predictions of Parental Consent to a Search of Their Belongings 
Search   Parent Consent Parent Wouldn’t Consent Don’t know 
Police: room  28 (65.1%)  6 (14.0%)   9 (20.9%) 
Police: pat down 21 (48.8%)  11 (25.6%)   11 (25.6%) 
Police: cell phone 26 (60.5%)  9 (20.9%)   8 (18.6%) 
Teacher: bag  31 (71.1%)  4 (9.3%)   8 (18.6%) 
Teacher: pat down 22 (51.2%)  11 (25.6%)   10 (23.3%)  
Teacher: cell phone 24 (55.8%)  8 (18.6%)   11 (25.6%) 
             
Pilot Study 2: Parental Knowledge and Experiences with Adolescent Searches 
 The second pilot study was designed to measure parents’ awareness of their 
adolescent children’s experiences of searches by both police officers and school officials.  
In addition, the study asked parents how they think they would react if police officers or 
school officials asked for their consent to search their adolescent child or their 
belongings.   
Method.  
Participants. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk survey.  
Amazon Mechanical Turk “workers” that had at least a 90% approval rate for their 
completed surveys, had completed at least 500 surveys, and were located in the United 
States were eligible for the survey.  Participants were not limited to any location in the 
United States. Participants were told that they must have at least one child between the 
ages of 12 and 17 to be able to participate.  Two hundred and five participants completed 
the survey (53% female, M age = 37.92).  No participants had to be excluded for failing 
the attention checks.  The average number of teenaged children the participants had was 
1.79 (SD = .68).    
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Procedures. Participants were told that the survey was examining parent’s 
knowledge and decision making regarding their adolescent children and searches.  
Participants first completed the informed consent online before proceeding to the survey.  
The survey first collected demographic information, including the number, gender, and 
ages of children.  Participants reported if they or their adolescent child had ever been 
arrested and, if so, for what.  Participants also reported if they had ever been searched 
and, if so, answered questions about their perceptions of that search.  
 The next section of the survey informed parents that the survey was asking 
questions about searches of their adolescent child by a police officer, which excluded 
security officers such as at an airport.  If the participant did know their child had been 
searched by a police officer, the participant answered questions about if they or the child 
gave consent, how they believe the search made their child feel, and what exactly was 
searched on their child.  The participant also answered questions regarding whether they 
would give police officers consent to search their adolescent child’s room, their 
adolescent child and his or her clothing, and their adolescent’s cell phone (including text 
messages, email, and all social media accessible on the cell phone).  The participant then 
answered these same questions regarding school officials, which includes teachers and 
principals but excluded police officers who came to the school.  
 Results.  Seventeen participants (8.3%) reported that their adolescent child had 
experienced a search by a police officer.  Most (n = 11) reported their child had only been 
searched once, but 6 reported their child had been searched on two different occasions.  
The most common items searched were the teenager’s backpack or bag (n = 13) or a pat 
down of the teenager’s outer clothing (n = 11).  Fifteen (7.3%) participants reported that 
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their adolescent child had been searched by a school official.  Most (n = 9, 92.7%) 
reported only one search, but two participants reported two searches, two reported three 
searches, one reported four searches, and one reported five searches.  The most common 
item searched was the teenager’s bag or purse (n = 12, 80%).  Twelve (5.9%) participants 
reported that a school official used a trained dog to sniff their adolescent child’s person or 
property.   
 Table 2 shows the parents’ predictions of whether they would consent to a search 
of their adolescent child or their adolescent child’s belongings by either a police officer 
or school official.  Participants were significantly more likely to predict they would 
consent to a police search of their child’s room (28.9%) or a police pat down of their 
child (28.3%) than a search of their child’s cell phone (21%; χ²(1) = 222.04, p < .001; 
χ²(1) = 140.19, p < .001).  Participants were also significantly more likely to predict they 
would consent to a school official’s search of their child’s bag (30.7%) than a school 
official pat down of their child (23.9%); χ²(1) = 174.69, p < .001); or a school official 
search of their child’s cell phone (21.0%; χ²(1) = 113.77, p < .001).  Similarly, 
participants were significantly more likely to predict they would consent to a school 
official pat down of their child than a school official’s search of their child’s cell phone 
(χ²(1) = 144.446, p < .001).  In addition, participants were significantly more likely to 
predict they would consent to a police pat down of their child than a school official pat 
down of their child (χ²(1) = 93.76, p < .001) and a police search of their child’s cell phone 
than a school official search of their child’s cell phone (χ²(1) = 120.28, p < .001).  
Table 2 
Parents’ Predictions of Parental Consent to a Search of Their Belongings  
Search   Consent  Wouldn’t Consent  Don’t know 
Police: room  59 (28.9%)  131 (64.2%)   14 (6.9%) 
94 
 
     
Police: pat down 58 (28.3%)  135 (65.9%)   12 (5.9%) 
Police: cell phone 43 (21.0%)  149 (72.7%)   13 (6.3%) 
Teacher: bag  63 (30.7%)  118 (57.6%)   24 (11.7%) 
Teacher: pat down 49 (23.9%)  140 (68.3%)   16 (7.8%)  
Teacher: cell phone 28 (13.7%)  163 (79.5%)   14 (6.8%)   
Pilot Data Discussion 
 The pilot data demonstrate that adolescents and parents of adolescents think very 
differently about searches by police officers and school officials.  While a majority or 
near-majority of adolescents predicted their parents would consent to a search of their 
belongings or a pat down search, a majority of parents predicted they would not consent 
to such searches.  In addition, parents of adolescents differentiated between police 
officers and school officials.  For equivalent searches (a pat down of their child and a 
search of their child’s cell phone), parents were more likely to predict they would consent 
to the police officer search than the school official search.  Adolescent participants did 
not show such a pattern of differentiating between consent to police officer searches and 
teacher searches.   
 There are several explanations for why the parent participants predicted they 
would not consent to searches while the adolescent participants predicted their parents 
would consent.  Adolescents may expect their parents to consent to a search because they 
are accustomed to parents invading their privacy.  Another explanation may be that 
adolescents and adults just think about privacy in different ways.  The following three 
studies examine how adolescents and adults conceptualize privacy, and whether these 
differences are due to a generational difference or due to developmental changes in risk-
taking.   
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Study 1: Adolescents’ Expectations of Privacy and Fourth Amendment Case Law 
Study 1 extends the research of Slobogin and Schumacher (1993), Blumenthal, 
Adya and Mogle (2009), and Fradella and colleagues (2010) by comparing adolescent’s 
expectations of privacy with court rulings on reasonable expectations of privacy.   
Method. 
Participants.  Participants are 95 adolescents ages 12 through 17 recruited from 
schools in the Livonia School District in Southeast Michigan.  Livonia School District 
serves 14,880 students, 2,263 students in middle schools (grades 7-8) and 5,201 enrolled 
in high school (grades 9-12).  Of the final sample, 32 (33.6%) were in the seventh grade, 
8 (8.4%) were in the eighth grade, 0 (0.0%) were in the ninth grade, 5 (5.2%) were in the 
tenth grade, 12 (12.6%) were in the eleventh grade, and 38 (40.0%) were in the twelfth 
grade, when they completed the survey.  
The majority of participants, 85 (89.5%) identified their race as White or 
Caucasian, 2 (2.1%) identified as Black or African American, 6 (6.3%) identified as 
Asian, and 2 (2.1%) identified as Hispanic.  Fifty-five participants (57.9%) identified as 
male, and 40 (42.1%) identified as female. The mean age of participants was 14.8 (SD = 
1.35), and the median age was 16.  
Procedures.  Parental consent was first obtained from parents via email.  Livonia 
School District regularly collects email addresses from all parents and uses them to 
communicate important information.  Two middle school teachers and two high school 
teachers forwarded an email to parents of children enrolled in their classes explaining 
their child’s opportunity to participate in an online study and providing a link to an online 
parental consent.  A total of 540 parents were emailed the parental consent survey and 
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375 parents (69.4%) provided parental consent for their child to participate in the study.  
When providing consent, parents entered an email address for their adolescent child to 
facilitate communication directly with the child.  
The 375 adolescents who had parental consent were emailed with a secure 
password and a link to the study.  If the adolescent did not complete the survey, a follow-
up email was sent one week after the initial email and two weeks after the first follow-up 
email.  Of these 375 adolescents, 187 (49.9%) opened the provided link, 175 (46.7%) 
answered at least one question, and 96 participants (25.6%) completed the survey.  One 
participant who completed the survey was excluded due to failing the attention check 
questions for a final sample size of 95 participants (25.3% of the contacted sample). 
Because demographics were not collected on the contacted sample, it is not possible to 
compare the demographics of those who completed the survey with those who chose not 
to participate.  
The middle and high school teachers provided time during school and school 
computers for participants to complete the study. Informed assent and all study materials 
were completed online.  Participants who completed the study received a $3.00 
Amazon.com gift card via email.    
Measures.  Participants read a series of short vignettes (see Appendix A) 
describing searches from already-decided appellate and Supreme Court cases.  The 
selected cases involve juveniles (e.g., the search of a purse from New Jersey v. T.L.O. or 
random drug testing from Vernonia School District) or scenarios that are applicable to 
adolescents (e.g., driving a car).  Consistent with Slobogin and Schumacher (1993), 
participants evaluated each search from two different perspectives: a first person 
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perspective (e.g., the school principal searches your bag) and a third person perspective 
(e.g., the school principal searches a student’s bag).  The twenty-four search descriptions 
were presented in random order.   
Participants rated each search using a Likert scale (0 = not at all, 5 = extremely) 
on the following dimensions identified from previous research (Blumenthal et al., 2009; 
Fradella et al, 2010): personal nature of the item searched; intrusiveness of the search; 
extent of permission for the search; the extent to which the participant expected the thing 
or area that was searched to be private; and the extent the search violates bodily privacy, 
territorial privacy, informational privacy, and communications privacy.  Readability 
statistics conducted with Microsoft Word revealed all vignettes and questions were 
written at a sixth grade reading level.   
Hypotheses.  It is hypothesized that, consistent with previous research (Slobogin 
& Schumacher, 1993; Fradella, et al., 2010) and with Steinberg’s Dual Processing Model, 
adolescents will mostly agree with court rulings on what areas or things should be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment because the decision is a cold or cognitive one 
separated from the actual incident.  It is also hypothesized that adolescents will rate 
searches described in the first person as more intrusive than those described in the third 
person.  Additionally, it is hypothesized that the dimensions identified by previous 
research (e.g., permission for the search, intrusiveness) will predict ratings of whether the 
search violates privacy.   
Results. 
  Adolescents’ ratings of searches.  Participants’ average ratings of the searches 
from a third-party perspective is depicted in tables three through seven.  Because courts 
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view searches from a third-party perspective, these tables only include data on the ratings 
for searches presented in the third person.  These tables will only provide descriptive 
statistics; a statistical comparison of the different searches and of first vs. third-person 
perspective follows in the next section.  
 Participants rated each search on the three domains of privacy described by 
Slobogin and Schumacher (1993): intrusiveness, personal nature, and consent. As shown 
in Table 3, participants rated the intrusiveness of a bodily search—a pat down in a school 
setting—as the most intrusive, most personal in nature, and the least amount of consent 
given.  Additionally, participants consistently rated searches of information, including 
electronic tracking devices, cell phones, and Social Networking Sites, at or above the 
midpoint of the Likert scale on both intrusiveness and personal nature.  In fact, 
participants rated a search of a cell phone by police officers (M = 4.23) and school 
officials (M = 4.22) as personal in nature as a pat down search by school officials (M = 
4.23).  Participants rated a pat down search as fairly intrusive (M = 4.33), as they did 
searches of a cell phone (M = 3.94 for a police search; M = 4.00 for a school official 
search), and these results indicate adolescent participants view cell phones as very 
personal to them.  
 Participants also rated the amount of consent given for a particular search.  The 
average rating was below the midpoint on the scale for every search presented. 
Participants rated airport security searches as having the most consent (M = 2.39), along 
with a search of a bedroom with parental consent (M = 2.16).  Participants rated random 
drug testing for students involved in extra-curricular activities (M = 2.10) as having the 
same level of consent as random drug testing for students involved in athletics (M = 1.94, 
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t(94) = .38, p =.71).  The Supreme Court determined a random drug testing scheme for 
students involved in athletics was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, while a 
random drug testing scheme for students involved in extra-curricular activities was not. 
Also, the two searches participants rated as having the least amount of consent—a 
flashlight looking through a car window (M = 1.16) and a search of garbage left at the 
curb (M = 1.18)—are consistently found as not searches violating the Fourth Amendment 
under the plain view exception.  This may indicate adolescents do not consider consent 
when evaluating privacy rights the same way adults or courts consider it.  
Table 3 
Adolescents’ Third Person Ratings of Searches: Slobogin and Schumacher’s Privacy 
Domains (0 = not at all; 5 = extremely) 
Search    Intrusiveness  Personal Nature Consent 
Physical Searches 
Pat down (school)  4.33   4.23   1.53 
Backpack (school)  3.87   4.00   1.36 
Bus passenger’s bag  3.58   3.52   1.65 
Bedroom with parental consent 3.54   3.75   2.16 
Blood draw   3.52   3.54   1.93 
Plain view   3.41   3.38   1.40 
Fingerprint student (police)  3.26   3.31   1.39 
Drug sniff (police)   3.20   3.23   1.68 
Drug sniff (school)  3.18   3.09   1.58   
Random drug test (extra-curricular) 3.09   3.20   2.10 
Curtilage of home  2.98   2.93   1.52 
Random drug test (sports) 2.84   2.96   1.94 
Stop and talk   2.70   2.46   1.82 
Flashlight through car window 2.51   2.48   1.16 
Garbage   2.18   2.11   1.18   
Airport security  2.17   2.49   2.39 
  
Information Searches 
Cell phone (school)  4.00   4.22   1.48 
Cell phone (police)  3.94   4.23   1.46 
Diary    3.90   3.93   1.40 
Cell phone pictures  3.74   3.88   1.55 
Instant messages (school) 3.60   3.72   1.52 
Electronic tracking device on car 3.49   3.38   1.63 
Social Networking Site (school) 3.01   2.92   1.49 
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 Table 4 compares adolescent participants’ ratings of intrusiveness of the searches 
with Slobogin and Schumacher’s adult participants’ ratings.  These comparisons must be 
interpreted with caution, as there is nearly twenty-five years between the two studies and 
many differences in the samples beyond age.  One major difference that is apparent is 
how participants rated a pat down search by a school official.  Participants in the current 
study rated a pat down search as the most intrusive search presented to them (M = 4.33), 
while adult participants in Slobogin and Schumacher’s study rated the search thirtieth out 
of fifty searches presented.  Conversely, adult participants in Slobogin and Shumacher’s 
study considered a stop and talk as relatively more intrusive (ranked as 15th most 
intrusive out of the 50 searches presented) than did adolescent participants in the current 
study (ranked as 20th most intrusive out of the 23 searches presented).  Current 
adolescents may not view brief stop and talk procedures as intrusive, perhaps because 
they are used to being routinely questioned by adults.  
 On the other hand, adults in Slobogin and Schumacher’s study viewed some 
searches as similarly intrusive to adolescents in the current study.  Both a flashlight 
search through a car window and airport security were ranked as relatively unintrusive in 
both studies, while reading a private diary ranked as relatively very intrusive.  Certain 
types of searches—such as searches of private information—may universally be viewed 
as intrusive.  
 Like Slobogin and Schumacher (1993), current participants’ ratings of 
intrusiveness can be compared to how courts ruled on the same search.  Notably, the 
three searches adolescent participants in the current study rated as most intrusive—pat 
down search, school official search of a cell phone, and police officer search of a cell 
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phone—were all determined to be an unreasonable search by the courts that evaluated 
them.  The fourth-ranked most intrusive search (diary) was only ruled as not a Fourth 
Amendment violation because the search was conducted by a private actor.  
 On the other end of the intrusiveness spectrum, the seven searches ranked as least 
intrusive were all ruled by courts to be not unreasonable searches in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, the current participants did not always agree with courts. 
While courts have ruled both a school official’s search of a student’s backpack with 
reasonable suspicion and a school official’s search of pictures on a student’s cell phone 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment, current participants saw these searches as fairly 
intrusive (ranked at 5th and 6th most intrusive, respectively).  And while the Supreme 
Court held a school’s procedure of randomly drug testing all students involved in extra-
curricular activities as violating the Fourth Amendment, current participants did not view 
this search as highly intrusive (ranked at 16th most intrusive out of 23).  Thus, similar to 
Slobogin and Schumacher’s comparison of adult lay individuals to court rulings, while 
there seems to be agreement between adolescents and courts on the extreme ends of the 
intrusiveness spectrum, in the middle there is most disagreement.  It is in these “gray 
area” cases that courts’ rulings differ the most from adolescents’ opinions. 
Table 4 
Perceptions of Third-Person Searches Ranked by Intrusiveness: Comparison to Slobogin 
& Schumacher 
Search     Intrusiveness Current Rank Rank in S&S  Court Ruling 
Pat down (school)   4.33  1 30/50  Search 
Cell phone (school)   4.00  2 --  Search  
Cell phone (police)   3.94  3 --  Search 
Diary     3.90  4 3/50  Not a search  
Backpack (school)   3.87  5 10/50  Not a search 
Cell phone pictures   3.74  6 --  Not a search 
Instant messages (school)  3.60  7 --  Search 
Bus passenger’s bag   3.58  8 7/50  Not a search 
102 
 
     
Bedroom with parental consent 3.54  9 4/50  Not a search 
Blood draw    3.52  10 5/50  Not a search  
Electronic tracking device on car 3.49  11 33/50  Not a search  
Plain view    3.41  12 41/50  Not a search 
Fingerprinting student (police) 3.26  13 --  Search 
Dog sniff (police)   3.20  14 28/50  Not a search 
Dog sniff (school)   3.18  15 --  Not a search 
Random drug test (extra-curricular) 3.09  16 --  Search 
Social Networking Site (school) 3.01  17 --  Not a search 
Curtilage of a home   2.98  18 30/50  Not a search 
Random drug test (sports)  2.84  19 --  Not a search 
Stop and talk    2.70  20 15/50  Not a search 
Flashlight through car window 2.51  21 47/50  Not a search 
Garbage    2.18  22 38/50  Not a search 
Airport security   2.17  23 49/50  Not a search 
 
 Table 5 shows participants’ ratings of each search on Fradella et. al.’s privacy 
domains.  Some average ratings are obvious based on the description of the search; for 
example, the search rated highest in bodily privacy was a pat down search (M = 4.29). 
But participants also rated a cell phone search by a school official as violating bodily 
privacy (M = 3.04) and privacy of a person’s space (M = 3.77)—ratings comparable to 
the average ratings for a school official search of a backpack (M = 3.07 for bodily 
privacy and M = 3.68 for territorial privacy) and a drug sniff at school (M = 3.00 for 
bodily privacy and M = 3.14 for territorial privacy).  Searches of a cell phone were rated 
the highest in violating privacy of information and privacy of communications (police 
officer search: 4.00 for informational privacy, 4.10 for communications privacy; school 
official search: 4.10 for information privacy, 4.08 for communications privacy).  The 
relationship between the privacy domains and other perceptions of searches is discussed 
below.  
Table 5 
Adolescents’ Third-Person Ratings of Searches: Fradella et. al.’s Privacy Domains (0 = 
not at all; 5 = extremely) 
Search      Body Terr. Info. Communications 
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Physical Searches 
Blood draw     3.45 3.23 3.17 2.70   
Backpack (school)    3.07 3.68 3.58 2.86 
Pat down (school)    4.29 4.33 3.72 3.13 
Random drug test (extra-curricular)  2.86 2.85 2.53 2.23 
Random drug test (sports)   2.57 2.45 2.38 2.10 
Plain view     2.71 3.38 3.27 2.71 
Curtilage of home    2.09 3.12 2.59 2.31 
Airport security    2.04 2.05 1.89 1.78 
Flashlight through car window  2.21 2.50 2.28 2.03 
Drug sniff (police)     3.16 3.12 2.88 2.56 
Drug sniff (school)    3.00 3.14 2.65 2.45 
Bedroom with parental consent  3.01 3.78 3.46 2.89 
Stop and talk     2.13 2.29 2.60 2.39 
Bus passenger’s bag    2.80 3.58 3.29 2.81 
Garbage     2.00 2.11 2.25 1.90 
Fingerprint student (police)    3.17 3.07 2.90 2.35 
 
Information Searches 
Electronic tracking device on car  2.81 3.32 3.41 3.04 
Cell phone (police)    2.96 3.65 4.00 4.10 
Cell phone (school)    3.04 3.77 4.10 4.08 
Diary      2.86 3.49 3.94 3.33 
Cell phone pictures    2.81 3.56 3.72 3.65 
Social Networking Site (school)  2.61 2.77 2.90 2.81 
Instant messages (school)   2.74 3.51 3.65 3.75 
 
 Three searches were rated as the most violating of privacy: school official pat-
down (M = 4.16), school official cell phone search (M = 4.14), and police officer cell 
phone search (M = 4.00).  Airport security (M = 2.15) and a search of garbage left at the 
curb (M = 2.22) were the least violating of privacy.  The same pattern was found for 
ratings of expectations of privacy.   
Table 6 
Adolescents’ Third-Person Ratings of Searches: Privacy Expectations (0 = not at all; 5 = 
extremely) 
Search     Expectation of Privacy Violation of Privacy 
Physical Searches 
Blood draw    3.33    3.33 
Backpack (school)   3.67    3.68 
Pat down (school)   4.22    4.16 
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Random drug test (extra-curricular) 2.83    2.67 
Random drug test (sports)  2.64    2.63 
Plain view    3.31    3.39 
Curtilage of home   2.98    2.98 
Airport security   2.13    2.15 
Flashlight through car window 2.49    2.49 
Drug sniff (police)    3.09    3.12 
Drug sniff (school)   3.04    2.92 
Bedroom with parental consent 3.78    3.65 
Stop and talk    2.36    2.51 
Bus passenger’s bag   3.35    3.42 
Garbage    2.27    2.22 
Fingerprint student (police)   3.09    3.16 
 
Information Searches 
Electronic tracking device on car 3.31    3.45 
Cell phone (police)   4.00    4.00 
Cell phone (school)   4.10    4.14 
Diary     3.75    3.70 
Cell phone pictures   3.75    3.86 
Social Networking Site (school) 2.90    2.82 
Instant messages (school)  3.82    3.67 
  
 Participants also predicted how upset they would be and how upset they thought 
the average person their age would be if they experienced each search.  Participants also 
rated how relieved they would be and how relieved the average person would be; 
however these ratings were included to not bias responses to the other questions and are 
not important to the current analyses.  As shown in Table 7, participants consistently 
predicted they would be less upset than the average person their age for each of the 23 
searches presented.  For sixteen of the twenty-three searches, participants rated the 
average person would be statistically significantly more upset than they would be.  There 
was no statistically significant difference for the searches the participants predicted they 
would be the most upset (pat down, cell phone search by school, cell phone search by 
police officer, electronic tracking device on a car, and a diary search). 
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Table 7 
Adolescents’ Third-Person Ratings of Searches: Average Person vs. Participant (0 = not 
at all; 5 = extremely) 
Search     Upset (Avg.)  Upset (You) t p-value 
Physical Searches  
Blood draw    3.44  3.41  1.96 .05 
Backpack (school)   4.04  3.86  1.84 .07  
Pat down (school)   4.27  4.26  -.24 .81  
Random drug test (extra-curricular) 3.20  2.70  3.96 .00  
Random drug test (sports)  2.95  2.53  2.78 .01  
Plain view    3.54  3.34  1.92 .06  
Curtilage of home   3.36  3.02  3.09 .00  
Airport security   2.09  1.70  3.36 .00  
Flashlight through car window 2.83  2.55  2.00 .05  
Drug sniff (police)    3.45  3.20  2.39 .02  
Drug sniff (school)   3.23  2.96  2.07 .04  
Bedroom with parental consent 3.93  3.70  2.35 .02  
Stop and talk    2.63  2.40  2.32 .02  
Bus passenger’s bag   3.65  3.33  3.18 .00  
Garbage    2.49  2.33  1.47 .15  
Fingerprint student (police)   3.49  3.20  .34 .73  
 
Information Searches 
Electronic tracking device on car 3.92  3.60  .81 .85   
Cell phone (police)   4.11  3.98  1.60 .11  
Cell phone (school)   4.08  3.99  .78 .44  
Diary     3.91  3.82  .71 .48  
Cell phone pictures   3.87  3.84  2.45 .02  
Social Networking Site (school) 3.54  3.06  2.51 .01  
Instant messages (school)  3.90  3.67  2.21 .03  
 
   
Search perspective: Third vs. first person searches.  Multilevel modeling (MLM) 
was used to examine whether adolescents’ ratings of searches presented in the first 
person differed from the ratings of searches presented in the third person.  MLM is 
appropriate to use for repeated measures within individual participants to account for the 
nested structure of the vignettes and to test both within-subject and between-subject 
differences (Woltman, Feldstain, MacKay & Rocchi, 2012). MLM accounts for the 
interdependence of ratings of vignettes within each participant. Further, vignette 
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characteristics (first person vs. third person) can be examined as within-subject predictors 
of outcome ratings. The model was specified as followed: 
Level 1: Yij (outcome rating) = β0j + β1j (vignette characteristic) + rij  
 
       Level 2: β0j = γ00 + µ0j   
                      β1j = γ10 + µ1j  
where Yij represents scores on the outcome variable for vignette i by respondent j; β0j 
represents the intercept of respondent j (i.e., the average rating across vignettes); β1j 
represents the degree to which ratings vary as a function of vignette characteristic (first-
person=0, third-person=1); and rij represents random error for individual j.  Coefficients 
can be understood as functionally similar to unstandardized regression coefficients, and 
they represent the degree of association between two variables. All Level 1 parameters 
include a constant and a unique error term (at Level 2).  
Separate models were tested for each of the following individual outcome 
variables: intrusiveness, violations of privacy, and expectations of privacy.  It was 
hypothesized there would be a negative slope coefficient for β1j suggesting that first-
person vignettes are rated with higher scores of intrusiveness, violations of privacy, and 
expectations of privacy than third-person vignettes. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, perspective of vignette was not significantly 
associated with intrusiveness ratings, t(3421) = .7, p = .48, ratings of personal nature of 
item searched, t(3325) = .49, p = .623, ratings of permission granted for the search, 
t(3325) = .68, p = .49, ratings of privacy of the item searched, t(3325) = -.22, p = .83, 
ratings of how much the search violated privacy, t(3325) = -.24, p = .81, ratings of how 
upset the participant thought they would be, t(3325) = .53, p = .60, or ratings of how 
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upset the participant thought the average person their age would be, t(3325) = 1.4, p = 
.16.  These results indicate adolescents do not rate searches presented in the first person 
differently than those presented in the third person on any of the measured dimensions.   
Searcher: Teacher vs. police officers.  MLM was also used to examine whether 
adolescents rate searches conducted by a teacher differently than those conducted by 
police officers.  The model was specified as followed: 
Level 1: Yij (outcome rating) = β0j + β1j (vignette characteristic) + rij  
 
       Level 2: β0j = γ00 + µ0j   
                      β1j = γ10 + µ1j  
where Yij represents scores on the outcome variable for vignette i by respondent j; β0j 
represents the intercept of respondent j (i.e., the average rating across vignettes); β1j 
represents the degree to which ratings vary as a function of vignette characteristic (school 
official=0, police officer=1); and rij represents random error for individual j.  Coefficients 
can be understood as functionally similar to unstandardized regression coefficients, and 
they represent the degree of association between two variables.  All Level 1 parameters 
include a constant and a unique error term (at Level 2).  
Separate models were tested for each of the following individual outcome 
variables: intrusiveness, violations of privacy, and expectations of privacy.  It was 
hypothesized there would be a positive slope coefficient for β1j suggesting that police 
officer vignettes are rated with higher scores of intrusiveness, violations of privacy, and 
expectations of privacy than school vignettes. 
Identity of the searcher was not significantly associated with ratings of how much 
the search violated privacy, t(3325) = .73, p = .47, ratings of how upset the participant 
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thought they would be, t(3325) = -.32, p = .75, or ratings of how upset the participant 
thought the average person their age would be, t(3325) = .82, p = .41.  Identity of the 
searcher was marginally associated with intrusiveness ratings; on average, searches 
conducted by police officers were rated as more intrusive than those conducted by school 
officials, t(3325) = 1.89, p = .058.  Identity of the searcher was marginally associated 
with ratings of private nature of the item search, t(3325) = 1.69, p = .09. 
Identity of the searcher was positively associated with ratings of the personal 
nature of the item searched, t(3325) = 5.93, p < .001.  On average, searches conducted by 
police officers were rated as more personal in nature than those conducted by school 
officials.  This relationship between identity of the searcher and ratings of personal nature 
was significantly associated with age, t(92) = 2.69, p < .01.  As age increased, searches 
conducted by police officers were rated as increasingly more personal in nature than 
those conducted by school officials.  
Identity of the searcher was also positively associated with ratings of permission 
granted for the search, t(3325) = 5.18, p < .001.  On average, searches conducted by 
police officers were rated as having more permission than those conducted by school 
officials.  Age was not significantly associated with this relationship, t(92) = .22, p = .83. 
Variables that predict privacy perceptions.  To determine whether variables 
identified by Slobogin and Schumacher (1993) or Fradella and colleagues (2009) 
accurately describe the variables adolescents use to determine whether a search violates 
privacy, two different models were analyzed using MLM. The models were specified as 
followed: 
Level 1: Yij (outcome rating) = β0j + β1j (vignette characteristic) + rij  
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       Level 2: β0j = γ00 + µ0j   
                      β1j = γ10 + µ1j  
where Yij represents scores on the outcome variable for vignette i by respondent j; β0j 
represents the intercept of respondent j (i.e., the average rating across vignettes); β1j 
represents the degree to which ratings vary as a function of vignette characteristic 
(personal nature, consent given, bodily privacy, territorial privacy, communications 
privacy, and informational privacy); and rij represents random error for individual j. 
Separate models were tested for each vignette characteristic and for each of the three 
outcomes (intrusiveness, violation of privacy, and expectation of privacy).  A significant 
β1j coefficient for a given model will provide evidence that an outcome varies as a 
function of a particular vignette characteristic (e.g., vignettes of a more personal nature 
will be rated significantly higher with regard to intrusiveness).  
The first model includes variables Slobogin and Schumacher identified—personal 
nature of item searched, intrusiveness of the search, and consent (extent to which 
permission was granted for the search)—as Level 1 predictors of ratings of how much the 
search violated privacy.  
Ratings of the personal nature of the item search were associated with ratings of 
how much the search violated privacy, t(3324) = 10.91, p < .001; on average, as ratings 
of the personal nature of the item searched increased, so did ratings of how much the 
search violated privacy.  Ratings of the intrusiveness of the search were also significantly 
associated with ratings of how much the search violated privacy, t(3324) = 53.39, p < 
.001; on average, as ratings of the intrusiveness of the search increased, so did ratings of 
how much the search violated privacy.  However, ratings of the extent to which 
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permission was granted were not associated with ratings of how much the search violated 
privacy, t(3324) = .01, p = .99.  Thus, while perceptions of the intrusiveness of the search 
and perceptions of the personal nature of the item searched are related to perceptions of 
the extent to which the search violated privacy, perceptions of consent are not.  
These relationships were not significantly associated with the participant’s age, 
t(92) = -1.32, p = .19.  
The second model included the four variables Fradella and colleagues posited 
affect perceptions of searches—bodily privacy, territorial, informational privacy, and 
communications privacy—as Level 1 predictors of perceptions of how much a search 
violated privacy.  All four of the variables were significantly associated with perceptions 
of privacy violations.  On average, as ratings of the extent to which the search implicated 
bodily privacy increased, so did ratings of how much the search violated privacy, t(3323) 
= 7.88, p < .001.  The same effect was found for territorial privacy, t(3323) = 23.04, p < 
.001, informational privacy, t(3323) = 21.69, p < .001, and communications privacy, 
t(3323) = 7.85, p < .001. These relationships were not significantly associated with the 
participant’s age, t(92) = 1.54, p = .13.  
Study 1 Discussion 
 One implication from Study 1 is that adolescents view searches of cell phones—
either conducted by school officials or police officers—as highly violating privacy, as 
much as a pat-down search. The Supreme Court indicated a search such as a pat-down is 
highly intrusive and requires a heightened level of suspicion in a school setting (Safford 
v. Redding, 2013).  In light of this research, courts may want to take into account that 
individuals view searches of cell phones as similar to the physical pat-down.  
111 
 
     
 The Supreme Court has determined searches of cell phones receive Fourth 
Amendment protections, partly because of their importance in society, so the Court may 
agree with adolescents in that regard (Riley v. California, 2015).  This is consistent with 
another finding from Study 1—while adolescents’ ratings of intrusiveness agree with 
court rulings on searches deemed to be either highly intrusive or not at all intrusive, there 
is still a “gray area” where adolescents and courts view searches differently.  This finding 
is consistent with Slobogin and Shumacher’s comparison of adult ratings to court rulings. 
This may be because there are some searches that are so intrusive (e.g., physical pat 
down) or so not intrusive (e.g., search of garbage placed at a curb) that the vast majority 
of people, regardless of age or profession, agree on the privacy implications.  
 Contrary to Slobogin and Shumacher’s findings, adolescents in the current study 
did not rate searches presented in the first person differently than those presented in the 
third person.  This may be due to a phenomenon referred to as the egocentric bias, in 
which people fail to consider situations from others’ perspectives (Greenwald, 1980). 
One form of this bias is the Emotional Egocentricity Bias: when individuals consider 
others’ emotions, they are highly influenced by their own emotions (Riva, Triscoli, 
Lamm, Carnaghi, & Silani, 2016).  This bias is enhanced in adolescents compared to 
adults. Thus, adolescents’ ratings of first- and third-person searches may not differ 
because adolescents are highly likely to consider the third-person searches from their 
own, first-person perspective.  
 However, the Emotional Egocentricity Bias would hypothesize that adolescents 
would predict others would have the same reaction to the search as they would.  This, 
however, was not found in Study 1.  Instead, for the majority of searches, adolescents 
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predicted average individuals their age would be more upset than they would be if they 
were the subject of the search.  One potential reason is adolescents (as do most 
individuals) have a desire to present themselves in a positive light (Fisher, 1993).  Thus, 
participants may have rated their own potential upset feelings lower than others’ because 
they wanted to be seen as someone not likely to have negative feelings.  
 Study 1 also examined whether adolescents’ ratings of dimensions identified by 
previous research were predictive of adolescents’ ratings of privacy violations.  One 
finding of Study 1 is that adolescents’ ratings of permission granted for the search were 
not predictive of ratings of whether the search violated privacy.  This finding is contrary 
to Blumenthal and colleagues, who identified consent as an important domain of privacy 
expectations in adults.  It is possible adolescents do not view consent as importantly as do 
adults; possibly, adolescents do not consider themselves as having the ability to consent 
to various searches, whether because others (such as their parents) are the ones to 
consent, or because adolescents are so accustomed to being the subject of searches in 
which explicit consent is not a factor (e.g., airport searches, security searches at schools). 
Further research can explore how adolescents understand the concept of consent and how 
this may differ from adults.  
 The current study also examined the privacy domains identified by Fradella and 
colleagues—bodily, territorial, informational, and communications privacy—and how 
adolescents’ ratings of these domains predicted whether adolescents thought a search 
violated privacy.  All four of the domains were significant predictors of ratings of privacy 
violations.  And while it may be predicted from Fradella and colleagues and adolescents’ 
increased use of wired communications that ratings of informational and communications 
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privacy may be more predictive of ratings of privacy violations, that was not the case in 
the current study.  This may be because adolescents view searches of property highly 
connected with information and communications (a cell phone search) as also violating 
bodily and personal space privacy.  This may indicate cell phones are so important to 
adolescents that they view the phones as part of their personal space, potentially as part of 
their identity.  
 Study 1 only examined adolescents’ perceptions of searches that courts had 
already confronted.  While the results could be compared to prior research and court 
rulings, direct comparisons of different age groups was not possible due to different 
measures and dependent variables.  Study 2 sought to expand the results of Study 1 by 
including participants across the lifespan.  In addition, Study 2 includes more individual 
difference variables to examine whether age and development play a role in privacy 
expectations.  Because searches of wired communications, such as cell phones and Social 
Networking Sites, are just now reaching the courts, and due to generational differences in 
the use of these types of communications, Study 2 focused on these types of searches.  
Study 2: Dual Systems Model and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the link between reasonable expectations 
of privacy and privacy-protecting behaviors.  Previous research (Patchin & Hinduja, 
2010) has established that adolescents’ expectation of privacy from private actors is 
positively correlated with privacy-protecting behaviors online and that adolescents 
disclose more information online than do adults (Christofides et. al., 2012).  Study 2 
compared expectations of privacy from government intrusions online and privacy 
protecting behaviors for a wide range of age groups and whether differences in privacy 
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expectations and privacy-protecting behaviors are related to decision-making 
development or due to a generational gap in experience with digital communications. 
Method.  
Participants.  A total of 341 participants completed the second study.  The 
average age of all participants was 33.4 years.  Two hundred eighty-three participants 
(81.8%) identified their race was White or Caucasian, 22 (6.4%) identified as Asian, 16 
(4.6%) identified as Hispanic, 14 (4.0%) identified as Black, 2 (.6%) identified as Native 
American or Pacific Islander, and 5 (1.4%) identified their race as “other.”  One hundred 
seventy-seventy participants (51.2%) identified as female, 163 (47.4%) identified as 
male, and 1 (.3%) identified as other.  
Forty-three adolescent participants ages 12-17 were recruited from the same 
school district as in Study 1 and received a $3.00 Amazon.com gift card via email.  The 
recruitment was done in a different semester as was Study 1, so while it cannot be 
guaranteed there were no participants who completed both studies, the overall population 
from which participants were recruited was mostly different. 
The mean age of the adolescent participant sample was 12.9 years (SD = 1.34).  
The majority (35 participants, 81.4%) identified their race as White or Caucasian, 5 
(11.6%) identified as Asian, 1 (2.3%) identified as Native American or Pacific Islander, 
and 2 (4.6%) identified as “other.”  Twenty-five (58.1%) adolescents identified as female 
and 18 (41.9%) identified as male.  
One hundred and twenty-nine young adult participants (ages 18-25) were 
recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
in exchange for course credit.  The mean age of the young adult population was 20.3 
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years (SD = 1.69).  The majority of young adult participants (113, 87.6%) identified their 
race as White or Caucasian, 8 (6.2%) identified as Asian, 7 (5.4%) identified as Hispanic, 
and 2 (1.6%) identified as Black.  The majority (84, 65.1%) of participants identified as 
female, and 45 (34.9%) identified as male.  
One hundred and sixty-nine adults—91 middle age adults (age 26-59) and 78 
older adults (age 60 and older) were recruited from the online Amazon MTurk database. 
Only participants who live in the Midwest were included in recruitment from MTurk to 
obtain similar demographic profiles across age samples.  Previous empirical research 
indicates participants who complete surveys via MTurk provide data that is reliable as 
data obtained from other methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, 
Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010).  Adult participants received $3.00 via the MTurk system in 
exchange for their participation.  
 The mean age of the overall adult population was 48.6 years (SD = 14.85).  The 
majority (135, 79.9%) identified their race as White or Caucasian, 12 (7.1%) identified as 
Black, 9 (5.3%) identified as Hispanic, 9 (5.3%) identified as Asian, 1 (.6%) identified as 
Native American or Pacific Islander, and 3 (1.8%) identified as “other.”  The majority of 
the adult sample (101, 59.8%) was male, and 68 (40.2%) was female.  The adult sample 
also reported their highest level of education.  Eleven participants (6.5%) reported an 
advanced degree such as a master’s or doctorate and 92 (54.4%) reported completing 
college.  Thirty-two (18.9%) reported completing some college.  Thirty-one (18.3%) 
reported the highest level of education they completed was high school and two (1.2%) 
reported completing some high school.  
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Procedures.  All participants completed the measures on-line.  Parental consent 
for adolescent participants was obtained the same way as in Study 1.  Two middle school 
teachers emailed the link to the parental consent survey to the parents of adolescents 
currently enrolled in their class.  Two-hundred and four parents were emailed the survey 
and 117 parents (57.3%) provided parental consent for their adolescent child to 
participate in the survey and an email address at which to contact their child.  Of the 117 
adolescents emailed the survey, 62 (52.9%) opened the survey link, 47 (40.2%) answered 
at least one question, and 45 (38.5%) completed the survey.  Two adolescent participants 
were excluded for failing the attention check questions for a final sample size of 43 
participants (36.8% of the contacted sample).  
University students were recruited via the on-line system SONA and received one 
credit of research participation.  Adult participants were recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk website.  Only MTurk “workers” that had at least a 90% approval rate 
for their completed surveys, had completed at least 500 surveys, and were located in the 
Midwestern United States were eligible for the survey.  MTurk participants received 
$3.00 in exchange for their participation.   
Measures.  Participants first answered demographic questions, and then 
completed the Social Networking Site disclosure survey (included in Appendix E) and 
information about their experience with digital communications.  Participants then 
answered questions regarding their expectations of privacy online from government 
actors.  Participants rated how likely it is that the government will access various forms 
of information (such as their Social Networking Site profile, private e-mails and instant 
messages, and pictures posted to social networking sites) and how reasonable they think 
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it is for government actors to access this information.  The search scenarios and questions 
are included in Appendix B.   
In addition, participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton & 
Stanford, 1995) and six items from the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1978) to measure developmental trajectories of the dual systems model of 
adolescent risk-taking.  Steinberg (2008) used the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale and the 
Sensation Seeking Scale to measure the incentive processing system of adolescents.   The 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Version 11) is a 30-item self-report measure; participants 
rate how often they do certain things on a scale of 1 (almost never/never) to 4 (almost 
always/always).  Higher scores indicate more impulsiveness.  The Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale Version 11 has been found to be an internally consistent measure of impulsiveness 
(Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995) and suitable for measuring impulsiveness among 
adolescents (Steinberg, 2008).  The Sensation Seeking Scale is a 19-item true/false 
measure.  The original Sensation Seeking Scale includes four sub-scales: thrill and 
adventure seeking, disinhibition, experience seeking, and boredom susceptibility.  
Steinberg (2008) only included six items from the original Sensation Seeking Scale 
because the other items measured impulsivity, not sensation seeking.  Both the entire 
Sensation Seeking Scale and the subset of six items has adequate internal reliability 
(Zuckerman, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1978; Steinberg, 2008).  The scales are included in 
Appendices C and D.  
Hypotheses.  It is hypothesized that, consistent with risk-taking research 
(Steinberg, 2010) privacy-protecting behaviors will be at their lowest in early and middle 
adolescence and increase in late adolescence to adulthood.  Similarly, age, impulsivity, 
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and sensation-seeking will be associated with ratings of privacy, indicating both age and 
development of decision-making behaviors are related to evaluations of privacy.  
Results. 
 Social networking usage and privacy disclosures. The majority of participants 
(327, 94.5%) were a member of at least one Social Networking Site (SNS).  The most 
popular SNS was Facebook, with 299 participants (91.4% of participants who are a 
member of at least one SNS) reporting they had a profile on that platform.  One hundred 
ninety-six participants (59.9% of participants who are a member of at least one SNS) 
reported they used Facebook more than any other SNS platform.  Table 8 displays the 
information participants share on the SNS profile they use the most and the privacy 
settings they utilize for each type of information.  The average number of hours 
participants spent each day on SNS was 1.71 (SD = 1.34); this number was significantly 
correlated with age (r = -.22, p < .05), such that as the age of the participant increased, 
the time the participant reported they spent on social media decreased. The average 
number of years participants had been using social media was less than a year; this was 
not associated with age (r = .08).  
 As shown in Table 8, the majority of participants publicly share their first (67.7%) 
and last names (60.2%).  The majority of participants did not include contact information 
such as their address (90.0%), phone number (75.8%), or email address (64.5%) 
anywhere on their SNS profile.  Participants commonly utilized privacy settings for 
pictures and posts; 48.9% of participants shared their pictures only with their friends and 
47.9% shared their posts only with their friends.  Additional privacy-protecting 
behaviors, such as sharing information with only some friends or posting only fake 
119 
 
     
information, were less commonly utilized.  For example, 3.0% of participants reported 
utilizing a fake profile picture.  
Table 8 
Privacy Settings for Specific Information on SNS Profile (All Age Groups Included; N = 
341) 
Information Not On Public  Limited  Friends Some Fake 
  Profile    Public    Friends  
First Name 8.2%  67.7%  6.4%  11.9%  4.0% 1.8% 
Last Name 17.3%  60.2%  6.1%  11.6%  3.0% 1.8% 
Picture  13.7%  60.8%  7.0%  10.9%  4.6% 3.0% 
Birthday 30.0%  19.3%  12.8%  31.8%  5.2% 0.9% 
Phone # 75.8%  2.1%  4.3%  11.6%  5.8% 0.3% 
Email  64.5%  6.4%  5.2%  15.6%  7.0% 1.2% 
IM Name 67.3%  11.0%  3.7%  14.1%  3.1% 0.9% 
Address 90.5%  0.3%  1.5%  4.6%  1.5% 1.5% 
Current City 39.9%  25.3%  7.6%  20.7%  3.6% 2.7% 
Schedule 90.0%  0.9%  2.7%  4.6%  0.9% 0.9% 
Employment 60.4%  15.5%  5.5%  15.5%  2.1% 0.9% 
School  51.5%  23.2%  5.8%  16.5%  2.1% 0.9% 
Orientation 62.1%  14.1%  5.2%  15.6%  2.4% 0.6% 
Likes  35.4%  26.5%  9.1%  25.0%  3.4% 0.6% 
Relationship 49.1%  20.4%  6.4%  21.0%  3.0% 0.0% 
Groups 63.0%  9.5%  7.3%  17.1%  2.4% 0.6% 
Pictures Tagged  15.9%  17.7%  23.2%  35.8%  7.3% 0.3% 
Own Pictures 9.2%  19.4%  17.2%  48.9%  4.9% 0.3% 
Others’ Posts 8.5%  22.6%  17.4%  47.9%  4.0% 0.6% 
Own Posts 13.1%  26.2%  21.3%  34/5%  4.6% 0.6% 
 
 A composite Privacy Disclosure Score was created to facilitate analysis of amount 
of information shared on social media and individual characteristics.  Responses that the 
information was not on the user’s profile received a score of 0, responses that the 
information was on the profile but access to the information was limited (limited public, 
friends only, some friends, and fake information) received a score of 1, and responses 
that the information was on the profile and all users had access to it received a score of 2. 
Thus, higher scores indicate more information shared on the profile with more public 
access.  Scores ranged from 0 to 40, and reliability analysis indicated adequate internal 
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reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .85).  The average Privacy Disclosure Score was 15.76 
(SD = 6.63).  
 The Privacy Disclosure Score was not significantly correlated with age (r = -.07) 
or scores on the Sensation Seeking Scale (r = .08), but was significantly correlated with 
scores on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale.  As impulsivity increased, so did the amount of 
information the user disclosed on social media (r = .18, p < .01).  A multiple regression 
examining whether age, impulsivity, sensation seeking, and hours per day using an SNS 
and years using an SNS predicted the Privacy Disclosure Score was significant (R2 = .06, 
F(5, 250) = 3.55, p < .01).  As shown in Table 9, the hours per day participants reported 
using social media and participants’ scores on impulsivity were significant predictors of 
the Privacy Disclosure Score, but age, years on SNS, and sensation seeking were not.  
Table 9 
Age, Development, and Experience as Predictors of Self-Reported Privacy Disclosures   
     B  SE B  Beta 
Age     -.02  .02  -.07 
Years on SNS    .00  .00  .00 
Hours/Day    .81  .32  .16*  
Impulsivity    .12  .05  .15* 
Sensation Seeking    -.04  .21  -.01 
Note: beta values identified with an asterisk are significant at the p < .05 level 
 Risk perceptions of sharing information.  Participants rated the risk associated 
with sharing each piece of information on a Likert scale of 0 (not at all risky) to 5 
(extremely risky).  One-way ANOVA’s were conducted to examine mean group 
differences in perceptions of risk; for significant differences, post-hoc analyses were 
conducted using Tukey’s HSD and LSD.  The average risk ratings are shown in Table 10.  
Information that would enable others to contact the participant, such as phone number or 
address, was rated the riskiest information across all age groups.  The least risky 
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information included first name, a user’s “likes,” and relationship status.  The risk 
perceptions for the riskiest and least risky rated information did not differ between the 
three age groups (F’s(2,329) < 2.5, p’s > .1). 
 There was no consistent pattern of differences in risk perceptions across the three 
age groups.  The perceived level of risk of each information may have been affected by 
variables unique to each age group.  Young adults perceived sharing some types of 
information—e.g., first name, last name, birthday—as less risky than did both 
adolescents and adults (F’s(2,329) > 8.5, p’s < .05).  But young adults perceived sharing 
their schedule as riskier (M = 4.28) than did both adults (M = 3.76) and adolescents (M = 
3.45; F(2,329) = 8.54, p <.001).  Perhaps college students, with schedules that vary from 
day-to-day, perceive publicly posting their schedule as riskier than do other age groups, 
members of which have schedules that are more predictably set with school and work. 
Adolescents rated sharing their current city as riskier (M = 4.15) than did young adults (M 
= 3.34) and adults (M = 3.00; F(2,329) = 9.73, p < .001).  The same pattern was found 
with other types of information, with adolescents rating sharing sexual orientation as 
riskier (M = 2.63) than both young adults (M = 1.22) and adults (M = 1.66; F(2,326) = 
13.76, p < .001) and sharing school information as riskier (M = 3.76) than both young 
adults (M = 2.36) and adults (M = 2.74; F(2,326) = 12.71, p < .001).  
Table 10 
Risk Perception of Sharing Specific Information on Social Media Profile: Age 
Comparisons (0 = not at all risky, 5 = extremely risky) 
Information  Adolescent  Young Adult  Adult  Overall 
   (N = 43)  (N = 129)  (N = 169)  
First Name  1.70   .88   1.43  1.25 
Last Name  3.07   1.77   2.46  2.27 
Profile Picture  2.43   1.50   1.87  1.80 
Birthday  2.67   1.98   2.56  2.35 
Phone #  4.00   4.02   4.07  4.04 
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Email Address 3.43   3.55   3.51  3.52 
IM Name  2.21   2.68   2.47  2.52 
Address  4.69   4.68   4.47  4.58 
Current City  4.15   3.34   3.00  3.28 
Schedule  3.45   4.28   3.76  3.92 
Employment  3.74   3.08   3.21  3.23 
School   3.76   2.36   2.74  2.72 
Sexual Orientation 2.63   1.22   1.66  1.61 
Likes    1.33   1.19   1.45  1.33 
Relationship  1.43   1.11   1.58  1.37 
Groups  2.90   1.87   2.16  2.14 
Pictures Tagged 2.68   2.25   2.43  2.39 
Your Pictures  2.60   2.15   2.34  2.29 
Others’ Posts  1.81   1.82   2.06  1.93 
Your Posts  1.71   1.71   2.07  1.88 
 
   
Age, impulsivity, and sensation seeking.  Pearson’s correlation was used to 
examine the relationship between impulsivity, sensation seeking, and age. As predicted, 
scores on the Sensation Seeking Scale were significantly negatively related to age—as 
age increased, scores on the SSS decreased (r = -.36, p < .001, n = 309).  However, the 
relationship between age and scores on the Barratt Impulsivity Scale was only trending 
toward significance, though in the predicted direction (r = -.10, p = .09, n = 277).  Also as 
predicted, scores on the BIS and SSS were significantly positively correlated; as 
impulsivity increased, so did sensation seeking (r = .28, p < .001, n = 277).  
 To examine the relationship between age and impulsivity and age and sensation 
seeking another way, one-way ANOVAs were conducted.  The same result was obtained; 
adolescents scored significantly higher on the SSS than young adults, who scored 
significantly higher than adults (F(2, 307) = 34.72, p < .001).  The same pattern was 
observed with scores on the BIS, but the difference was not statistically significant 
(F(2,275) = 2.50, p = .08).  
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Table 11 
Average Scores on the SSS and BIS by Age Group 
   Adolescents Young Adults Adults   Overall 
   (N = 43)  (N = 129) (N = 169) 
SSS (Max = 6.00) 4.45  3.85  2.15  3.08 
BIS (Max = 120.00) 69.54  67.69  65.94  67.00 
 
 Perceptions of searches.  Participants rated searches on eight dimensions on a 
scale of 0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The following tables show the average ratings for 
each dimension by age group.  
 Table 12 displays the average likelihood ratings for searches. Participants overall 
rated police officer searches of text messages stored by a cell phone provider (M = 4.43), 
phone numbers dialed (M = 4.20), and text messages stored on a cell phone (M = 4.17) as 
the police officer searches most likely to occur, and rated searches of apps on a cell 
phone (M = 2.85) and searches of anonymous SNS posts (M = 3.66) as the least likely to 
occur.  Searches by school officials of social networking posts (M = 3.40) and pictures 
(M = 3.15) were rated the most likely to occur.  
Table 12 
Likelihood of Search Occurring (0 = not at all likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N = 129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.84  4.34   4.36  4.17 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.08  4.30   4.37  4.20 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.70  3.78   4.30  3.91 
Websites Visited on Cell 2.55  3.71   4.07  3.75 
Cell Phone GPS  2.44  4.24   4.27  4.05 
Car GPS   2.84  4.05   4.16  3.96 
Cell Phone Apps  1.39  2.68   3.32  2.85 
Emails on Computer  3.00  4.13   4.18  4.03 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.70  3.93   4.04  3.84 
Private Messages   2.59  3.93   3.97  3.80 
Texts Stored by Provider 3.15  4.47   4.68  4.43 
Posts on SNS   2.84  4.29   4.17  4.07 
Pictures on SNS  2.87  4.13   4.17  4.00 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.77  3.66   3.86  3.66 
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Audio of Phone Calls  2.69  4.29   4.38  4.15 
Documents on Computer 2.86  3.90   4.34  4.00 
Websites Visited on Comp 2.94  4.02   4.40  4.09 
 
School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N = 129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.76  2.47   2.40  2.47 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.08  1.98   2.10  2.05 
Cell Phone Contacts  1.72  1.91   2.28  2.07 
Websites Visited on Cell 2.42  2.15   2.33  2.72 
Cell Phone GPS  1.58  1.77   1.73  1.73 
Car GPS   1.78  1.36   1.56  1.50 
Cell Phone Apps  1.59  1.91   2.14  1.98 
Emails on Computer  2.91  2.20   2.26  2.31  
Emails on Cell Phone  2.27  2.17   2.22  2.21 
Private Messages   2.56  2.29   2.29  2.32 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.41  2.11   2.10  2.14 
Posts on SNS   2.57  3.48   3.54  3.40 
Pictures on SNS  2.76  3.24   3.17  3.15 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.49  2.73   3.05  2.85 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.89  1.95   1.71  1.83 
Documents on Computer 2.37  2.40   2.37  2.38 
Websites Visited on Comp 2.79  2.59   2.84  2.73 
 
 Participants’ average ratings of the reasonableness of each search are presented in 
Table 13.  The most reasonable police officer searches as perceived by participants were 
searches of posts on SNS (M = 3.74) and searches of anonymous SNS posts (M = 3.65), 
while the least reasonable search were a search of cell phone apps (M = 2.50). 
Participants rated school official searches of posts on SNS (M = 2.80), pictures on SNS 
(M = 2.70), and anonymous SNS posts (M = 2.59) as the most reasonable, and a school 
official search of a GPS on a car was the search rated the least reasonable (M = 1.28).  
Table 13 
Reasonableness of Search (0 = not at all reasonable, 7 = extremely reasonable) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.78  3.66   3.27  3.37 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.24  3.81   3.25  3.48 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.69  3.58   3.22  3.31 
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Websites Visited on Cell 2.95  3.42   2.81  3.07 
Cell Phone GPS  2.63  3.87   3.36  3.49 
Car GPS   2.70  3.84   3.30  3.45 
Cell Phone Apps  1.69  2.60   2.61  2.50 
Emails on Computer  2.94  3.68   3.12  3.32 
Emails on Cell Phone  3.11  3.49   2.99  3.20 
Private Messages   2.86  3.40   2.78  3.04 
Texts Stored by Provider 3.21  3.71   3.22  3.42 
Posts on SNS   2.92  4.12   3.61  3.74  
Pictures on SNS  3.00  3.88   3.19  3.44 
Anonymous SNS Posts 3.34  3.67   3.70  3.65 
Audio of Phone Calls  2.89  3.80   3.15  3.38 
Documents on Computer 3.20  3.54   3.06  3.27 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.18  3.72   3.27  3.44 
 
School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.76  1.75   1.60  1.80 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.19  1.67   1.50  1.65 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.08  1.60   1.63  1.67 
Websites Visited on Cell 1.97  1.90   1.47  1.71 
Cell Phone GPS  1.60  1.67   1.31  1.49 
Car GPS   1.89  1.18   1.21  1.28 
Cell Phone Apps  1.57  1.53   1.50  1.52 
Emails on Computer  2.60  1.66   1.32  1.60 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.35  1.67   1.56  1.70 
Private Messages   2.39  1.80   1.58  1.76 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.30  1.75   1.41  1.64 
Posts on SNS   2.70  2.98   2.67  2.80 
Pictures on SNS  2.89  2.69   2.65  2.70 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.40  2.66   2.57  2.59 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.77  1.73   1.33  1.54 
Documents on Computer 2.54  1.94   1.65  1.87 
Websites Visited on Comp 2.48  2.38   2.07  2.24 
 
 As shown in Table 14, participants predicted they would be the most upset if 
police officers searched their text messages (M = 4.34) or private messages (M = 4.25), 
while they would be the least upset if their anonymous SNS posts (M = 2.45) were 
searched.  Similarly, participants predicted they would be the most upset if school 
officials searched their text messages (M = 4.87) and private messages (M = 4.67), and 
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least upset if school officials searched their anonymous posts on an SNS (M = 2.70). The 
same pattern is seen in Table 15, with ratings of participants’ predictions of how upset the 
average person their age would be.  Participants predicted the average person their age 
would be the most upset at a police officer search of their text messages stored on their 
phone (M = 5.05), text messages stored by their cell phone provider (M = 4.90), and 
private messages (M = 4.89).  Participants predicted the average person their age would 
be least upset at a police officer search of their anonymous SNS posts (M = 3.15). 
Looking at school official searches, participants predicted the average person their age 
would be most upset at a search of their text messages stored on a cell phone (M = 5.27) 
and by the service provider (M = 5.13) and private message (M = 5.08).  
 As in Study 1, participants predicted the average person their age would be more 
upset than the participant would be for each search presented.  This pattern was observed 
for both police officer and school official searches.  
Table 14 
Prediction of How Upset Participant Would be if Search Occurred (0 = not at all upset, 7 
= extremely upset) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages   3.32  4.40   4.53  4.34 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.73  2.84   3.91  3.34 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.80  3.06   4.13  3.55 
Websites Visited on Cell 2.95  3.33   4.43  3.82 
Cell Phone GPS  2.36  3.57   4.21  3.74 
Car GPS   2.54  3.32   4.04  3.57 
Cell Phone Apps  1.75  2.41   3.61  2.92 
Emails on Computer  2.71  3.59   4.61  3.99 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.24  3.48   4.38  3.78 
Private Messages   3.08  4.00   4.73  4.25 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.79  4.10   4.46  4.13 
Posts on SNS   2.05  2.53   3.56  2.98 
Pictures on SNS  2.24  2.63   3.57  3.04 
Anonymous SNS Posts 1.86  2.11   2.86  2.45 
Audio of Phone Calls  2.36  3.69   4.59  3.98 
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Documents on Computer 2.66  3.81   4.68  4.10 
Websites Visited on Comp 2.74  3.18   4.26  3.67 
 
School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  3.11  5.05   5.15  4.87 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.03  3.91   4.71  4.19 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.28  3.71   4.58  4.43 
Websites Visited on Cell 2.66  4.02   5.05  4.35 
Cell Phone GPS  2.53  4.19   5.12  4.44 
Car GPS   2.86  4.31   4.83  4.39 
Cell Phone Apps  2.41  2.96   4.28  3.53 
Emails on Computer  3.00  4.12   5.08  4.46 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.65  4.10   5.10  4.41 
Private Messages   3.43  4.46   5.13  4.67 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.88  4.69   4.97  4.63 
Posts on SNS   2.46  2.88   3.88  3.31 
Pictures on SNS  2.28  2.91   3.93  3.33 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.26  2.40   3.05  2.70 
Audio of Phone Calls  2.42  4.52   5.20  4.61 
Documents on Computer 2.97  3.96   5.07  4.39 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.03  3.41   4.58  3.94 
 
Table 15 
Prediction of How Upset Average Person Would Be if Search Occurred (0 = not at all 
upset, 7 = extremely upset) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  3.84  5.28   5.15  5.05  
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.32  3.79   4.26  3.97 
Cell Phone Contacts  3.33  3.78   4.48  4.07 
Websites Visited on Cell 3.53  4.30   4.93  4.51 
Cell Phone GPS  3.08  4.40   4.62  4.36 
Car GPS   3.11  4.07   4.37  4.10 
Cell Phone Apps  2.25  3.20   4.07  3.51 
Emails on Computer  3.43  4.46   5.02  4.62 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.84  4.13   4.94  4.37 
Private Messages   3.83  4.95   5.09  4.89 
Texts Stored by Provider 3.94  4.94   5.08  4.90 
Posts on SNS   3.35  3.53   4.26  3.86 
Pictures on SNS  2.87  3.60   4.18  3.80 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.97  3.04   3.29  3.15 
Audio of Phone Calls  2.86  4.53   5.06  4.60 
Documents on Computer 3.43  4.69   5.19  4.79 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.61  4.20   4.58  4.32 
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School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  4.03  5.57   5.33  5.27 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.51  4.51   4.95  4.61 
Cell Phone Contacts  3.31  4.16   4.92  4.43 
Websites Visited on Cell 3.29  4.64   5.28  4.79 
Cell Phone GPS  2.83  4.67   5.14  4.70 
Car GPS   3.30  4.78   4.98  4.71 
Cell Phone Apps  2.59  3.63   4.44  3.90 
Emails on Computer  3.69  4.62   5.17  4.78 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.84  4.71   5.16  4.71 
Private Messages   4.03  5.13   5.30  5.08 
Texts Stored by Provider 3.88  5.28   5.26  5.13 
Posts on SNS   3.43  3.72   4.25  3.94 
Pictures on SNS  3.24  3.47   4.15  3.33 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.74  2.97   3.32  3.11 
Audio of Phone Calls  3.28  4.85   5.27  4.88 
Documents on Computer 3.46  4.43   5.31  4.75 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.52  4.21   4.67  4.36 
 
 Table 16 shows the average participant ratings for how relieved they would be, 
and Table 17 shows the average participant ratings for how relieved the average person 
their age would be.  As in Study 1, these ratings were primarily used to prevent a 
negative bias in participants’ ratings.  While participants predicted the average person 
their age would be more upset if they experienced each search than the participant 
himself would be, the opposite pattern was observed here with police officer searches—
participants predicted they would be more relieved if they experienced each search than 
the average person would be.  
Table 16 
Prediction of How Relieved Participant Would Be if Search Occurred (0 = not at all 
relieved, 7 = extremely relieved) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.18  1.82   1.38  1.65 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.19  1.98   1.50  1.77 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.08  1.90   1.43  1.70 
Websites Visited on Cell 1.92  1.80   1.36  1.60 
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Cell Phone GPS  2.06  2.46   1.47  1.93 
Car GPS   2.22  2.27   1.61  1.95 
Cell Phone Apps  1.64  1.57   1.46  1.52 
Emails on Computer  2.09  1.70   1.28  1.53 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.11  1.89   1.38  1.67 
Private Messages   1.97  1.87   1.27  1.59 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.00  1.78   1.30  1.57 
Posts on SNS   2.00  1.86   1.45  1.68 
Pictures on SNS  2.05  1.76   1.47  1.65 
Anonymous SNS Posts 1.80  1.84   1.82  1.82 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.86  2.02   1.37  1.69 
Documents on Computer 2.11  1.88   1.39  1.67 
Websites Visited on Comp 1.94  1.71   1.36  1.56 
 
School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  1.64  1.19   1.09  1.19 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.05  1.30   1.21  1.34 
Cell Phone Contacts  1.61  1.27   1.32  1.34 
Websites Visited on Cell 1.79  1.42   1.21  1.37 
Cell Phone GPS  1.47  1.52   1.04  1.28 
Car GPS   2.00  1.29   1.24  1.35 
Cell Phone Apps  1.59  1.19   1.19  1.24 
Emails on Computer  2.00  1.27   1.15  1.29 
Emails on Cell Phone  1.68  1.48   1.21  1.37 
Private Messages   1.86  1.50   1.25  1.42 
Texts Stored by Provider 1.94  1.26   1.36  1.38 
Posts on SNS   1.89  1.43   1.27  1.41 
Pictures on SNS  1.87  1.43   1.26  1.40 
Anonymous SNS Posts 1.71  1.45   1.68  1.59 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.74  1.42   .98  1.24 
Documents on Computer 2.17  1.35   1.22  1.38 
Websites Visited on Comp 1.97  1.38   1.22  1.36 
 
Table 17 
Prediction of How Relieved Average Person Would Be if Search Occurred (0 = not at all 
relieved, 7 = extremely relieved) 
Police Officer Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  2.11  1.57   1.15  1.43 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.24  1.62   1.45  1.61 
Cell Phone Contacts  2.11  1.57   1.41  1.55 
Websites Visited on Cell 1.87  1.65   1.34  1.53 
Cell Phone GPS  1.78  1.85   1.53  1.69 
Car GPS   2.17  1.95   1.65  1.83 
Cell Phone Apps  1.46  1.29   1.20  1.26 
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Emails on Computer  2.17  1.44   1.12  1.36 
Emails on Cell Phone  2.00  1.48   1.25  1.43 
Private Messages   2.14  1.58   1.15  1.44 
Texts Stored by Provider 1.85  1.53   1.32  1.42 
Posts on SNS   2.05  1.61   1.47  1.60 
Pictures on SNS  2.24  1.60   1.30  1.53 
Anonymous SNS Posts 1.80  1.67   1.78  1.74 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.78  1.77   1.30  1.55 
Documents on Computer 2.20  1.50   1.19  1.43 
Websites Visited on Comp 2.16  1.53   1.26  1.46 
 
School Official Searches Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  1.76  1.21   1.13  1.24 
Phone Numbers Dialed 2.03  1.16   1.15  1.25 
Cell Phone Contacts  1.64  1.16   1.29  1.28 
Websites Visited on Cell 1.95  1.41   1.27  1.41 
Cell Phone GPS  1.53  1.53   1.17  1.36 
Car GPS   1.92  1.15   1.18  1.25 
Cell Phone Apps  1.51  1.00   1.21  1.16 
Emails on Computer  1.77  1.14   1.16  1.22 
Emails on Cell Phone  1.95  1.30   1.19  1.32 
Private Messages   2.08  1.18   1.10  1.24 
Texts Stored by Provider 2.12  1.24   1.18  1.30 
Posts on SNS   1.86  1.26   1.40  1.39 
Pictures on SNS  2.00  1.25   1.18  1.30 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.00  1.53   1.75  1.69 
Audio of Phone Calls  1.58  1.35   .99  1.20 
Documents on Computer 2.23  1.30   1.16  1.33 
Websites Visited on Comp 1.97  1.24   1.31  1.35 
 
 Average ratings of two of Slobogin and Schumacher’s perceived privacy 
domains—personal nature and intrusiveness—are presented in Tables 18 and 19.  Text 
messages (M = 5.57) and audio of phone calls (M = 5.31) were rated the most personal, 
while anonymous SNS posts were rated the least person (M = 2.94).  Similarly, 
participants rated searches of text messages, either stored on their cell phone (M = 5.66) 
or cell service provider (M = 5.50) as the most intrusive.  Searches of anonymous posts 
on SNS were rated the least intrusive (M = 3.23).  
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Table 18 
Ratings of Personal Nature of Information (0 = not at all personal, 7 = extremely 
personal) 
    Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  4.42  5.74   5.71  5.57 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.51  4.27   4.91  4.49 
Cell Phone Contacts  3.61  4.14   5.08  4.53 
Websites Visited on Cell 3.29  4.38   4.96  4.53 
Cell Phone GPS  3.72  4.76   4.95  4.73 
Car GPS   3.59  4.40   4.76  4.48 
Cell Phone Apps  2.46  3.06   3.80  3.35 
Emails on Computer  3.43  4.70   5.53  4.97  
Emails on Cell Phone  3.19  4.86   5.48  4.98 
Private Messages   4.14  4.87   5.54  5.11 
Texts Stored by Provider 3.85  5.32   5.56  5.28 
Posts on SNS   2.86  3.69   4.26  3.87 
Pictures on SNS  3.05  3.67   4.40  3.94 
Anonymous SNS Posts 2.94  2.85   3.01  2.94 
Audio of Phone Calls  3.42  5.39   5.68  5.31 
Documents on Computer 3.54  4.77   5.54  5.01 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.36  4.23   4.80  4.42 
 
Table 19 
Ratings of Intrusiveness of Search (0 = not at all intrusive, 7 = extremely intrusive) 
    Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
Text Messages  4.61  5.71   5.87  5.66 
Phone Numbers Dialed 3.84  4.71   5.10  4.80 
Cell Phone Contacts  4.22  4.42   5.26  4.80 
Websites Visited on Cell 3.82  4.80   5.35  4.95 
Cell Phone GPS  4.11  5.16   5.38  5.15 
Car GPS   4.00  4.74   4.99  4.78 
Cell Phone Apps  3.22  3.48   4.29  3.84 
Emails on Computer  4.11  5.04   5.63  5.22 
Emails on Cell Phone  3.78  5.25   5.58  5.24 
Private Messages   4.26  5.21   5.61  5.30 
Texts Stored by Provider 4.50  5.53   5.70  5.50 
Posts on SNS   3.46  3.31   4.42  3.86 
Pictures on SNS  3.71  3.30   4.42  3.89 
Anonymous SNS Posts 3.63  3.05   3.29  3.23 
Audio of Phone Calls  3.89  5.45   5.67  5.38 
Documents on Computer 4.09  5.10   5.72  5.29 
Websites Visited on Comp 3.91  4.40   5.14  4.71 
 
132 
 
     
 The final rating participants provided of these searches is the riskiness of sharing 
of storing information in each way. Participants rated cell service providers storing text 
messages as the most risky (M = 4.97), followed by sending private messages (M = 4.91). 
Storing cell phone apps (M = 3.58) and making anonymous posts on SNS (M = 3.72) 
were rated as the least risky.  
Table 20 
Ratings of Riskiness of Storing Information (0 = not at all risky, 7 = extremely risky) 
    Adolescents Young Adults  Adults  Overall 
    (N = 43) (N =129)  (N = 169) 
 
Text Messages  4.08  4.98   5.10  4.93 
Phone Numbers Dialed 4.05  3.98   4.47  4.23 
Cell Phone Contacts  3.89  3.74   4.59  4.17 
Websites Visited on Cell 3.79  4.63   4.63  4.53 
Cell Phone GPS  4.22  4.35   4.64  4.71 
Car GPS   4.22  4.74   4.81  4.47 
Cell Phone Apps  3.30  3.29   3.86  3.58 
Emails on Computer  4.29  4.55   5.06  4.77 
Emails on Cell Phone  3.65  4.52   5.09  4.70 
Private Messages   4.19  5.00   5.00  4.91 
Texts Stored by Provider 4.21  4.92   5.17  4.97 
Posts on SNS   4.11  4.50   4.68  4.50 
Pictures on SNS  3.84  4.32   4.55  4.37 
Anonymous SNS Posts 3.80  4.13   3.36  3.72 
Audio of Phone Calls  3.86  4.62   5.06  4.75 
Documents on Computer 4.11  4.41   4.95  4.64 
Websites Visited on Comp 4.18  4.68   4.68  4.63 
 
Experience with social media and perceptions of searches.  I hypothesized that 
perceptions of searches will vary based on experience with Social Networking Sites (SNS).  
A multilevel linear model (MLM) was used to test the hypothesis that ratings vary as a 
function of experience with social media, and that the strength and direction of that 
difference varies as a function of age.  The following model was tested: 
Level 1: Yij (outcome rating) = β0j + rij 
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Level 2: β0j = γ00 + µ0j   
                      β1j = γ10 + γ11 (experience with SNS) + µ1j  
In this model, experience with SNS was defined as the length of time participants have 
used SNS and the number of hours per day participants use SNS.  I hypothesize that 
individuals with more experience with SNS will be more likely to view searches of 
electronic communication devices as intrusive and violating privacy.  Level 2 predictors 
include: (a) number of years the participant has used SNS and (b) the number of hours the 
participant spends on a SNS each day.  A separate MLM was conducted for each 
outcome variable (intrusiveness, violation of privacy, and expectation of privacy).  
 Consistent with this hypothesis, years using SNS was significantly associated 
with ratings of intrusiveness, t(317) = 2.68, p < .001, and ratings of personal nature of 
item searches, t(317) = 2.80, p < .001, but was not significantly associated with ratings of 
riskiness of sharing information, t(317) = .96, p = .34.  The coefficients of these 
relationships were all positive, indicating that, on average, as participants reported more 
years of using social media, their ratings of intrusiveness of the search and personal 
nature were higher.  
 Number of hours per day using SNS was also significantly associated with ratings 
of intrusiveness, t(317) = -2.50, p < .05, and personal nature of the item searched, t(317) 
= -2.48, p < .05, but was marginally significantly associated with ratings of riskiness of 
sharing information, t(317) = -1.80, p = .07.  Contrary to the hypotheses, these 
coefficients were negative, indicating that, on average, as participants spend more time 
on social media each day, their ratings of the intrusiveness of searches, riskiness of 
sharing information, and personal nature of the item searched are lower.  
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Age, development and search perceptions.  This study also examined whether 
perceptions of searches vary based on development of risk-taking processes.  It was 
hypothesized that individuals who are more impulsive and sensation seeking will view 
searches as more intrusive and more violating of privacy.  Same as the prior analyses, 
MLM was used for this hypothesis.  Level 1 of the model included each vignette and 
Level 2 was scores on the three risk-taking capacity measures: the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale, the Sensation Seeking Scale, and the self-reported risk-taking behaviors.  A 
separate MLM was conducted for each outcome variable of interest.  
Age was significantly associated with ratings of intrusiveness, t(264) = 2.30, p < 
.05, and ratings of the personal nature of the item searched, t(264) = 2.81, p < .01, but 
only marginally significantly associated with ratings of riskiness of sharing information, 
t(264) = 1.94, p =.05.  The two significant coefficients were positive, indicating that as 
the age of the participant increased, on average, ratings of intrusiveness and personal 
nature also increased.   
Impulsivity was not significantly associated with ratings of intrusiveness, t(264) = 
.88, p = .38, ratings of the personal nature of the item searched, t(264) = 1.22, p = .22, or 
ratings of riskiness of sharing information, t(264) = 1.42, p = 1.6. 
Sensation seeking was significantly associated with ratings of intrusiveness, 
t(264) = -2.31, p < .05, and ratings of the personal nature of the item searched, t(264) =    
-3.11, p < .01, but only marginally significantly associated with ratings of riskiness of 
sharing information, t(264) = -1.70, p = .09.  The coefficients were all negative, 
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indicating that as participants increased in sensation seeking, on average, their ratings of 
intrusiveness of the search and personal nature of the item searched decreased.  
Search dimensions and age, impulsivity, and sensation seeking.  Multilevel 
modeling was also used to examine what dimensions were associated with participants’ 
ratings of impulsivity, riskiness of sharing information, and personal nature of the item 
searched, and whether these dimensions varied according to age, impulsivity, and 
sensation seeking.  
Ratings of the personal nature of the item searched were significantly associated 
with perceptions of intrusiveness, t(4256) = 58.51, p < .001, as were ratings of the 
riskiness of sharing information via the object of the search, t(4256) = 18.03, p < .001. 
On average, as participants perceived the object of the search as more personal in nature, 
and as riskier to share information using, participants perceived the search as more 
intrusive.  These relationships were not associated with age, t(271) = .65, p = .52, 
impulsivity, t(271) = -.25, p = .81, or sensation seeking, t(271) = -.22, p = .82.   
Individual models were created for perceptions of searches conducted by a police 
officer and for perceptions of searches conducted by a school official.  For searches 
conducted by a police officer, ratings of the likelihood of the search occurring were 
significantly associated with ratings of intrusiveness, t(4254) = 7.70, p < .001.  On 
average, as ratings of the likelihood of the search occurring increased, so did ratings of 
the intrusiveness of the search.  Ratings of how upset the participant would be if they 
were the subject of the search were also significantly associated with ratings of 
intrusiveness, t(4254) = 17.35, p < .001.  On average, the more upset participants 
predicted they would be, the more intrusive they rated the search.  However, ratings of 
136 
 
     
the reasonableness of the search were not significantly associated with intrusiveness 
ratings, t(4254) = -.11, p = .91.  
These relationships were not significantly associated with age, t(271) = .01, p = 
.99, or impulsivity, t(271) = -.01, p = .99, but were significantly associated with sensation 
seeking, t(271) = -2.01, p < .05. 
A different pattern of results was observed for school official searches.  For 
searches conducted by a school official, ratings of the likelihood of the search occurring 
were not significantly associated with ratings of intrusiveness, t(4252) = 1.63, p = .1. 
Ratings of the reasonableness of the search were significantly associated with ratings of 
intrusiveness, t(4254) = -5.78, p < .001, as were ratings of how upset the participant 
predicted they would be if they were subject to the search, t(4254) = 19.07, p < .001.  On 
average, as ratings of the reasonableness of the search increased, ratings of intrusiveness 
decreased.  The more reasonable a search was perceived to be, the less intrusiveness the 
search was perceived to be.  On average, as ratings of how upset the participant would be 
increased, intrusiveness ratings also increased.  
These relationships were not associated with age, t(271) = 1.17, p = .25, 
impulsivity, t(271) = 1.18, p = .24, or sensation seeking, t(271) = -.82, p = .41. 
Study 2 Discussion    
 Study 2 extended the results of Study 1 by including participants across the age 
span and adding measures of impulsivity, sensation seeking, and experience with social 
media to further explore what variables may affect how individuals view searches of 
online information.  Replicating prior research, age was negatively correlated with 
sensation seeking—older participants had lower scores on the sensation seeking measure 
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than did younger participants.  However, the positive relationship between age and 
impulsivity was only marginally significant.  This may indicate our measure of 
impulsivity was not sensitive enough to fully capture the change of impulsivity over time.  
An initial finding of Study 2 is that while the amount of information participants 
reported sharing on their social media profile was not associated with either age or 
sensation-seeking, it was associated with impulsivity.  Participants with higher scores on 
the BIS reported sharing more information on their social media profile.  This may 
indicate what information is shared publicly online is a spur-of-the-moment, “hot” 
decision that is not fully reasoned, regardless of the age of the social media user.  
According to legal scholars, courts make a distinction between “coding” and 
“content” information when evaluating Fourth Amendment protections—information that 
only provides the intended recipient is “coding” information not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, while information comprising the content of a message is protected by the 
Fourth Amendment (Kerr, 2009).  Participants’ ratings of searches mirror this distinction. 
Searches of “coding” information, such as phone numbers dialed or cell phone contacts, 
were not rated as highly intrusive or highly personal in nature, while searches of 
“content” information, such as text messages, audio of phone calls, and documents, were 
rated as highly intrusive and personal in nature.  This finding supports the distinction 
courts have made between information regarding the intended address of a recipient, 
which by its nature is necessarily shared with a third party, and the content of a message. 
Even in the digital age, where all information sent via wired communication is shared 
with a third party, individuals view content information as more private than coding 
information.  
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This distinction did not hold true, however, for posts and pictures shared on social 
media.  These types of searches were rated as not very intrusive and not very personal in 
nature.  This is possibly because the purpose of these types of posts is to share 
information with a large number of other people.  Users posting a message on another 
user’s profile intends that user, and the user’s friends, to be able to read that message.  In 
that way, social media posts are more similar to coding information that is necessarily 
shared with others and not meant to be kept private.  Courts evaluating searches of social 
media posts may be able to analogize to coding information when determining whether 
the Fourth Amendment protects such searches.  
Another difficulty for the coding vs. content distinction is websites.  The URL of 
a website a user visits could be seen as coding information, because the user must type in 
the address in order to visit that particular site.  On the other hand, the URL—which 
frequently includes a descriptive title of the website—can provide information about the 
content included on the website, which in turn can provide information about the user.  
But participants in the current study did not rate searches of websites visited as highly 
intrusive or personal in nature, and considered such searches fairly reasonable.  This may 
be because participants see such information as similar to coding information that must 
be shared with a third party.  Alternatively, participants may be accustomed to third 
parties tracking the websites they visit—employers and schools regularly restrict and 
monitor Internet traffic—that such searches are now routine.  
In examining participants’ ratings of the searches, it is clear that participants view 
searches of text message as highly intrusive and upsetting.  This is true whether the text 
messages are stored on a cell phone or stored by a cell phone service provider.  While all 
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three age groups rated text messages stored on a cell phone as more personal in nature 
than those stored by a provider, and rated a search of cell phone text messages as more 
intrusive than a search of messages stored by a provider, a search of text messages stored 
by a provider was rated the second-most intrusive search and the third-most personal in 
nature overall.  
This finding may have important implications for courts.  Currently before the 
Supreme Court is Carpenter v. United States, a court case challenging the warrantless 
search of cell phone records of historical cell site location information, which provides 
information on a cell phone’s physical location over time.  The records that were 
searched in Carpenter were stored solely by the cell phone service provider for their own 
records, and were not stored or searched on a physical cell phone.  Part of the reasoning 
supporting the United States’ argument that such a search is not an unreasonable search 
under the Fourth Amendment is that cell phone users knowingly share their cell site 
location data with their cell phone provider and thus give up all reasonable expectation of 
privacy in that information (Francisco, Blanco & Ellickson 2017).  The findings of this 
study, however, indicate people of all ages hold at least a subjective expectation of 
privacy in information stored by their cell phone provider.   
One type of search that participants do not view as very intrusive or personal 
nature, in contrast, is a search of anonymous social media posts.  Several social media 
sites, such as Whisper and YikYak, allow users to post anonymously on various topics. 
Perhaps because these posts cannot be associated with any individualizing information, 
participants were not concerned with potential searches of such information.  This feeling 
of “safety” in posting information anonymously may not be warranted.  Anonymous 
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applications often allow law enforcement to subpoena or get a warrant for identifying 
information such as IP addresses and location information, and users have been able to 
create fully-automated software that can identify the location of posts with accuracy up to 
100 meters (Xue et. al. 2016).  Anonymous posts are likely not as anonymous as users 
believe.  
This assumed anonymity may lead posters to do things they would not otherwise 
do.  In 2015, students at both Emory University and Virginia Tech University caused 
quite the kerfuffle when they were arrested for anonymous posts on YikYak stating the 
user was going to perpetrate a school shooting (Shapiro, 2015).  Scholars have professed 
concern over anonymity leading to increased rates of cyberbullying (Peebles, 2014).  The 
same factor that make users less concerned with privacy online—lack of individualizing 
information—may also make users more likely to make negative comments or even 
commit crimes.  The anonymity may provide a false sense of security for posters to stalk, 
harass, or bully other users, but the website and law enforcement are still able to track 
down the poster.  Courts may need to take into account the dichotomy between what 
users understand to be the information shared with others and what information actually 
can be accessed by posting online.  
Study 2 provided an examination of what individual difference variables—age, 
impulsivity, sensation seeking, and experience with social media—may be associated 
with perceptions of searches, and what dimensions individuals use when evaluating 
searches.  One interesting finding of Study 2 was that while impulsivity is related to the 
amount of information a user posts on their social media profile, impulsivity was not 
associated with perceptions of searches.  This may be because the decision to share 
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information online is a cognitively “hot” decision, while rating a search on various 
dimensions is a cognitively “cold” decision.  Study 3 sought to provide a more direct 
measure of decision making regarding posting information online and the link between 
age, decision-making development, and privacy-protecting behaviors.  
Study 3: Anticipating Negative Outcomes in Sharing Information Online. 
Study 3 extends the results of the prior two studies by examining actual decisions 
made by adolescents and young adults in sharing information online.   
Methods. 
Participants.  Adolescents ages 12-18 and young adult participants ages 19 and 
up were recruited for the third study.  Power analysis was estimated with G*Power 
(Buchner, et al., 2009).  Previous research on adolescents’ physiological changes prior to 
taking risks report average effect sizes of .38 (Crone & van der Molen, 2007); therefore, 
power analysis included effect size of .38 power of .80 and α = .05.  The final goal 
sample was increased by 10% to account for having to drop participants from final 
analyses, resulting in the goal of 188 total participants (94 adolescents and 94 young 
adults).   
Adolescent participants were recruited from the Lincoln, Nebraska, community. 
Various methods were used to recruit participants.  First, middle school and high school 
teachers in the Lincoln Public School District were contacted for their assistance. 
Teachers willing to assist with recruitment were provided with flyers and a sample email; 
teachers handed out physical copies of flyers, emailed their students regarding the study, 
or both.  Teachers were contacted for their assistance during three different academic 
semesters.  Second, youth groups and organizations in the Lincoln community were 
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contacted in a similar manner.  A list of organizations that serve the targeted age group 
was made and contact information was obtained from organizations’ websites.  Groups 
were solicited via email, over the phone, and in person.  Organizations that responded 
with willingness to assist in recruitment were provided with flyers and a sample email 
and were able to hang or pass out physical copies of flyers, email listservs with the study 
information, or both.  For both methods, I offered to provide a lecture on psychological 
research, criminal procedure, and/or social media, but no teachers or organizations 
accepted the offer.  
Third, the participant opportunity was shared with the greater Lincoln community. 
Flyers were hung in the Lincoln community where the targeted population may frequent, 
including coffee shops, gas stations near schools, and malls.  A local electronic newsletter 
targeting parents ran the study recruitment flyer as an advertisement and posted the 
advertisement on their social media page.  Finally, social media was used to attempt to 
recruit participants.  My academic advisor, members of our lab, and other associates 
shared the recruitment flyer along with a brief description of the study.  
Forty-four adolescents participated in the study in exchange for a gift card to 
Amazon.com.  Twenty-seven adolescents received a $25 gift card and 17 received a $50 
gift card.  The compensation was increased to a $50 Amazon.com gift card in Spring 
2018 to further incentivize participation.  Four adolescents had to be removed from the 
sample due to equipment malfunction and two were removed for failing attention checks 
resulting in a final adolescent sample of 38.  The age of adolescent participants ranged 
from 12 to 18, with an average of 15.5.  More than half (57.9%) of adolescent 
participants identified as male and 39.5% identified as female.  One adolescent 
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participant (2.6%) identified as non-binary.  Most (78.9%) of adolescent participants 
identified their race as White or Caucasian, 5.3% identified their race as African 
American, 5.3% identified their race as Asian, 2.6% identified their race as Hispanic, and 
7.9% identified their race as other.  
Almost all (97.4%) of adolescent participants were a member of at least one social 
networking site.  The most commonly used social media site was Instagram (n = 33 
participants, 86.8%), followed by Facebook (n = 26, 68.4%) and Snapchat (n = 25, 
65.8%).  The average age participants first joined a social networking site was 12.2, and 
participants had been a member of a social networking site, on average, for 3.5 years.  
Participants reported spending an average of 2.6 hours each day on a social networking 
site.    
Young adult participants (n = 156) were recruited from undergraduate psychology 
classes at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in exchange for course credit.  Nineteen 
young adults did not complete the study due to equipment malfunction or running out of 
time, and two participants failed attention checks, resulting in a final young adult sample 
of 135.  The age of young adult participants ranged from 19 to 28, with an average of 
20.2.  Most (73.3%) of the young adult participants identified as female and 25.9% of 
young adult participants identified as male; one young adult participant (.7%) identified 
as “other.”  Most (77.8%) of young adult participants identified their race as Caucasian, 
.7% identified their race as African American, 12.6% identified their race as Asian, 6.7% 
identified their race as Hispanic, and 2.2% identified their race as other.  
Virtually all (99.3%) of young adult participants were a member of at least one 
social media site.  The most commonly used social media site was Facebook (n = 129 
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participants, 95.6%), followed by Instagram (n = 111, 82.2%) and Snapchat (n = 111, 
82.2%).  The average age participants first joined a social networking site was 13.5, and 
participants had been a member of a social networking site, on average, for 6.7 years. 
Participants reported spending an average of 2.5 hours each day on a social networking 
site.  Tables 21 and 22 depict the information adolescent and young adult participants 
reported they shared on their social networking profile they use the most.  
Table 21 
Privacy Settings for Specific Information on SNS Profile for Adolescents (N = 38) 
Information Not On Public  Limited  Friends Some Fake 
  Profile    Public    Friends  
First Name 8.3%  77.8%  5.6%   8.3%  0% 0% 
Last Name 5.7%  74.3%  5.7%  14.3%  0% 0% 
Picture  11.1%  69.4%  11.1%  8.3%  0% 0% 
Birthday 44.4%  8.3%  8.3%  27.8%  8.3% 2.6% 
Phone # 88.9%  0%  2.8%  5.6%  2.8% 0% 
Email  86.1%  2.8%  2.8%  5.6%  2.8% 0% 
IM Name 47.2%  38.9%  5.6%  5.6%  0% 2.8% 
Address 100%  0%  0%  0%  0% 0% 
Current City 72.2%  11.1%  5.6%  11.1%  0% 0% 
Schedule 97.2%  0%  0%  2.8%  0% 0% 
Employment 91.7%  5.6%  0%  2.8%  0% 0% 
School  47.2%  30.6%  8.3%  13.9%  0% 0% 
Orientation 75.0%  13.9%  0%  8.3%  2.8% 0% 
Likes  38.9%  27.8%  8.3%  25.0%  0% 0% 
Relationship 83.3%  8.3%  0%  8.3%  0% 0% 
Groups 72.2%  13.9%  2.8%  9.3%  2.8% 0% 
Pictures Tagged 25.0%  30.6%  22.2%  19.4%  2.8% 0% 
Own Pictures 8.3%  25.0%  19.4%  44.4%  2.8% 0% 
Others’ Posts 11.1%  38.9%  11.1%  33.3%  5.6% 0% 
Own Posts 30.6%  38.9%  19.4%  11.1%  0% 0% 
 
Table 22 
Privacy Settings for Specific Information on SNS Profile for Young Adults (N = 135) 
Information Not On Public  Limited  Friends Some Fake 
  Profile    Public    Friends  
First Name .7%  84.4%  4.4%  7.4%  2.2% .7% 
Last Name 5.2%  77.8%  6.7%  8.9%  1.5% 0% 
Picture  4.4%  81.5%  5.9%  7.4%  .7% 0% 
145 
 
     
Birthday 20.0%  24.4%  11.1%  41.5%  1.5% 1.5% 
Phone # 71.9%  1.5%  3.0%  17.0%  6.7% 0% 
Email  63.7%  .7%  5.2%  23.7%  6.7% 0% 
IM Name 70.4%  15.6%  5.2%  8.1%  .7% 0% 
Address 96.3%  0%  .7%  3.0%  0% 0% 
Current City 44.4%  21.5%  9.6%  23.7%  .7% 0% 
Schedule 97.0%  0%  1.5%  0%  .7% 0% 
Employment 55.6%  14.1%  7.4%  23.0%  0% 0% 
School  19.3%  42.2%  11.1%  25.9%  1.5% 0% 
Orientation 57.8%  21.5%  5.9%  14.1%  0% 0% 
Likes  37%  20%  13.3%  25.9%  3.0% .7% 
Relationship 56.3%  16.3%  8.9%  18.5%  0% 0% 
Groups 68.1%  11.1%  4.4%  16.3%  0% 0% 
Pictures Tagged  7.4%  19.3%  30.4%  37.8%  3.7% 0% 
Own Pictures 3.0%  20.0%  22.2%  51.9%  3.0% 0% 
Others’ Posts 5.2%  16.3%  25.9%  48.1%  3.0% 0% 
Own Posts 8.9%  25.2%  25.2%  34.8%  5.9% 0% 
 
The overall pattern of self-reported information sharing between young adults and 
adolescents was the same and was similar to the results in Study 2.  Participants reported 
using the most extensive measures of privacy protection (limiting information to only 
some friends or using fake information) very rarely.  But the most identifying 
information, such as a physical address and email address, participants reported leaving 
off their profile entirely.  While more adolescents left off employment information 
(91.7%) and relationship information (83.3%) than did young adults (55.6% for 
employment and 56.3% for relationships), this could be because young adults are more 
likely than adolescents to have a job or be in a relationship.  
Procedures.  All procedures were conducted in a single, approximately one-hour 
in-lab session. Adolescents were required to be accompanied by a parent or guardian to 
provide parental consent.  The parent or guardian was brought to the lab to see the setting 
and the equipment and asked to provide parental consent.  If they consented, the parent or 
guardian was escorted to a waiting area until the debriefing session.  
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Participants first completed demographic measures and provided information 
about their experience with and use of Social Networking Sites, including the Social 
Media Usage and Privacy Questionnaire from Study 2.  Participants were then told the 
experimenters were testing a new SNS that is being developed and were interested in 
their perceptions.  
A “new” SNS was created using buddypress (buddypress.org), a social 
networking site developing tool for bloggers utilizing the Word Press platform.  The 
SNS, ConnectED, was modeled as a SNS solely for students, similar to the initial purpose 
of Facebook.  ConnectED allowed participants to create profiles; search, “friend,” and 
instant message other users; and form and join groups.  Participants were told the study 
would like to see how they created a profile on this new site.  
For the next part of the study, participants’ heart rate and skin conductance were 
measured in order to track participants’ physiological responses to the various decisions 
in creating a social media profile.  Skin conductance is related to activity in the 
autonomic nervous system, which plays an important role in emotion, motivation, and 
risk taking (Figner & Murphy, 2011).  Heart rate is also linked to the autonomic nervous 
system.  Generally, heart rate slows when an individual anticipates making a decision, 
then accelerates back to baseline, and this deceleration is more pronounced when the 
individual anticipates the decision to be risky (Crone, Smonsen, van Beek & van der 
Molen, 2004).  Previous studies have found younger adolescents reflect a heightened 
deceleration of their heart rate compared to older adolescents and young adults when 
anticipating greater rewards, which may indicate younger adolescents are more sensitive 
to rewards than are older individuals (Crone & van der Molen, 2007). 
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Both physiological measures were collected utilizing BIOPAC MP36R 
technology and data was recorded via Acqknowledge software (Braithwaite, Watson, 
Jones, & Rowe, 2015).  Skin conductance was measured with sensors placed on the 
second and third finger of the participant’s non-dominant hand.  The electrode sensors 
measures electrical flow between the two points of contact with the skin.  BIOPAC 
collects two measures of skin conductance: background tonic, or stable, skin conductance 
(skin conductance level) and phasic changes in skin conductance (skin conductance 
reactance).  Because I am interested in how skin conductance changes to stimuli, I focus 
on skin conductance reactance.  
Changes in skin conductance reactance can be either event-related (responses that 
are attributed to a specific stimulus) or non-specific (responses that are not connected 
with a stimulus) (Braithwaite, Watson, Jones, & Rowe, 2015).  Acqknowledge identifies 
event-related skin conductance responses (ER-SRCs) as an SCR with a significant 
deviation in electronic signal occurring between one and three seconds after the stimulus 
is present.  SCRs that occur outside this time window are designated non-specific SCRs 
(NS-SRC).  For the current study, stimuli was identified at set time points when the 
participant heard the instruction to enter a piece of information into his or her profile.  
Heart rate was measured with sensors placed on the inside of the participant’s 
wrist and on the opposite ankle.  Individual heart beats were measured via voltage passed 
across the chest from the arm to the lower leg.  The Acqknowledge software identifies a 
heartbeat as a positive peak in the electrical current.  Participants were instructed to keep 
their arm and leg as still as possible to minimize noise in the data.  
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After the participant was connected to the electrodes, the experimenter instructed 
the participant to continue with the study and left the room.  An audio recording guided 
participants through the profile-creation process.  This ensured I would be able to match 
up each decision point with the participant’s physiological data.  Participants first heard 
and read a brief description of the social networking site and what they would have to do 
to create a profile.  This time also served the purpose of creating a baseline for 
participants’ physiological measures.  
Participants created a personal profile on the SNS, which included information 
such as full name, location, and school.  Participants were also instructed they could take 
a picture of themselves and upload it as their profile picture (using a webcam connected 
to the computer) or were able to upload a generic stock photo as their profile picture. 
Participants were also able to set each piece of information to public (viewable by any 
person who accessed the website), private (viewable only by people the participant 
“friended”), or not viewable (only the participant could see the information).  
At a set time point, another user instant messaged the participant.  This other user 
was actually a confederate, one of the experimenters in the other room.  The experimenter 
followed an exact script at specific time points, asking the participant a series of 
questions.  The script is reproduced in Appendix F.  If the participant asked the 
confederate for information, the confederate responded with identical answers to the 
participant to make the participant believe he or she was communicating with an 
individual of the same age and gender.  
After the audio recording walking the participant through the creation of the 
social media profile concluded, the experimenter disconnected the participant from the 
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skin conductance and heart rate sensors.  Participants then completed the measures from 
Study 2: the self-reported impulsivity and sensation-seeking scales and the expectation of 
privacy from governmental actors vignettes.  To be consistent with the study’s purported 
purpose of creating a new social networking site, participants were also asked their 
perceptions of ConnectEd.   
Hypotheses.  The main hypothesis for Study 3 is that whether the participant 
makes information public on their profile is a function of the following dimensions: age, 
development of risk-taking capacities, experience with SNS, and perception of risk.  
Perception of risk was measured by a physiological response to a decision regarding 
sharing information.  It is hypothesized that older individuals will be more likely to 
perceive sharing information as risky, as will individuals with lower scores on the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale and Sensation Seeking Scale.  
Results. 
 Amount of information shared on the SNS, age, impulsivity, and sensation 
seeking.  For each piece of information on the profile, participants had the opportunity to 
leave the field blank or complete the field and choose to share the information with 
everyone, friends, or no one.  The exception was all participants had to complete the field 
for their name, and were told this field was viewable to all users who accessed ConnectEd. 
Table 23 displays the name participants chose to add to their profile: first name only, full 
name, or other (e.g., initials or an obvious nickname).  
Table 23 
Display Name for Profile by Age Group 
Type of Display Name Adolescents  Young Adults  Overall 
    (N = 38)  (N = 135) 
First name only  42.1%   39.7%   40.3% 
Full Name   55.3%   54.4%   54.6% 
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Other (initials)  2.6%   5.8%   5.2% 
 
 For each remaining piece of information, participants had the option to leave the 
field blank, share the information with all users, share the information only with those users 
the participant added as a friend, or only have the information viewable to the user.  Table 
24 and 25 display the privacy settings for each piece of information, by age group.  
Table 24 
Privacy Settings for Specific Information on ConnectEd Profile for Adolescents (N = 38) 
Information  Blank  All Users Friends Only Only Participant 
School   18.4%  39.5%  36.8%  5.3% 
Hometown  2.6%  47.3%  42.1%  7.9%    
Self-Description 18.4%  52.6%  26.3%  2.6% 
Email Address 0%  100%  0%  0%  
Phone Number 100%  0%  0%  0% 
Table 25 
Privacy Settings for Specific Information on ConnectEd Profile for Young Adults (N = 
135) 
Information  Blank  All Users Friends Only Only Participant 
School   23.5%  41.1%  33.8%  1.4% 
Hometown  5.1%  31.6%  55.8%  7.4% 
Self-Description 52.2%  28.7%  19.1%  0% 
Email Address 5.1%  94.1%  0%  .7% 
Phone Number 99.2%  0%  0%  .7% 
  
 
 Participants also had the opportunity to add a profile picture—either a “selfie” 
they took with the computer’s web camera or a stock photo.   Two adolescent participants 
chose to take an actual photograph of themselves, 9 (23.7%) left the profile picture blank, 
and 27 (71.1%) used a generic stock photograph. No young adult participants chose to 
take an actual photograph of themselves, 26 (19.1%) left the profile picture blank, and 
110 (80.9%) uploaded a generic stock photograph.  
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 After the participants completed their profile, a confederate posing as another 
participant in the study instant messaged the participant.  The confederate sent up to 
seven messages to the participant, and the participant could respond, ignore the 
confederate, and ask his or her own questions.  Table 26 displays the distribution of the 
number of responses per participant for each age group.  Fourteen participants (eight 
young adults and six adolescents) refused to provide the confederate with identifying 
information such as their age or location, but still responded to the participant.  The 
proportion of young adults and adolescents who indicated an unwillingness to provide 
identifying information was statistically significantly different, indicating a higher 
percentage of adolescents than young adults were unwilling to share identifying 
information (χ2(1) = 3.94, p < .05)  
The overall average number of responses per participant was 3.8.  Adolescent 
participants responded significantly more times (M = 4.74, SD = 2.7) than did young 
adult participants (M = 3.49, SD = 2.2, F(1, 82) = 4.74, p < .05).  
Table 26 
Number of Messages to Confederate by Age Group  
Number of Messages  Adolescents  Young Adults  Overall 
    (N = 38)  (N = 135) 
0 (never responded)  39.5%   55.1%   51.7% 
1    10.5%   12.5%   12.1% 
2    10.5%   7.4%   8.0% 
3    0%   2.2%   1.7% 
4    2.6%   6.6%   5.7% 
5    7.9%   6.6%   6.9% 
6    10.5%   5.9%   6.9% 
7    10.5%   2.2%   4.0% 
8    2.6%   .7%   1.1% 
9    5.3%   .7%   1.7% 
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In addition to the instant messages, several participants spontaneously sent the 
confederate a friend request.  Fourteen young adult (10.3%) and 9 adolescent (23.7%) 
participants sent the confederate a friend request.  This difference was statistically 
significant (χ2 (1) = 4.62, p < .05).    
A privacy score was calculated using the information participants added to their 
profile.  If a participant left the information off their profile, that was coded as 0. If the 
participant included the information but limited access to that information, that was 
coded as 1.  Finally, if a participant included the information and made it available to all 
users, that was coded as 2.  Composite privacy scores ranged from zero to ten, as the 
profile had five pieces of information for which participants selected privacy settings, and 
higher scores indicate more sharing of information.  The ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure 
scale had reasonable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .62) (Goforth, 2015).  
The mean ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Score for young adults was 5.1, and for 
adolescents was 6.0.  This difference was statistically significant (F(1,168) = 6.1, p < 
.05), indicating adolescent participants shared more information publicly than did young 
adult participants.  
 The bivariate relationship among the individual variables and the ConnectEd 
Privacy Disclosure Score was also considered.  As shown in Table 27, the ConnectEd 
Privacy Disclosure Score was not significantly correlated with age, scores on the Barratt 
Impulsivity Scale, or scores on the Sensation Seeking Scale.  The number of replies was, 
however, significantly negatively associated with participants age (r = -27, p < .05) and 
years using a social networking site (r = -.30, p < .01), indicating that older participants 
and participants who had been a member of a social networking site longer were more 
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likely to give fewer replies to the confederate.  Participants’ age and years on social 
networking site were also significantly positively correlated (r = .70, p < .01).  
Table 27 
Summary of Means and Correlation Between Privacy Score, Number of Replies, and 
Individual Difference Variables (N = 174) 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1. Privacy Score --  .08 -.08 -.01 .06 -.05 -.01 5.1 1.9 
    (0-10) 
2. Num. of Replies .08 -- -.27* -.30** .10 .03 -.09 3.5 2.2 
    (0-9) 
3. Age (12-28) -.08 -.27* -- .70** -.01 -.10 -.05 20.2 1.9 
 
4. Years on SNS  -.01 -.30** .70** -- .07 -.08 -.06 6.7 1.6 
    (2-12) 
5. Hours/Day    .06 .10 -.01 .07 -- -.10 .12 2.5 2.2 
    (0-20) 
5. Impulsivity  -.05 .03 -.10 -.08 -.10 -- -.09 67.6 7.3 
    (0-90) 
6. SSS (0-12)  -.01 -.09 -.05 -.06 .12 -.09 -- 8.1 1.6 
Note: Correlations marked with an asterisk are significant at the .05 level. Correlations 
marked with a double asterisk are significant at the .01 level.  
 
 Physiological responses to sharing information online.  Physiological data was 
analyzed utilizing the Acqknowledge software version 4.1. For skin conductance, the 
“Find Cycle” function creates an excel spreadsheet of all skin conductance responses per 
participant.  The stimuli (here, when the participant was instructed to enter information) 
is designated with a flag at the specific time point.  If an SRC occurs within three seconds 
of the stimulus, it is designated an event-related SRC (ER-SRC).  If the SRC occurs 
outside this window, it is designated as non-specific (Braithwaite, Watson, Jones, & 
Rowe, 2015).  Using this analysis, the number of ER-SCRs was collected for each 
participant.   
 Acqknowledge includes an automated ECG Analysis function that computes heart 
rate.  This function identifies heart beats by positive peaks in the electronic current 
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passing across the chest.  Beats per minute (BPM) can be calculated for a specified cycle. 
The event markers associated with the stimuli served as the reference point for measuring 
changes in BPM.  A cycle was identified as the three seconds immediately after a 
stimulus, and a significant deceleration in heart rate occurring in this three-second 
window was identified as being associated with the stimulus.  Like with ER-SRCs, the 
number of stimulus-rated heart rate changes per participant was collected.  
As just discussed, the number of ER-SRCs and event-related heartrate changes 
(ER-HR) was determined using the “Find Cycle” function on Acqknowledge.  In 
completing the profile, participants had eight distinct decisions to make regarding sharing 
information: enter information in six fields of their profile (name, school, hometown, 
email address, phone number, and an “About Me” description), take or select a profile 
picture, and respond to the confederate.  Because participant’s subsequent responses were 
not timed, only when the confederate first instant messaged the participant was included 
as an event.  
 As shown in Table 28 below, the overall number of event-related physiological 
responses was low.  The number of ER-SCR was not statistically different between 
young adults and adolescents (F(1, 172) = .06, p = .81), and neither was the number of 
ER-HR (F(1,171) = .01, p = .97).  
Table 28 
Average Number of Event-Related Physiological Responses by Age Group 
   Adolescents  Young Adults  Overall  
   (N = 38)  (N = 135)  
ER-SCR  1.6 (.98)  1.6 (.97)  1.6 (.97) 
ER-HR  .5 (.50)  .5 (.40)  .5 (.40) 
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 As shown in Table 29, the number of event-related changes in physiological 
responses was not related to age, years using a SNS, time spent on an SNS each day, 
impulsivity, or sensation seeking.  
Table 29 
Summary of Means and Correlation Between Event-Related Physiological Changes and 
Individual Difference Variables (N = 174) 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1. ER-SCR (0-4)  --  -.03 -.03 -.01 -.05 .05 .01 1.6 .97 
 
2. ER-HR (0-2) -.03 -- -.01 .02 -.01 .05 .07 .5 .64 
 
3. Age (12-28) -.03 -.01 -- .70** -.01 -.10 -.05 20.2 1.9 
 
4. Years on SNS  -.01 .02 .70** -- .07 -.08 -.06 6.7 1.6 
    (2-12) 
5. Hours/Day   -.05 -.01 -.01 .07 -- -.10 .12 2.5 2.2 
    (0-20) 
6. Impulsivity  .05 .05 -.10 -.08 .10 -- -.09 67.6 7.3 
    (0-90) 
7. SSS (0-12)  .01 .07 -.05 -.06 .12 -.09 -- 8.1 1.6  
Note: Correlations marked with an asterisk are significant at the .05 level. Correlations 
marked with a double asterisk are significant at the .01 level.  
 
 Variables predicting information-sharing online.  A single regression was used 
to examine the relationship among age, experience with social networking sites, and 
development of decision making variables to the outcome of sharing information.  The 
outcome variable of interest is the amount of information participant made information 
public on their SNS profile.  As discussed above, a scale was made summing the amount 
of information the participant made public on his or her profile for the outcome variable: 
the ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Score. The independent variables of interest are age, 
score on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, score on the Sensation Seeking Scale, score on 
the self-reported risk-taking behaviors, number of years using a SNS, number of hours 
per day using a SNS, and the number of event-related physiological responses.  If heart 
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rate decelerates and skin conductance increases immediately prior to the decision to share 
information, this will indicate a perception of risk.  This regression will establish a model 
of what factors play a role in whether an individual is likely to share identifying 
information online.  The following model was tested:  
 Y(ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Score) = a + b(age) + b(Barratt Impulsiveness) + 
 b(Sensation Seeking Scale) + b(self-reported risk-taking behaviors) + b(years 
 using SNS) + b(hours per day using SNS) + b(ER-SCR) + b(ER-HR) + e 
This model did not explain the proportion of variance in privacy sum scores with 
statistical significance (R2 = .03, F(7, 153) = .52, p = .82).  Table 30 includes the 
coefficients and standard deviations for each predictor, none of which were statistically 
significant predictors.  
Table 30 
Age, Development, Experience, and Physiological Responses As Predictors of 
Information Sharing Online 
     B  SE B  Beta 
Age     -.10  .09  -.11 
Years on SNS    .06  .11  .06 
Hours/Day    .05  .07  .06 
Impulsivity    -.02  .02  -.08 
Sensation Seeking    -.04  .10  -.03 
ER-SCR    -.15  .16  -.07 
ER-HR    -.08  .24  -.03 
 
A second regression was tested to determine whether the same variables predicted 
the number of responses the participant gave to the confederate “stranger” when s/he 
instant messaged the participant.  
The model was as follows:  
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 Y(number of replies) = a + b(age) + b(Barratt Impulsiveness) + b(Sensation 
 Seeking Scale) + b(self-reported risk-taking behaviors) + b(years using SNS) + 
 b(hours per day using SNS) + b(ER-SCR) + b(ER-HR) + e 
While this model was significant (R2 = .18, F(7,70) = 2.2, p < .05), none of the 
individual independent variables were significant predictors of the number of replies.  
Table 31 
Age, Development, Experience, and Physiological Responses As Predictors of 
Responding to “Stranger” Online  
     B  SE B  Beta 
Age     -.16  .15  -.17 
Years on SNS    -.22  .20  -.17 
Hours/Day    .16  .12  .16   
Impulsivity    .01  .04  .02 
Sensation Seeking    -.16  .19  -.09 
ER-SCR    .38  .30  .14 
ER-HR    -.40  .43  -.11 
 
Study 3 Discussion  
 While Study 2 relied on self-report data to evaluate the amount of information 
participants share online, Study 3 observed actual decisions regarding sharing 
information and attempted to connect that with physiological changes associated with 
risk perception.  Adolescent and young adult participants completed a profile on what 
they were told was a new social networking site limited to student use.  
 Adolescent and young adult participants differed in the information they made 
public on their profiles.  Participants had the option to make any information entered on 
their profile (except for their display name) viewable by everyone, viewable by just users 
they “friended,” or viewable by no one but the participant.  The majority of adolescent 
participants, 52.6%, made their self-description viewable by all users and did not limit 
access to it.  In contrast, only 28.7% of young adults made their about me publicly 
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viewable; the majority of young adult participants left their “About Me” section 
completely blank.  It is possible adolescents, higher in sensation seeking than young 
adults, saw the self-description as a chance to set themselves apart from other users and 
attract positive attention.  Another explanation is that adolescent participants were more 
engaged in the social networking site itself, while young adult participants favored only 
entering the bare minimum information.  
 Just under half of both adolescent (47.3%) and young adult (41.1%) participants 
entered their school information and made that publicly viewable, while around a third of 
adolescent (39.5%) and young adult (31.6%) participants included their hometown and 
made that publicly viewable.  Only two participants—both adolescents—uploaded a 
“selfie” as their profile picture.  This result must be interpreted with caution, however, as 
it was much easier for a participant to upload a generic stock photo than it was for the 
participant to take a picture.  When participants were instructed to upload a profile 
picture, they were given the option to “select a photo” or to “take a photo.”  If the 
participant chose “select a photo,” a document window opened with various stock 
photographs of animals, flowers, athletics, and local landmarks.  If the participant chose 
to take a photo, they had to then select which device to use, adjust the device, take the 
photograph, and then accept the photograph.  It is possible participants chose the “easier” 
route of just selecting a generic stock photograph instead of going through the process of 
taking a photograph.  Additionally, there were reports of the web camera not always 
working.  The web camera was marketed as a “plug and play” device, meaning the only 
step in setting up the camera was plugging the USB cord into the computer’s port.  The 
experimenter tested the camera prior to each participant, but there were participants 
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where the camera appeared to enter a sleep mode and the experimenter would have to 
unplug the camera and plug it back in for it to work.  It is not known how many 
participants this error affected.   
 Another potential reason for the low use of selfies for a profile picture is vanity.  
Participants had not been warned prior to their participation that they would have the 
opportunity to upload a picture of themselves.  Participants may have chosen to upload 
the stock photograph instead of a selfie because they were concerned about their 
appearance and did not want to upload a selfie without adequate preparation.  
 Regardless of the issues with the camera, adolescent participants did share more 
information, and share more information publicly, than did young adult participants. 
Scores of the ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure scale were significantly higher for 
adolescent participants (M = 6.0 out of 10) than for young adult participants (M = 5.1 out 
of 10).  However, the ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Score was not significantly 
correlated with age.  This may indicate there was a categorical difference between 
adolescent and young adult participants.  
 One categorical difference between the participants was type of school.  All 
adolescent participants were middle or high school students, while all young adult 
participants were college students (and, because the age of majority in Nebraska is 19 and 
I wanted to make sure none of the young adult participants were considered adolescents, 
all young adult participants were age 19 or older, so many had been in college for at least 
one year).  Similarly, all adolescent participants still lived with a parent or guardian, 
while many of the young adult participants lived in a dorm, with friends, or on their own. 
It is possible that being in the smaller, more protected setting of middle or high school 
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living with a guardian led to participants being more trusting with their information 
online, while college students are more wary of the way their information could be used.  
 Unlike the ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Score, the number of replies to the 
“stranger” was significantly correlated with age.  Older participants responded to the 
confederate a fewer number of times.  Over half of young adult participants (55.1%) 
never responded to the confederate at all, while 39.5% of adolescent participants never 
responded.  This could indicate young adult participants were less interested in 
communicating with a stranger than were adolescent participants, but could also be a sign 
that young adult participants were less engaged in the SNS than were adolescent 
participants.  Responding to the confederate did require the participant to be paying 
sufficient attention to the site to see the notification pop up and be interested in the site 
enough to open the message and read it.  
 A number of participants did respond to the confederate but indicated they would 
not share identifying information.  Eight young adult participants and six adolescent 
participants responded but said they would not tell the confederate their age, gender, or 
location.  A significantly higher proportion of adolescent participants (15.8%) than young 
adult participants (5.9%) responded in this way, indicating adolescents may be more 
likely to affirmatively tell a stranger they are not willing to share identifying information. 
However, the proportion of young adult participants who responded at all to the 
confederate was smaller than for adolescent participants, so it is possible the lack of 
response is driving that difference.  
 Almost a quarter of adolescent participants (23.7%) spontaneously sent the 
confederate a friend request after messaging.  A significantly smaller proportion of young 
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adults (10.3%) requested to “friend” the confederate.  As with other results from this 
study, this could indicate adolescent participants are seeking the positive attention from 
being “friends” with another user.  It could also indicate, however, a higher level of 
engagement with testing out the social networking site.  
 Study 3 also attempted to examine whether adolescent and young adult 
participants viewed the decision to share information online as a risky decision, as 
reflected in physiological responses.  Previous research (e.g., Crone & van der Molen, 
2007) has examined age-related differences in skin conductance and heart rate preceding 
risky decisions involving gambling tasks.  Unlike that prior research, however, I found no 
age-related differences in skin conductance or heart rate changes related to the decision to 
include information on a SNS profile.  
 There are a number of explanations for the lack of physiological response.  The 
lack of response could be a result of the method used.  Prior research on physiological 
changes related to decision making used controlled tasks such as the Iowa Gambling 
Task or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (e.g., South, Dana, White & Crowley).  In these 
tasks, participants had limited amount of time during which they could make their 
decision.  Here, though participants were guided through making a profile, there was no 
way to ensure they entered the specific information at the time they were instructed. 
Participants were given sufficient time to enter each piece of information (between 30 
and 45 seconds) but for some participants that may have been too long and the participant 
could have filled out the profile on their own time table.  It is also not clear whether 
participants first considered whether to include the information at all before considered 
how public to make the information, or whether participants first considered the privacy 
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settings before deciding whether to include information.  Though the current study 
allowed participants to complete the SNS profile similarly to how they would in the real 
world, further research could employ more controlled measures such as only presenting 
one field of information to the participant at a time, or further measures such as eye 
tracking to better evaluate how individuals make the decision to share information.  
 A second possibility is that, unlike the decision to take a risky gamble or add 
another pump to a balloon that may blow up, the current participants did not view the 
decision to add information to a profile as a risk.  The vast majority of the participants 
had their own social networking profiles and spent, on average, 2.5 hours each day 
utilizing social media (the number of hours per day did not significantly differ between 
adolescents and young adults).  The decision to add information to their profile or to 
respond to a stranger’s instant message may be something so normal, something 
participants do on their own many times a day, that even in the lab setting it was not seen 
as a risk.  If that is the case, participants may be so accustomed to sharing information 
they do not take the time to consider the potential risk.  
 Similarly, unlike gambling, the potential risk and rewards for sharing information 
online are very remote.  The possible risk is someone using private information for a 
nefarious purpose, which individuals can balance against the possible reward of positive 
attention and getting information in return.  But, unlike in the IGT or the BART where 
the punishment of losing the trial or the reward of earning money occurs shortly after the 
decision to take a risk, these possible outcomes will occur at some point in the future. For 
this reason, it is possible at least adolescent and young adult users do not actively 
consider the risks and rewards enough to be reflected in a physiological response.  
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 The main hypothesis that the decision to share information publicly on an SNS is 
a function of age, experience, decision-making development, and physiological 
perception of risk, was not supported by the current study.  A model with age, years using 
an SNS, hours per day using an SNS, self-reported impulsivity, self-reported sensation 
seeking, and the number of ER-SCRs and ER-HRs did not significantly explain the 
variance in ConnectEd Privacy Disclosure Scores.  
 One explanation is that the age of the current sample was too limited.  Though 
participants ranged in age from 12 to 28, the majority of participants fell in the older 
adolescent, early emerging adulthood age group of 16 to 20.  The adolescent and young 
adult participants, all of whom are considered digital natives because they have grown up 
with wired communications, may be too similar to fully capture how age, experience, and 
decision making affects the information shared online.  Future research should extend the 
sample to include older adults; this may capture more variance in the amount of 
information uploaded to the profile and more variance in development decision making.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The vast majority of Americans—approximately 95%—own a cellular phone, and 
the type of technology upon which individuals rely is increasingly evolving (Pew 
Research Center, 2018).  In 2011, only 35% of Americans owned a smartphone, and that 
number increased to 77% in 2018 (Pew Research Center, 2018).  The use of these devices 
comes with a catch: when we use a cellular device, we are necessarily communicating 
information, such as our location and who we are communicating with, with the cellular 
provider.  The provider, then, may share that information with government actors.  Courts 
now face the difficult task of determining what expectations of privacy remain reasonable 
in an age where information is constantly shared, whether the user is aware of the sharing 
or not.  
The three current studies aimed to begin identifying expectations of privacy in 
today’s digital age and how privacy may evolve along with technology.  A variety of 
individual factors may shape privacy expectations; these studies focused on age, 
development, and experience with social media.  Age may affect privacy expectations 
because younger generations have grown up with wired communications and will never 
know a world that is not constantly connected.  Development may affect privacy 
expectations because of enhanced impulsivity and sensation seeking in adolescence.  
Experience may affect privacy expectations because the more we use social media and 
other technology that requires sharing information, we may view privacy differently. 
These three studies examined the interplay between the various factors that affect privacy 
expectations.  
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Across all three studies, a consistent pattern emerged: individuals of all ages view 
information shared on wired communications such as cell phones as highly private and 
searches of that information as highly intrusive.  In Study 1, adolescents rated searches of 
cell phones as intrusive as a search of a private diary and nearly as intrusive as a physical 
pat down.  In Study 2, all age groups viewed text messages and private messages sent via 
social media as the most personal in nature and a search of such communications as 
highly intrusive; all age groups viewed these types of searches similar to a search of 
audio recording of phone conversations.  It seems that there is something different or 
special about private communications, even those that are sent via wired 
communications.  
The participants in Study 2 ranged in age from 12 to older than 60 and, 
predictably, had equally ranging experiences with social media.  As a participant’s age 
increased, they, on average, viewed searches of electronic communication devices as 
more intrusive.  Similarly, as the number of years a participant had been a member of a 
social media site increased, their average ratings of intrusiveness and personal nature of 
the item searched also tended to increase.  The number of years on social media is closely 
connected with the age of the participant, so it makes sense the results mirror one 
another.  
The other proxy measure of experience with social media, the number of hours 
per day a user spends on a social media site, had the opposite relationship with perception 
of searches: as the self-reported number of hours per day on social media increased, 
average ratings of intrusiveness, riskiness of sharing information, and personal nature of 
information decreased.  Users who spend more time on social media each day view 
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searches of private communications as less intrusive, view sharing this type of 
information as less risky, and view the nature of that information as less personal.  This 
may indicate a desensitization to the privacy risks associated with electronic 
communication devices.  As a user incorporates social media into their daily life, to the 
point they are logged on to a site for upwards of ten hours a day (as some participants 
here reported), they may become used to constantly sharing information with others, and 
less concerned about an unintended party viewing their information.  
While one measure of development of decision making—impulsivity—had no 
relationship to perceptions of searches, sensation seeking did.  As sensation seeking 
increased, the average ratings of intrusiveness and personal nature decreased.  
Participants higher in sensation seeking viewed searches of electronic communication 
devices, on average, as less intrusive and the information as less personal in nature.  
These participants who scored high in sensation seeking may focus on the rewards 
associated with sharing information—positive attention from others—and may view 
searches of their information as a potentially good thing.  
This finding from Study 2—that age and sensation seeking are associated with 
ratings of searches, but impulsivity is not—was flipped when examining self-reported 
privacy protecting behaviors.  Participants’ self-reported privacy protection behaviors, 
such as utilizing privacy settings to limit who can see the information they post on social 
media, was not significantly associated with either age or sensation seeking, but was 
associated with impulsivity.  This could reflect two different decision making systems at 
play: hot vs. cold processing (Steinberg, 2010).   
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The decision whether to share information on social media and what privacy 
settings could be a “hot” decision, it is made in the moment, as a user is adding 
information to their profile, and a user may not explicitly take the time to weigh the pros 
and cons.  In contrast, evaluations of searches are a “cold” decision that do not implicate 
any actual risks or emotion at the time of the decision.  Adolescents are more likely to 
make impulsive decisions than adults in a hot setting, but make decisions that are more 
similar to older individuals in a cold setting (Steinberg, 2008).  That impulsivity was 
associated with privacy-protecting behaviors in a hot setting, but not privacy ratings in a 
cold setting, is an example of this distinction.  Age and sensation seeking had an effect on 
decisions in a cold setting, though, that may be entirely unrelated to decision making 
development.  As discussed above, as both age and years on social media increased, 
average ratings of intrusiveness also increased.  It may be that years on social media is 
driving the relationship between the age of the participant and intrusiveness ratings in 
that cold decision.  
The finding that participants reported privacy concerns with search vignettes but 
still reported widely sharing information on their social media page can be explained by 
Kahneman’s (2011) dual systems processing model.  This model posits individuals 
reason through two different processes: System 1, which is automatic, unconscious, and 
implicit; and System 2, which is conscious, explicit, and controlled.  Individual 
participants may use System 1 when they are deciding what information to post on their 
social media profiles, but use more deliberative, conscious System 2 when thinking about 
the implications of a search vignette.  But this model does not explain why participants 
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were fairly restrictive in the amount of information they shared online in the in-lab social 
media task.     
Study 3 further explored whether age, sensation seeking, and impulsivity affects 
the decision to share information online.  Adolescents publicly shared more information 
online than did young adults.  Like the results in Study 2, privacy protecting behaviors as 
measured by the amount of information publicly shared was not related to age or 
sensation seeking, but unlike the results from Study 2, these privacy protecting behaviors 
were also not related to impulsivity.  Possibly, creating a profile for a new SNS that the 
participant did not intend to actually use and knew their profile would be deleted after 
their participation (to protect participants’ privacy, all profiles were deleted after data 
collection was completed), did not have the same emotional reaction to the risks and 
rewards that creating an actual profile did.  At least in the lab, the amount of information 
shared on a public profile is not related to age, sensation seeking, impulsivity, experience 
with SNS, or physiological perceptions of risk. 
Like prior research regarding privacy domains in the parent-child relationship 
(Smetana & Daddis, 2002), individuals may view governmental intrusions of privacy 
differently depending on the type of information sought.  Fradella and colleagues (2009) 
explored how lay perceptions of searches differed by the type of privacy interest 
implicated, but further research can explore how privacy interests differ depending on the 
type of information revealed by the search.  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally 
ignores the type of information or evidence revealed by a search, focusing instead on the 
act of the search itself.  But if lay individuals view governmental intrusions differently 
depending on the domain intruded upon, scholars may need to consider the implications 
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for Fourth Amendment case law.  It may be that certain searches likely to reveal 
information in a domain that is considered private (e.g., the type of information you 
would send as an instant message to a friend on a social media site) are considered more 
intrusive.  While the current studies focused on the medium of communication that was 
searched, future studies can explore whether lay individuals view intrusions of privacy 
differently depending on domains and whether those domains mirror those in parent-child 
private intrusions.   
The relationship between age, development, experience, and privacy is 
complicated.  But what can be determined from the current results is that electronic 
communication devices are changing views of privacy.  Scholars have mused for years 
that the nature of privacy is likely changing due to our reliance on wired 
communications, and these results, in general, support that hypothesis.  
The Court is currently pondering the applicability of doctrines such as the third 
party doctrine that were developed long before society could even contemplate our 
current ability to share information with others.  In the 1970’s, the Court reasoned that an 
individual must assume responsibility for the risk of sharing information with a third 
party, such as a bank teller or a telephone operator (United States v. Miller, 1976; Smith 
v. Maryland, 1979).  The Court grounded this doctrine in reasonable expectations of 
privacy: users do not have any legitimate expectation of privacy in information they 
knowingly and willingly share with a third party.  The owner of the information—the one 
who could claim a violation of their expectation of privacy—must accept that by sharing 
that information with a third party, that third party could share their information with law 
enforcement.  
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But the information the Court dealt with in Miller and Smith was limited to bank 
records and telephone numbers dialed, respectively.  Electronic communication devices 
today, however, collect and transmit an incredible amount of data.  Cell phone towers 
track our movements while we actively make phone calls or passively receive automated 
alerts from the applications on our phones.  Social media sites collect our likes and 
dislikes and the identity of our friends and family.  Fitness trackers store information 
about our heart rate and activity level (and may even be able to tell when a user is 
pregnant before she realizes it herself, or if a plaintiff is faking an injury) (Hern, 2016).  
In addition to the amount of information technology collects, users do not always 
make the explicit choice to share information with a third party.  It is likely that in the 
1970’s users were aware they were sharing their bank records with the bank teller when 
they handed over the ledger and aware they were sharing a phone number dialed with the 
telephone operator (at the time, an actual person).  Today, though, technology users do 
not hand over information to another person.  Cell service providers and application 
platforms automatically collect much of the information without an explicit exchange of 
information.  The data users provide is, in a way, an unlisted price of using the 
technology.  
Facebook, for example, recently revealed it sold massive amounts of user data to 
advertisers and political firms (Granville, 2018).  Applications users installed on the 
Facebook site collected information on user identities, personal networks, and “likes.” 
The firms then used this information to target specific advertisements to specific users. 
While there was a public outcry over this alleged data breach, all user information that 
the application collected was collected with consent (at least, with consent to participate 
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in research included in the application’s terms of service; it is not clear whether users 
actually read those terms or understood them to mean their data would be collected), 
though some applications did collect data on users’ friends without those friends’ explicit 
consent.  
Should the government obtain Facebook’s data, a strict application of the third 
party doctrine would hold that the data is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Thus 
the government would not need to have probable cause to search Facebook’s data 
because users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.  In light of 
the results of the current research, that users of all ages view private messages sent via 
text or social media as secret as a personal diary, this would be contrary to societal 
expectations of privacy.   
Courts developed the third party doctrine over four decades ago, long before the 
amount of information society shares online was even imaginable.  Society’s expectations 
of privacy then look very different than expectations do now.  Courts struggle with how 
to apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test to technology that changes must faster 
than does the law.  Added to that, judges differ demographically from the general public 
and may have less experience with the new technology, so may be unable to adequately 
evaluate expectations of privacy.  
 This struggle is similar to the struggle courts have in crafting policies regarding 
rights for juveniles: the struggle to decide between policies that respect personhood and 
polices that protect vulnerable populations.  On the one hand, courts want to honor the 
decisions individuals make in sharing information or using platforms that collect their 
personal data.  But, on the other hand, courts also want to protect society’s right to 
172 
 
     
privacy even when individuals do not always take action to protect their own information. 
A strict application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test and particularly the third 
party doctrine could lead to a complete loss of the right to privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment because individuals share so much information.  Should courts, then, change 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test to protect society from themselves, or should 
courts recognize that people exchange their right to privacy for something desirable, and 
honor that decision?  
 Some governments have taken steps to protect their citizens’ privacy interests. 
The European Union recently passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
that went into effect on May 25, 2018.  The stated purpose of the measure is to give users 
more control over their data (Kharpal, 2018).  To do this, the GDPR enhanced the 
requirements regarding consent to collect and use information, including requiring 
consent language to be clear and prevent companies from combining consent to lots of 
different data collection into one document.  Under the GDPR, users must be able to 
withdraw their consent at any time and to access their data if they so desire.  The GDPR 
grants users the “right to be forgotten”—to ask the website to erase all their data and to 
prevent any third party the site provided the data from using the data going forward.  This 
type of policy puts the decision whether to share information firmly in the hands of the 
user, but attempts to guide the user by placing more control over private data in the hands 
of the consumer.  
 Though the GDPR is only enforceable in the European Union, many United 
States businesses that also do business the EU were forced to bring their websites into 
compliance (Handley, 2018).  Many United States businesses updated their consent to 
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data collection to be in compliance with the GDPR to avoid the heavy fines associated 
with violations.  In late May, 2018, many users, even in the United States, experienced a 
flurry of emails regarding updated terms of service.  It remains to be seen, however, if the 
GDPR will change how users provide consent to the collection of their information or 
whether it changes expectations of privacy.  
 Many legal scholars have proposed answers to the problem of determining 
reasonable expectations of privacy, mostly revolving around either adapting the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test or doing away with it altogether (Kerr, 2010).  But 
changing this test would require the Supreme Court to overrule Smith v. Maryland or, 
even more improbably, require the states to pass a constitutional amendment.  
 Instead, courts may be able to both protect privacy interests and respect 
individual’s personhood by utilizing empirical research on expectations of privacy. 
Scholars have published research on empirical expectations of privacy (Kugler, 2017; 
Slobogin & Schumacher, 1993) and can continue to do so as technology evolves. 
Scholars have advocated that “empirical research findings lend legitimacy to the Court’s 
role as a decider of privacy,” but empirical findings can go further than that to help guide 
judicial rulings (Smith, Madden, & Barton, 2016, pg. 141).  
 Empirical legal researchers filed an amicus brief in Carpenter v. United States 
arguing empirical research demonstrates individuals are not aware cell phone companies 
track their location using cell site location information and people do retain an 
expectation of privacy in both cell site location information and GPS coordinates 
(O’Rouke Schrup & Green, 2017).  While it remains to be seen if the Court utilizes this 
brief in their ultimate decision, such briefs can provide valuable information to courts 
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evaluating expectations of privacy.  To be helpful to courts, researchers would have to 
constantly update studies as new technologies are developed and to include a 
representative sample of society in their studies.  As a result, the law would still lag 
behind technology because technology will move faster than the empirical studies can.  
But the law quite often moves even more slowly, and the knowledge that will be added as 
a result of these studies will help craft a more complete Fourth Amendment.  
 Kerr (2014) argues the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is normative 
rather than descriptive, thus courts do not and should not really care what society actually 
considers private.  But perhaps the reasonable expectation of privacy test should turn to 
being more descriptive.  If courts fully consider what privacy interests people actually 
hold important, this will demonstrate a respect for individual’s right to make decisions 
regarding their own information, especially where they may consciously trade access to 
their information for some benefit like attention.  At the same time, an understanding of 
actual privacy interests, as opposed to normative privacy interests, will still protect 
individual’s privacy rights even when they are vulnerable.  
 Privacy expectations are a result of a number of factors, including age, 
development, and experience with social networking sites.  As generations continue to 
grow up with constantly new and changing technology, privacy expectations will also 
evolve and change.  To adapt alongside technology, courts should turn to empirical 
studies to help guide them.  The current dissertation is a first step in providing an 
understanding of what factors shape expectations of privacy and how expectations of 
privacy may evolve alongside technology.  
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 SEARCH VIGNETTES 
Perceptions of searches.  
For each of the following searches, participants will rate on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely): 
How personal was the thing that was searched  
How much did the search interfere with property or a person 
How intrusive was the search 
How much permission was given for this search  
How much does this search violate privacy of a person’s body 
How much does this search violate privacy of a person’s space 
How much does this search violate privacy of information 
How much does this search violate privacy of communications  
Do you expect this type of thing to be kept private? 
 
Searches (case that evaluated whether the search fell within the Fourth Amendment is in 
parentheses and will not be included in the questionnaire presented to the participants). 
Searches will be presented in both a first person and third person tense 
Searches followed by an asterisk were included in previous research (Slobogin & 
Schumacher, 1993; Blumenthal, Mogle & Adya, 2009; Fradella et. al., 2010).  
1. A police officer draws blood to test the blood for alcohol (Schmerber v. 
California, 1966)* 
2. A school principal asks a student for permission to search her purse for evidence 
of smoking cigarettes in school. The student says no, but the principal searches 
her purse anyway (New Jersey v. TLO, 1985)* 
3. A school principal suspects a student of having drugs. She pats down the student’s 
outer clothing and asks the student to strip down to her bra and underwear. The 
principal asks the student to shake out the bands of her bra and underwear to see if 
there are drugs inside (Safford v. Redding, 2009)*  
4. A school has a policy of randomly drug testing any student who participates in 
extra-curricular activities, including sports, band, and clubs (Board of Education 
v. Earls, 2002)*  
5. A school has a policy of randomly drug testing and student who participates in 
sports at the school (Vernonia School District v. Acton, 1995).* 
6. Police officers see evidence of a crime sitting out in plain view, and enter a home 
to take that evidence (Illinois v. Caballes, 2005)*  
7. Police officers search the area around a person’s home (Oliver v. United States, 
1984)* 
8. Police officers place an electronic tracking device on a car. The officers track the 
car’s movement (United States v. Knotts, 1983)* 
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9. Everyone flying at an airport must go through a metal detector and their bags go 
through an X-ray machine before they can get to their gate (United States v. 
Davis, 1962)*.  
10. A police officer pulls over a driver.  While the police officer is questioning the 
driver, the officer shines his flashlight in the backseat to observe what the 
passengers are doing (Texas v. Brown, 1983)*  
11. Police officers bring a trained drug sniffing dog to a school and ask students to 
line up in the hallway. The dog walks up to and sniffs each student (United States 
v. Place, 1983).  
12. A school principal brings a trained drug sniffing dog to school and asks students 
to line up in the hallway. The dog walks up to and sniffs each student (Doe v. 
Renfrow, 1980).  
13. A police officer comes to a teenager’s house when the teenager is not there. The 
teenager’s mom lets the police officer search the teenager’s bedroom (Georgia v. 
Randolph, 2006).*  
14. A police officer takes a teenager’s cell phone.  The police officer looks through 
the teenager’s text messages, phone calls, and what websites the teenager has 
visited (Riley v. California, 2014).  
15. A teacher takes a student’s cell phone. The teacher looks through the student’s 
text messages, phone calls, and what websites the student has visited (G.C. v. 
Owensboro Public Schools; 6th Cir. 2013).  
16. A police officer stops a teenager on a public sidewalk. The police officer asks the 
teenager questions for about 10 minutes (Terry v. Ohio, 1968).*  
17. Two police officers get on a bus at a scheduled stop. The police officers ask to 
search the passenger’s bags (Florida v. Bostick, 1991).  
18. Police officers read a private diary to find evidence of breaking the law (Burdea v. 
McDowell, 1921).*  
19. Police officers go through garbage that has been put on the curb (California v. 
Greenwood, 1988).*   
20. Police officers search a teenager’s cell phone and use pictures on there as 
evidence of a crime (State of Iowa v. Canal, 2009).  
21. Police officers come to a school and pull a student out of a classroom. The 
officers fingerprint the student (State of Texas v. Lanes, 1989) 
22. Teacher accesses a student’s Social Networking Site profile (R.S. v. Minnewaska, 
2012).  
23. Teacher accesses a student’s instant messages that the student privately sent to a 
friend on a Social Networking Site (R.S. v. Minnewaska, 2012)   
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APPENDIX B: EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY AND DIGITAL 
COMMUNICATIONS VIGNETTES FOR STUDIES 2 AND 3 
For each of the follow searches, rate (1) how likely it is that government actors (police 
officers, agents, or school officials) will access the type of information and (2) how 
reasonable it is for them to do so.  
1. A cellular phone, including all text messages, phone numbers dialed, and websites 
accessed.  
2. Emails saved on a computer 
3. Emails saved on a cellular phone 
4. Private messages sent to another user on a social networking site 
5. Text messages saved by a cellular phone company  
6. A user’s post on their own profile of a social networking site 
7. Pictures a user posts on their social networking site  
8. An anonymous post a user posted on a website  
9. An audio recording of a telephone call  
10. A computer, including all documents stored on the computer and websites 
accessed on the computer.  
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APPENDIX C: BARRATT IMPULSIVENESS SCALE, VERSION 11 
Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995 
 
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to 
measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and indicate 
which answer is best for you. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer 
quickly and honestly.  
Rate: 1 (rarely/never); 2 (occasionally); 3 (often); 4 (almost always/always) 
1. I plan tasks carefully 
2. I do things without thinking 
3. I make-up my mind quickly 
4. I am happy-go-lucky. 
5. I don’t “pay attention.”  
6. I have “racing” thoughts 
7. I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8. I am self-controlled 
9. I concentrate easily 
10. I save regularly 
11. I “squirm” at plays or lectures 
12. I am a careful thinker. 
13. I plan for job security. 
14. I say things without thinking.  
15. I like to think about complex problems. 
16. I change jobs.  
17. I act “on impulse”.  
18. I get easily bored when solving thought problems.  
19. I act on the spur of the moment.  
20. I am a steady thinker.  
21. I change residences.  
22. I buy things on impulse.  
23. I can only think about one thing at a time.  
24. I change hobbies.  
25. I spend or charge more than I earn.  
26. I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.  
27. I am more interested in the present than the future.  
28. I am restless at the theater or lectures.  
29. I like puzzles.  
30. I am future oriented.  
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APPENDIX D: SENSATION SEEKING SCALE 
Zuckerman et. al., 1978 
True/false:  
1. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations even if they are a little 
frightening.  
2. I like doing things just for the thrill of it.  
3. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.  
4. I’ll try anything once 
5. I sometimes do “crazy” things just for fun.  
6. I like wile and uninhibited parties.  
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APPENDIX E: SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE USAGE AND PRIVACY SURVEY 
1. Are you a member of a social networking site (e.g., Facebook, Myspace, Twitter, 
etc.)?  Y/N 
2. What is your primary social networking site (the one you use most often):  
Facebook    Myspace    Twitter   Other:    
3. How long have you been a member of you primary social networking site?  
 (years) 
4. How much time do you spend on social networking websites in the average 
week?        (Hours/Week) 
5. Please indicate the visibility of your personal information that your profile page 
accurately contains at this time (e.g., is correctly posted). Check all that apply.   
Completely Public (CPu): Anyone can see it and the information is 
truthful.  
Mostly Public (PPu): Some people outside of my contact list can see it 
(e.g., friends of friends or networks) and the information is truthful 
Mostly Private (PPr): Only people on my contacts list can see it, but they 
all see the same truthful information.  
Completely Private (CPr): Only some people on my contacts list can see 
it and the information is truthful.  
Posted Inaccurately (NA): Fake or joke information is posted on your 
profile.  
Not posted (NP): Information is left off your profile.  
i. Profile Name 
ii. Main Profile (Default) Photo 
iii. Birthday 
iv. Phone Number   
v. Email Address 
vi. Instant Messenger Screen Name     
vii. Home Address (e.g. 5555 Lincoln Ave) 
viii. Current Residence (City/State) 
ix. Personal or class schedule 
x. Current Employment Information 
xi. Name of Current School  
xii. Sexual Orientation       
xiii. Likes/Hobbies/Interests      
xiv. Relationship Status       
xv. Community & Social Groups (e.g., church, clubs, etc.) 
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APPENDIX F: CONFEDERATE INSTANT MESSAGE SCRIPT 
1. [After 5 minutes and 45 seconds from the beginning of the ConnectEd audio] Hi! 
They told me I was supposed to instant message you.  
2. [Immediately after above] Um, not sure what to say…  
3. [Wait about 1 minute. If participant responds with a question, answer it. Then ask this 
question. The participant never responds or responds with something that is not a 
question, ask this question after about 1 minute] How old are you?  
a. If participant asks how old you are: Cool! me too! My birthday is in August.  
4. Im in some tall building – is that where u r?  
a. If the participant asks where you are: idk, just some tall building. 
5. So what do you think of all this?  
a. If participant asks what you think: I’m getting so bored. Tho its better than 
school   
6. Who’s the person running your study? My guy/girl is kind of weird.  
a. If participant asks who is running your study: My guy/girl is kind of weird – 
how about yours?  
7. OK they’re telling me to move on to the next part. Gotta go!  
 
 
